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There is a kind of power no one should have over anyone else, even if they don’t
do anything with this power, or even if they only use this power for good. The republican
tradition of political philosophy calls this kind of power domination. Here, I develop a
theory of domination, and use this theory to advance our understanding of political
legitimacy and justification.
My account of domination refines recent neo-republican attempts to identify
dominating social power with the capacity to interfere arbitrarily with the choices of
others. I argue that this capacity is not sufficient for domination. Instead, domination
requires that one agent possess “impositional” power over someone else: power enough
to make their refusal to cooperate more costly than cooperation across a wide range of
forms that cooperation might take. But not all impositional power is domination;
impositional power is domination to the extent that those wielding it do so in
“deliberative isolation”—in accord only with their own sense of what’s best.

The nature of domination, what it takes to minimize it, and its connection to
deficits in political values like freedom and equality, are the subject of Chapter 2. The
remainder of the dissertation uses the results of that chapter to construct a non-voluntarist
alternative to the standard liberal account of how to reconcile political power with
freedom and equality. Chapters 3 and 4 show how consent—actual or hypothetical—is
not necessary to legitimize political power. What is necessary is that such power enable
us to fulfil our duties against dominating others, while remaining accountable to us so
that the state does not itself become a source of domination. How duties against
domination can legitimize states is the primary subject of Chapter 3. Chapter 4 turns to
the question of what we owe our fellow citizens as we cooperate together in the task of
holding the state accountable. The answer to this question amounts to a repurposing and
reformulation of public reason liberalism.
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CHAPTER 1
AN INTRODUCTION

Whatever else happens here, I want to do three things. First, I’m going to offer a
new theory of domination. When I say “new” I don’t mean “entirely new”. In fact, it
might be better to say that I’m going to offer a refurbished theory of domination. Mine is
a theory recognizably indebted to theories that have come before, supremely from Philip
Pettit and Frank Lovett. But both Pettit’s and Lovett’s theories of domination don’t give
us what we need from a theory of domination. (Part of my theory is a theory of what we
need.) Even so, my theory obviously belongs to an evolutionary—I hope— lineage, with
Pettit’s and Lovett’s back up the ancestral line a bit.
After I offer a new theory of domination, I’m going to do two things with it. The
first thing (the second of the aforementioned three things) is apply it to the question of
political legitimacy. At its most basic, here’s what I take that question to be: Why should
we go along with states? States usually claim that we owe them our cooperation, and if
it’s not forthcoming they can force it out of us. Is a state ever right about that? For the
representatives of the classical social contract tradition—Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau—the
looming option behind one possible response to this question was anarchism: i.e. that
states are never right that we owe them what they claim.1 Chapter 3 is my response to the
looming option.

The anarchist was the looming threat to the classic social contractarians, I should say, when it wasn’t the
monarchist.
1
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The second thing (the third of the aforementioned three) is to apply my theory of
domination to another set of questions that is often discussed nowadays under the
heading of political legitimacy. This set of questions also comes from the social contract
tradition, but from that supreme generalizer and carrier “to a higher level of abstraction
the traditional conception of the social contract”: Rawls, of course. For the late Rawls in
particular—and by “late” I mean after “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980)
but especially after “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical” (1985)—this set of
questions is about the connection between the legitimate use of political power and public
justification or justification via public reasons. In chapter 4 I’ll try to show how to extract
an attractive conception of public justification from anti-domination commitments.
So there are three things I want to do, and I’ll try to do them in chapters 2-4. Here
in this introductory chapter I’ll sketch the primary motivations and leading ideas that
figure in the attempt. This will involve (§1) an introductory stroll through neo-republican
ideas about domination, which will position us to see (§2) the connections between
theorizing domination and theorizing legitimacy. This done, (§3) I’ll sketch the state of
play with regard to liberal approaches to legitimacy and public justification, where
they’ve gone awry, and then (in §4) what I intend to do about this.

§1

I said above that my first task is to offer a new or at least refurbished theory of

domination. What I have to say about domination, and the way I put my conception of
domination to work figuring out problems of political legitimacy, makes me a republican.
Or so it seems to me. I don’t have a theory of what it takes to be a republican, but here’s
why I think I am one. First, I think the first virtue of social institutions is how well they
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reduce domination.2 Too, I believe that ecumenically lauded political values like freedom
and equality are misunderstood unless we come to terms with the ways domination
undermines both. Now, I will not provide much direct argument for either of these claims
in what follows; but perhaps the best way to see domination’s connection to deficits in
freedom and equality is just to understand what domination is. The second chapter tries to
advance such understanding. If, in the aftermath, you don’t see how freedom and equality
wane as domination waxes, I’m not sure I have more compelling arguments to offer.
Happily, if you do see how freedom and equality decrease as domination increases, that
goes a long way toward making good my claim that the primary normative measure of
social arrangements is their ability to contain domination. Once we’ve worried all we
need to worry about domination, I suspect we will have worried all we need to about
freedom and equality as well.
The attempt to unite [or reunite] central political values with the absence of
domination is most of what the recent revival of republican political theory has been
about. Most importantly, the reunion has meant tying freedom or political liberty to the
absence of domination. Pettit, with Quinten Skinner,3 began to argue in the mid-90s that
traditional liberal notions of freedom cannot account for commonsense about who is and
is not free. Such traditional liberal accounts identify freedom with the mere absence of
interference: e.g. Berlin (1969, 7), who claimed that I enjoy freedom or political liberty
“to the degree” that “no human being interferes with my activity.”4 If this is right,

2

This is not necessarily a disagreement with Rawls (1971). Perhaps the justice of social institutions is
measurable in terms of how well they prevent domination.
3
Not that Pettit and Skinner speak with one voice, of course. Richard Dagger (2008) offers a helpful and
concise adjudication of their differences. For a helpful introduction to the history of republican political
thought, see Ferejohn (2013).
4
Berlin here follows luminaries like Hobbes (1994, 79) and Mill (2002, 14).
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freedom should be measured by actual non-interference.5 But some agents who enjoy lots
of non-interference are not free. Suppose I happen to be a slave with a master who is
sufficiently kind that he leaves me alone (Pettit 1997, 22-23). I may enjoy lots of noninterference, perhaps as much as many people who are not slaves; but it’s odd to say I
count as free because of all this non-interference. After all, I am a slave. To be a slave,
say republicans, is paradigmatically to be unfree. Freedom requires the absence of
masters, not just that the ones I have leave me alone. It follows, say neo-republicans, that
instead of cashing out unfreedom in terms of interference, we should identify the slave’s
lack of freedom with his dominated condition.
I believe the republican revival would have been worth it only to highlight likely
conceptual connections between freedom and domination’s absence. I hope that some of
my own arguments in what follows help us to see more about how promoting or
respecting political values like freedom requires attention to domination. I hope even
more to convince you that there are good reasons to think domination and its absence
have profound moral and political significance independent of efforts to tie domination—
analytically or otherwise—to other values. Why? Because of what attention to
domination enables us to see and say about social power.
Some kinds of social power—and by “social power” I mean, roughly, the power
of one agent over another—are innocent. If I make the best apple pie in all the land, that
will give me some power over apple pie lovers. It’s hard to see what could be wrong with
that. If a bully would beat up his classmates, except that he’s afraid of going to the
principal’s office, the principal has some kind of power over him, but that looks like a

5

For a mostly sympathetic and detailed treatment of Berlin on liberty, see Pettit (2011).
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good thing. But decent people tend to think some kinds of social power are guilty: the
power of masters over slaves; the power of despots, tyrants, gang leaders, unchecked
bullies, men within patriarchy, Caucasians in places like the American South and South
Africa under apartheid6—all have (or have had) power nobody ought to have. It’s not like
we just want enlightened and gentle slave masters, tyrants, bullies, gang leaders, and
patriarchs. We’d prefer a world without any at all. If you must have (e.g.) a slave master,
you’d rather have a gentle one, of course; but better not to have one, if “not having one”
is on the menu.
This guilty form of social power just is domination. Tyrants, slave masters, et all,
are dominators. Dominating is what they have in common. It’s what’s wrong with them,
whatever else is wrong with them. And what’s so wrong with domination? For starters,
whatever else it may have to do with deficits in other political values, to be dominated by
someone is to experience a dangerous and damaging form of vulnerability. Pettit says this
about the phenomenology, and I think he’s right:
Think of how you feel when your welfare depends on the decision of others and
you have no come-back against that decision. You are in a position where you
will sink or swim, depending on their say-so. And you have no physical or legal
recourse, no recourse even in a network of mutual friends, against them. You are
in their hands. (2003)
That’s toward the extreme of what domination feels like from the inside. To feel your
domination is to feel that you’re at the mercy of someone else. When they’re around, you
better not speak out of turn. You better remember your place.

6

Not to suggest that such days are all gone by – not by a long shot.
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But you don’t have to feel it to be dominated. To those who have lived long under
domination, their subordination may seem natural. I am unfortunately well positioned to
offer an example. Most of my upbringing took place under the influence of an especially
extreme sect of Protestant fundamentalism. The leader of this sect had a sexual
predilection for very young women. He was good at convincing parents to allow their
daughters to work under his direct supervision, where he would eventually abuse them.
Because of his carefully cultivated reputation for extreme holiness, the vast majority of
his victims could not see his abuse for what it was until deep into their adult lives. At the
time, it seemed to most of them that any fault must be theirs, not his. That his victims
could not recognize the guiltiness of his power is no indication of its innocence.
Obviously, the opposite is true. His domination’s invisibility to its victims and those who
should have protected them only makes it worse.
Whether or not victims of domination recognize it, when A avoidably puts B in a
position to “sink or swim” according to A’s whims, A harms B. I think this is plausible on
a commonsense understanding of harm, but retains its plausibility on more precise
renderings. Suppose we say A harms B just in case A causes B to be in a noncomparatively bad state, where states are non-comparatively bad when they don’t depend
for their badness on what state B was in antecedently. To become vulnerable to A’s
whims looks non-comparatively bad to me: no matter what your situation at t1, it is a badmaking feature of your situation at t2 that you are now dominated. This is not to say that
someone might not be better off overall because some A comes to dominate them.
Imagine B avoids starvation only by becoming A’s slave: they are better off overall
insofar as avoiding starvation is better than starving, but this is consistent with saying that
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they are worse off insofar as they are now dominated. The new master may leave them
better off qua not starving, but they are harmed qua now dominated.
Or suppose we opt instead for a conception of harm according to which A harms
B just in case A causes B to be in a state such that B is merely worse off in some way for
being in that state. Again, it seems to me that if A causes B to be deeply vulnerable to A’s
power when B was not antecedently vulnerable, it is very plausible to think A has harmed
B, especially when we keep in mind the point just made about how being harmed in one
way is consistent with being better off all things considered. For those who aren’t
inclined to rest easy with the natural language sense of “harm”, I hope the above is some
evidence that linking A’s causation of B’s domination with a harm to B by A is robust
against different conceptions of harm.7
So, to dominate someone looks like a way of harming them. What’s more, to be
dominated is a harm that facilitates further harms. While it’s true that more or less
enlightened dominators may use their power for good—e.g. a slave master might provide
for the education of his slaves or, perhaps, prevent aggression among his slaves—the
possibility that dominating power can bring some weal with its intrinsic woes changes
nothing about its intimate connection to further harms beyond the harm of domination
itself. This is easy to understand. Take most any example of interpersonal wrongdoing.
Whatever your pet example, it’s a good bet that the intensity of A’s domination of B will

The conceptions of harm here are adapted slightly from Judith Thomsen’s (2010). See also Hanser
(2008). There are of course difficulties in parsing the metaphysics of comparative vs. non-comparative
badness. My point is just that if you’re in inclined to think of harm in this way, there is an accessible story
about how domination counts as a harm. It’s important to see too that B might have a legitimate complaint
of domination over against A even if A did not bring it about that B is dominated by A. Suppose A inherited
slave B. Plausibly, A still dominates B; furthermore, if it is possible for A to release B from B’s dominated
condition, A is culpable for not doing so.
7
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be directly proportionate to the ease with which A can wrong B in this way. It’s no
accident that we associate the relation of masters to slaves with easy (or much easier)
killing, assault, rape, and other obvious forms of interpersonal wrong.
This puts us right on the doorstep of what I think is the signal benefit of theorizing
domination. Domination is a way of harming or wronging someone just by having a
certain power over them. Other forms in interpersonal wrong may follow, but they need
not. Attention to domination makes visible the harms and wrongs that may accompany
certain kinds of power independently of particular uses of power. To say that A
dominates B is to object to the kind of power A has independently of how A uses it. That
A has power enough that B is vulnerable to their whims morally disfigures A’s power,
even if all their whims are innocent. This is why I think that even if nobody thought
opposing domination had anything to do with promoting freedom, equality, and other
values, that theorizing domination helps us to see what’s wrong with certain power
relations as such is reason enough to do it.
My job in chapter 2 is to present a conception of domination that makes sense of
its moral seriousness, even independently of its connection to deficits in other values, and
enables a general normative critique of social power. Here’s how I hope it works. I show
that paradigmatic dominators—the power holders most of us will be inclined to agree
possess dominating power if anybody does—have power with a common structure. In
essence, what explains why a slave master dominates is the same as what explains why a
despot or a tyrant dominates. Once we’re clear(er) about what this structure is, we can
examine less paradigmatically dominating varieties of social power to see if they share
this structure. If they do, that’s reason to think they’re morally objectionable for some of
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the same reasons.8 The anti-domination approach to political legitimacy and justification
I present in chapters 3 and 4 is an application of chapter 2 mostly in the sense that I try to
show how less obviously objectionable social relationships share the structure of
paradigmatic domination.

§2

I trust it’s obvious by now why thinking about domination might be vital to

correct thinking about political legitimacy. Above, I said that tyrants, despots, slave
masters, patriarchs, politically successful white supremacists, et al., are all dominators.
Here’s what else they are: obvious instances of illicit rule. If you want to tell the right
story about political legitimacy, and thus show that at least some exercises of power are
morally permissible or morally required, this looks like a given: you need to show that
such exercises don’t share the common structure of domination’s prime exemplars.
That’s just to say, to justify the exercise of power, you must show that it doesn’t
instantiate domination, whatever else you want to say about it. In the same way, if you
want to vindicate a principle or set of principles to guide such exercises of power, you
need to show that the principle or principles won’t permit domination.
Thinking about domination leads us headfirst into thinking about political
legitimacy, and I think it also shows us as good an answer as any about why we should
worry about political legitimacy. Our paradigms of illicit rule—slave masters, despots,
tyrants, patriarchs—all are very powerful and try to leverage this power into rule over

8

Not all of course—a loving relationship between a patriarch and his relatively powerless spouse will
obviously have virtues the relationship between a master and his slave lacks, even if both instantiate
domination. A willingness to recognize a common structure of dominating social relationships has made
republican theorists unpopular in the past. Pettit argues that liberal notions of freedom as non-interference
became more influential than republican alternatives in part because the most vocal theorists refused to
admit that they might be dominating their spouses. See Pettit (1997).
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others. But states9 are also very powerful and try to leverage their power into rule. Most
of us are inclined to think that there are significant differences between paradigmatic
dominators and at least contemporary democratic states. But are these inclinations sound?
If it’s true that some states aren’t tyrannies, if it’s true that some wielders of political
power aren’t despots, what makes that true? I’ll take it for granted that nobody thinks
paradigmatic dominators should have the kind of power they have. (And, again, what
kind of power it is will be addressed in the next chapter.) But if they shouldn’t, nobody
should. If it turns out that the power possessed by a state is structurally identical to the
power of our paradigms, we should denounce it.
But this talk about states and their power shouldn’t be allowed to obscure
something very important: states have never had a monopoly on social power. Perhaps
only the state claims a monopoly on a certain kind of social power—the kind backed up
officially with guns—but you don’t have to have guns to have dominating power.
Besides, only one of our prime exemplars directly represents a state: the tyrant or despot.
Slave masters, bullies, gang leaders, patriarchal husbands, and we might add dictatorial
employers, are all non-state entities. These power-holders don’t typically have armies at
their beck (except indirectly if they enjoy the patronage of states),10 but the power they
wield has frequently been no less onerous. In many cases non-state power holders are
better positioned to inflict misery because they are more intimately involved in the
workaday lives of their subjects. States have far-flung concerns sufficient to distract them

9

I will observe the standard distinction between states and governments, where the former endure over
changes in the latter; so, there may be a change of government, as after the election of a new executive or
when one political party achieved parliamentary ascendency, but no change in what state this executive or
political party governs.
10
And this function of the state as a power source for non-state dominators must be born in mind.
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from the factory floor, the field, and the home; not so the boss, the master, the husband.
Feminist and other critics of liberalism have pointed out how the tradition has
sometimes shown a blinkered disregard for the power exercised by non-state entities.11
My focus here will be on the forms of political legitimacy and justification, but most of
what I have to say about political power generalizes easily to the evaluation of other
forms of power than that held by states. In fact, my account of political legitimacy is
embedded in a broader story about what it takes to restrict non-political forms of power.
The task of justifying political power shouldn’t be separated from the need to justify nonpolitical power relations, and it isn’t here.

§3

I’ve provided some preliminary reasons to care about domination and to think that

attention to domination might be necessary to right thinking about political legitimacy.
But there are also reasons to think that the current state of liberal theorizing about
political legitimacy makes attention to domination especially necessary.
Questions about political legitimacy are questions for the liberal tradition—and at
least in part for the neo-republican tradition too—because of the tension between two
claims.12 How can it be true that (a) a state can legitimately do what states do (even the
decent ones) and (b) the citizens of that state are no less free and equal than they would
be without it? What do states do? First, as we’ve seen, they brandish political power,
which as Rawls put it, “is always coercive power backed by the government’s use of
sanctions” (1996, 136). Further, states typically claim that they have the right to rule and
that citizens have a duty to obey. Why does this bundle of facts about what states do need

11
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Okin’s (1991) is one of the original and more important of such critiques.
I join both Gaus (2011) and Enoch (2013) in setting up the problem this way.
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to be reconciled with (b)? Because, (b) presumes that any claim of any state to rule is
addressed to persons who are legitimate claimants to freedom and equality, over against
each other and anyone who might act in the name of the state. Any claim to rule a person
so conceived is problematic.
We understand (b) in the light of an insight that emerges—however dimly—in
Enlightenment political philosophy. After centuries of refining the insight, we can say it
like this: No human being has a natural right to rule any other human being. There is no
true sorting of humans into natural kinds of “ruler” and “ruled”. The exercise of political
power is never justified “Just because that’s the way of things”. For post-Enlightenment
political philosophy, what’s “natural” is the freedom and equality of human beings. It is
the subjugation of one human by another that interrupts the natural order; therefore, the
burden of justification is exactly here. To show that rule is justified, it must be shown that
there is a morally permissible way one person could come to rule another. From the
perspective of the ruled, there must be a morally permissible way to “exit the state of
nature” and enter the political condition, with its hierarchy of rulers and ruled.
The social contract tradition offers the most sustained, explicit attempt to show
how a state could have legitimate political power even though it has no natural right to
such. We all know that social contractarians tried to reconcile (a) and (b) by appeal to
consent. If free and equal persons are ruled only because they have consented to be ruled,
if the duties incumbent on them are self-imposed, aren’t they just as free within the state
that rules them as without? In Rousseau’s slogan, each (presumptively male) person, by
“joining forces” voluntarily with a state, “may still obey himself alone, and remain as free
as before” (1988, 92).
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Of course, specifying any sense in which most residents of any state have
consented to its rule turned out to be extremely difficult. By most lights, it turned out to
be impossible. By now, almost everybody agrees that traditional social contract theory is
a non-starter—unless you want to end up with the conclusion that no state is legitimate.13
As a consequence, social contractarian accounts of legitimacy spent most of the 19th and
half of the 20th Century well beneath ascendant varieties of utilitarianism and
perfectionism.
When liberalism turned again to questions of legitimacy in social contractarian
terms, it was primarily because of what is now known as John Rawls’ “political turn”.
Consider the standard Rawlsian line on the legitimate use of political power, what Rawls
calls in Political Liberalism “the liberal principle of legitimacy”:
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles
and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.
Interpreting precisely what Rawls himself means by this is difficult. I won’t try to
join the effort here. What matters is that Rawls is mostly responsible for spawning a
contemporary movement that theorizes the legitimacy of political power by surrogating
particular forms of “acceptability” for actual acceptance.14 As Nagel puts it, the

13

That the central claims of social contract theory—particularly its Lockean variety—is true, and that an
attenuated form of anarchism is the upshot, is perhaps the central theme of A. John Simmons’ work. See
Simmons (2001, 122).
14
Maffettone’s summary remark about the relation of public justification to consent in the latter Rawls
demonstrates rather than removes the interpretive difficulties: “The justification that Rawls is thinking of is
public justification . . . and starts from the assumption that citizens share fundamental ideas about politics.
Hence, the citizens’ consent to the public culture of liberal democracy ends up being the basis of the Rawlsian
rationale. From this perspective, political obligation is based on the consent of all citizens. In Rawls’ case,
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motivation for this approach is that we need to “realise some of the values of voluntary
participation in a system of institutions that is unavoidably compulsory” (1991, 33).
Again, this is the need to reconcile the claims of typical states with the freedom and
equality of their subjects. The idea is (very, very broadly) that because the right kind of
voluntary participation would or could be motivated by the right kind of reasons—public
ones—it’s not so bad if we strong-arm you into participation even when there’s no actual
volunteering, only justification by appeal to such reasons.
What are they like, these public reasons? Across the spectrum of contested
formulations, public reasons are supposed to be in some sense accessible reasons;
accessible even in the face of reasonable pluralism.15 They must be accessible insofar as
they are reasons all citizens “have” or “can see the reason giving force of” or “can
accept”. While Rawls deploys notions like acceptability and reasonable endorsement only
as necessary conditions for legitimacy, it’s common enough for his descendants to speak
of accessible reasons as both necessary and sufficient that the Stanford Encyclopedia
entry for “Public Justification” uses the following “master principle” to categorize “the
family of liberal public reason political theories”:
A coercive law L is justified in a public P if and only if each member i of
P has sufficient reason(s) Ri to endorse L.16

this is not a question of an effective consent, but of virtual consent based on reasons that depend on the social
contract” (2010, 12).
15
Says Rawls: “[The fact of reasonable pluralism] is the fact of profound and irreconcilable differences in
citizens’ reasonable conceptions of the world, and in their views of the moral and aesthetic values to be
sought in human life” (2001, 3).
16
Vallier and D’Agostino (2013). In Vallier’s own view, this principle holds not just of laws, but of all
coercive acts: “A coercive action C is justified if and only if each and every member of the public P has (a)
conclusive reason(s) R to endorse C” (2011, 262). This strikes me as somewhat perverse. Suppose you
tackled a slave master before he could set about whipping one of his slaves. Now, I have no doubt that we
can come up with a sensible rendering of “member of the public P” such that no member would regard this
coercion-via-tackle as unjustified. The trouble is that Vallier’s analysis directs our attention away from
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According to “the family”, public justifications proceed in terms of what reasons
the public “has” and are thus accessible to them, but not only so. They must be accessible
in the face of “reasonable pluralism”. We must not look to a day when all decent and
intelligent citizens will have the same reasons in virtue of having the same basic
“comprehensive doctrine” or “conception of the good”. Rawls popularized at least, and
perhaps originated, this way of talking about the plurality of more or less systematic
religious and secular ways of thinking and acting, understanding and ordering values, we
see in contemporary democratic societies: Roman Catholicism is such a comprehensive
doctrine; so are forms of Kantianism thoroughgoing enough to include a vision of what
life is best for humans.17 There are obviously many others. I’ll generally prefer to call
them “worldviews”.
Rawlsian liberalism, with the broader tradition of what I’ll call “public reason
liberalism”, has been dogged from the beginning by the enormous difficulties born of
trying to make accessibility work while honoring persistent pluralism. If you think it’s a
fact that decent, intelligent people, reasoning freely about matters of ultimate concern,
will persistently disagree about such matters and so be generally unable to recognize the
same considerations as reasons, how can it be that all citizens have reason to accept the
ways their governments are empowered to coerce them? Why shouldn’t we think that the
same forces that produce dissensus on pretty much all matters religious, philosophical,
and moral will somehow be at peace and stillness when it comes to the political?

what’s really relevant, it seems to me, and toward what’s epiphenomenal. It may be true that you can justify
such coercion to suitably specified members of the public, but so what? That can’t be the rock bottom
explanation of what makes this bit of coercion justified. Whatever the true story is about what makes it
okay to coercively tackle you in this case, shouldn’t it have something directly to do with the harm you
thereby prevented to the unwitting slave? That question is meant to be rhetorical.
17
As far as I can tell, Rawls first uses this language at (1985, 408).
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We shouldn’t expect anything like that, and the leading lights of public reason
liberalism don’t really expect us to. And so we have an approximately 30-year old
tradition that acknowledges real world dissensus about the political, but tries to show
how, in the sense that really matters to the justification of political arrangements, it can
still be true that “all” citizens “have” reasons to accept a recognizably liberal polity.
Alright then, how can it be true that despite the fact that real citizens of actual
democracies don’t recognize the same considerations as giving them reasons to do or
think much of anything, it’s still true that they all have reasons to comply with the laws
characteristic of a recognizably liberal polity? The most popular way of answering this
question in the public reason tradition has been to think about the reasons all citizens
have by concentrating on the reasons some subset of citizens understand that they have.18
Rawls was fond of saying that political justification is addressed to “reasonable”
citizens.19 That’s just to say that political arrangements are justified when all reasonable
citizens accept them. When we discover what reasons all reasonable citizens realize they
have, we’ve got a window into what reasons the unreasonable citizens have too, though
they don’t realize it. There’s obviously something attractive about this move. If we
interpret “reasons had by all citizens” as “reasons all those of voting age in the United
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As to those outside this subset—those who think of the political relation not as between free equals but as
between friend on the one side and foes on the other, between those who are “of a particular religious or
secular community” as opposed to “those who are not”, those who see politics as “a relentless struggle to
win the world for the whole truth” (1997, 574)—political liberalism does “not engage” such.
19
As in his criterion of reciprocity, when has an appeal to the reasonable, as Rawls admits, “at both
ends”—we must “reasonably think” that the terms of cooperation we offer to other citizens are such that
they can “reasonably accept” them (1996, xliv). The second appeal to reasonableness sometimes replaces
the “acceptable to their common human reason” language in the “liberal principle of legitimacy” quoted
above. See also (1997, 578), where Rawls says that “political power is proper only when we sincerely
believe that the reasons we would offer . . . are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens
might reasonably accept those reasons.” I won’t venture a guess here as to whether these various
formulations are equivalent.
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States at present think they have”, not even the most decent state can be justified. There
are citizens, as we all know, who think they have reason to deny freedom of speech to
those they despise, along with the standard set of liberal rights and freedoms, and so
would deny that they have reason to respect this freedom. But who cares, right? At any
rate, it’s plausible to think no one should care about what reasons people like that think
they have enough to let them veto laws protecting freedom of speech, etc. The fact that
reasonable citizens accept laws protecting freedom of speech shows us that unreasonable
citizens have reason to accept laws protecting freedom of speech too. They would see
that they do if they were reasonable.
For such and related reasons, when public reason liberals don’t just focus on “the
reasonable”, it’s common to try and unearth the reasons of the unreasonable by reflecting
on the reasons of idealized, hypothetical citizens, scrubbed of the too common prejudices,
ignorance, irrationality, etc., of their actual-world counterparts. Once we know what
reasons idealized citizens see that they have, we can get a grip on what public reasons
there are, and we can set those public reasons to work demonstrating the justice of realworld polities.
Not surprisingly, there’s disagreement in the public reason tradition about what
idealized citizens look like. Do idealized citizens look like the occupants of Rawls’
Original Position? If so, doesn’t that mean that public reason is radically unitary, so that
(surprisingly) a view that started with the frank acknowledgement of worldview diversity
now ends up telling us that public reasons are just those considerations recognized as
such behind the veil of ignorance, where all such diversity has been rendered invisible?20
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Gaus emphasizes this problem at (2011, 38)
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That’s an odd result. Should we think instead that idealized citizens look like Gerald
Gaus’ “Members of the Public” (2011, 276), who are designed to resemble their realworld counterparts much more closely, and recognize the plurality of worldviews
amongst themselves? Should we expect that idealized citizens would reason via
consensus, so that what one recognizes as a reason will also be recognized by all other
idealized citizens?21 Should we allow instead that members of the public may arrive at
mutually acceptable laws from diverse pathways, converging from separate points of
view?22
It’s not a surprise that formulating exactly what kind of reasons are suitably
public is very hard to do. But even without the debate about how to sort public from nonpublic reasons, the approach to legitimacy that necessitates public reasons in the first
place is deeply troubled. The best reasons to think so were first pointed out, or at least
brought to the fore, by John Simmons in his seminal paper “Justification and
Legitimacy”.23 Political legitimacy, Simmons argues, is not the same as political
justification. The justification of political power is the demonstration that it has morally
good-making features, and this is never enough to show that the power in question is
legitimate.
[The] general quality or virtues of a state (i.e. those features of it appealed
to in its justification) are one thing; the nature of its rights over any
particular subject (i.e. that in which its legitimacy with respect to that
subject consists) are quite another thing. The legitimacy of a state with
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Quong (2011, Chapter 9).
Gaus (2011, 263-292), Vallier (2011)
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Simmons (1999).
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respect to you and the state’s other moral qualities are simply independent
variables . . . (2001, 136).
Simmons argues that even if B may reasonably be expected to endorse the “principles and
ideals” or “reasons” that undergird A’s coercion of B, it’s not easy to see how that’s even
relevant to whether A’s coercion is legitimate. The fact that compliance would be an
excellent idea, that it’s morally praiseworthy, that it’s rationally required, that B would
comply if B were reasonable—none of the above tells us whether A’s coercion of B is
morally permissible. In most other contexts, this is common sense. Imagine that B wants
to save for retirement, but B has no financial acumen at all. Imagine that A has all kinds
of acumen, and proceeds to give B a series of directives about how best to achieve
financial security in B’s twilight years. But B has an irrational dislike for A and has no
time for A’s advice. As a consequence, B shows an unheeded A the door. That B
shouldn’t refuse to follow excellent advice based on an irrational dislike and thus thwart
B’s own goals looks very much to me like a principle everyone “as free and equal may
reasonably be expected to share in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their
common human reason”, but it’s plausible to think that this has nothing much to do with
the shape of B’s duties to A or A’s rights to coerce B.24
Given the assumption of our mutual freedom and equality, I think we should be
puzzled by the idea that you could come to have an enforceable power to create duties for
me—and so have the powers typically claimed by states—just because it would be deeply
sensible for me to treat you in that way, that an idealized version of myself would so treat
you, that I’m unreasonable to refuse, etc. If what we want is an explanation for how some
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Huemer makes the same point at (2013, 44).
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A could come to have legitimate coercive power over some B, especially in the light of
the free co-equality of A and B, the standard approach of public reason liberalism seems
wrong-footed.25

§4

Even if Simmons is correct about the distinction between legitimacy and

justification, and even if public reasons—on any rendering—can’t show that political
power is legitimate, it might yet be that we need public reasons to talk about when
particular uses of state power are justified. Here, I believe, the public reason tradition is
much better positioned to help us out. There is something “luminously undeniable”,
something “fundamentally right (even beautiful)”, as David Schmidtz once said (2006,
196), about Rawls’ insistence that we should think of society as a system of cooperation
between free equals. What it takes to show that the terms of such a system do justice to
each participant are, I’ll eventually argue, public reasons. Crucially, public reasons are
not a standalone answer to the question, When may a particular person rightly be forced
to participate in that system. This is just another way of stating the lesson of Simmons’
legitimacy/justification distinction. One of the central problems with public reason
liberals is that they’ve tried to put public reasons to work on both sides of this distinction,
when public reasons aren’t suited for this kind of work. That you would submit to a
particular state if you were reasonable cannot show that it’s morally impermissible for
you to resist it; however, once we have shown on other grounds that it’s morally

Of course, it would be unreasonable to resist coercive power you’d promised not to resist, but in
explanations like that, it seems to me that what justifies the coercive power is your promise, not the
unreasonableness of breaking it, or something like that.
25

21
impermissible for you to resist a particular state, we may turn to the question of what you
would accept if you were reasonable to see how that state should be organized.
I was drawn into political philosophy in the first place by the appeal of public
reason liberalism. All of my arguments in what follows were originally born of the desire
to defend and refine that tradition. What first piqued my interest in neo-republicanism
was the affinity between republican talk about “arbitrary interference”—interference, as
Pettit says, that isn’t forced to track “the ideas” or “judgment” or “world-view” of the
interferee (1997, 55-56)—and Rawlsian insistence on the public justification of power.
My interest in accounts of legitimacy that don’t depend on idealized or hypothetical
acceptance emerged initially from my dissatisfaction with liberal accounts of legitimacy
that do,26 and then by the desire to construct an account of legitimacy that allowed public
reasons the theoretic role to which they’re best suited.
This is not to say that the arguments I develop in chapters 2 and 3 are of interest
only to those who worry about getting public reason right. I think insights drawn from the
public reason tradition are the best way to advance the “substantivist” understanding of
non-arbitrary social power I defend in chapter 2, but my arguments there don’t require
that it’s the only way. In chapter 3 I argue that all states deserve our resistance to the
extent that their power isn’t accountable to the demos, and I think the public reason
tradition offers vital guidance for what this accountability should look like; but, again,
you could agree with me about the need for accountability and disagree that it has much
to do with public reason.
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Initially because of Simmons (1979).
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Having said this, if you do care for the fortunes of the pubic reason tradition, I
think my somewhat hedgehogish anti-domination commitments show why we shouldn’t
resist a state organized as a cooperative scheme accountable to public reason and why the
terms of that cooperative scheme are precisely those we can justify by appeal only to
public reasons. Chapter 3 gives the former by applying republican insights to a less
influential stream of Rawls-inflected legitimacy theory: Natural Duty theories. Chapters 4
gives the latter by showing how the commitment not to impose our worldviews via the
state (what I call “liberal restraint”) follows from commitments to non-arbitrary power,
and how we might use public reasons to show that power is not arbitrary. All depend for
normative steam on the arguments of chapter 2: the reasons I offer for accepting states
under certain circumstances, the reasons I offer for observing liberal restraint and doing
the work of political justification via public reasons, are essentially reasons to oppose the
social phenomenon I try to sort out next.
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CHAPTER 2
THE STRUCTURE OF DOMINATION
Sometimes dictators are benevolent. Sometimes masters are kind and
gentle to their slaves. John Adams was a pretty good husband to Abigail Adams.
But it seems like there’s something very wrong with being a dictator or a master
or a husband with the power that John Adams had over Abigail Adams in late 18th
Century America. A theory of domination tries to pinpoint what’s distinctive
about dictatorship and mastery and patriarchy, and what is distinctively wrong
with such—even the benevolent, kind, gentle, and pretty good varieties.
There has been a lot of thinking about domination over the last twenty or
so years. As I mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, this is due largely to the
efforts of republican political philosophers, who have used domination and its
absence—nondomination—as the primary moving part in their conceptions of
freedom.27 Concern with domination figures prominently also in some responses
to the general focus on distributive justice after Rawls (1971): Iris Young’s
Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) being the locus classicus.28 Perhaps
because domination has appeared primarily in a supporting role for the analysis of
other concepts, conceptualizing domination itself is still a more-or-less nascent
endeavor.29
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See Laborde (2008), Laborde and Maynor (2008), Lovett (2010), Lovett (2012), Maynor (2003),
Pettit (1996), Pettit (1997), Pettit (1999), Pettit (2001), Pettit (2005), Pettit (2008), Pettit (2012),
Richardson (2002), Skinner (1998), and Skinner (2008).
28
Hampton (2008) picks up this theme as well, though she tends to speak of mastery rather than
domination.
29
Frank Lovett’s A General Theory of Domination and Justice (2010) remains the only booklength treatment of domination from an analytically oriented philosopher.
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Accounts of domination need at least two movements. First, domination is
a subset of a social phenomenon with—at least more or less—unobjectionable
varieties. Maybe this social phenomenon is power; maybe it’s the capacity to
interfere with choice; maybe something else. Whatever it is, it’s plausible to think
it’s not always bad. Sometimes it’s perfectly alright to have power over someone
else; sometimes there’s nothing wrong with the capacity to interfere with
someone’s choices. Obviously, if you want to go after your neighbor with a meataxe, it’s a good thing if someone has enough power to interfere with you. The first
task of a theory of domination is to specify exactly what this broader social
phenomenon is.
Next we need to figure out what gives domination its negative moral
valence, and thus sets it apart from that broader social phenomenon. Republicans
usually say that what makes domination morally problematic is its arbitrariness.
Frank Lovett claims that domination is instantiated in a social relationship
between A and B only if A is permitted to exercise power over B arbitrarily
(2010, 120). Philip Pettit, until recently30, claimed that domination is a capacity
for arbitrary interference. Marilyn Friedman calls it “arbitrary interference in
someone’s choices…” (2008, 265). If that’s right, and arbitrariness is the
difference maker between forms of social power that aren’t domination and those
that are, we need a story about what arbitrariness is.

Pettit (2012, 58) now prefers to say that domination is manifest in interference “uncontrolled” by
the subject of the interference, though he explicitly claims that this is merely a terminological
shift.
30
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Such are the two essential tasks of conceptualizing domination. I offer
here what I think are important course-corrections for recent attempts to complete
them. In §1 I set out two constraints on a conception of domination that can do the
work I think we need it to do. In §2 I look at the problem of “cheap domination.”
This is the problem of identifying ordinary, innocuous social interactions with
anything we call domination, and I think it afflicts the most influential accounts of
domination on offer nowadays—in particular Pettit’s and Lovett’s. The solution
to the cheap domination problem, I’ll argue, is my account of what sort of power
domination requires. I call it “impositional” power. Then, in §3, I consider the
nature of arbitrariness. Here, I tie the arbitrariness of power to its “deliberative
isolation.” I’ll try to show that thinking about arbitrariness in this way unites the
most compelling of Lovett’s and Pettit’s claims about arbitrary power. I wrap
things up in §4 with a brief word about how my arguments relate to contemporary
republican theories of political freedom.

§1

What do we want from a conception of domination and how would we

know when we’ve got it? The following arguments aim to live up to two
adequacy constraints. First, just having the concept of domination puts us in a
position to recognize certain paradigms/primary exemplars of domination. These
paradigms have already been introduced above: mastery, dictatorship, traditional
husbanding, etc. Historically, republican political theorists have thought that the
relation of masters to slaves is especially emblematic of the dominated
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condition—if anybody ever dominates anyone, masters dominate slaves.31 A
primary point of theorizing domination is to clarify what’s amiss in these
paradigms. It follows that there’s reason to think something’s wrong with a
conception according to which clear instances of slavery or despotism or feudal
overlording or traditional husbanding don’t count as domination. For example, if
we say that A dominates B only if A’s power over B leaves B worse off overall
than they would be otherwise,32 we commit ourselves to the claim that sufficiently
beneficent masters don’t dominate their slaves. But this is a mistake if slaves are
paradigmatic victims of domination. Thus the first constraint: an adequate account
won’t strand us on a conception of domination too far from the concept.33
The second constraint is grounded in the idea that domination is morally
wrong or unjust. We talk about dictators and slave masters and such as morally
bad insofar as they are dictators and slave masters.34 People often complain when
they are dominated; they regard themselves as victims. They often blame their
dominators. In Strawsonian terms, they feel reactive attitudes of indignation and
resentment toward them.35 Now people complain about all kinds of things, and we
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For a summary of Roman contributions to the republican tradition, see Sellers (1995).
Lovett dispatches this view in (2010, 44-47).
33
I’m working with the concept/conception distinction familiar from Hart (1994: 159-163) and
Rawls (1971: 5-6, 8-11).
34
We don’t talk about traditional husbands in this way quite as much. We’ll get there. Also, I
don’t mean to suggest that being a dominator is enough to make you morally bad all things
considered. For example, John Adams was probably a very decent person overall. We might say
instead that masters and tyrants are paradigms of morally bad roles which might be filled by
persons of varying moral goodness and badness. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Ethics for
pressing me for clarification here.
35
See Strawson (1962). Ian Shapiro is probably foremost among contemporary theorists of
domination in emphasizing its seriousness, but even he is willing to say that some forms of
domination are “trivial” (2012, 332). I agree that some instances of domination are far worse than
others, but talk of trivial domination makes me uneasy, if by “trivial” we mean something like
“not complaint-worthy”.
32
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don’t always think their complaints are legitimate; but lots of us do think that
subjects of dictators and masters and patriarchal husbands have appropriate
attitudes of indignation and resentment toward them. That’s why I think a useful
conception of domination needs to give us a sense of why domination is morally
serious. We want to know why victims of domination have grounds for legitimate
complaint. Too, our conception should be consistent with the claim that we have a
pro tanto obligation not to dominate others. If our account of domination says that
lots of morally unserious or clearly permissible forms of human interaction
instantiate domination, I think we should get another one.36
When I say I think we need an account of domination that doesn’t leave us
with the result that many innocent forms of human interaction are actually
domination, I don’t mean that we should trump for an essentially moralized
account of domination. For example, Eva Kittay defines domination as “the
exercise of power over another against her best interests and for purposes that
have no moral legitimacy” (1999, 33-34). Maybe it will turn out that we can’t do
any better, but if we end up with a conception like this, we obviously won’t be
able to recognize instances of domination without applying a more-or-less fully
worked out account of moral legitimacy. It seems preferable to me to work up a
conception of domination that those with different ideas (or no ideas) about moral
legitimacy can agree to, rather like a Kantian might agree that a particular action
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If you go along with me in thinking we should avoid a conception on which dominating
someone can be innocent, you’ll probably want to agree with me too that whatever it is a paid
dominator/dominatrix does to their clients, it’s only “domination,” or else calling it domination is
just one of those uses of the word in English my theory isn’t meant to cover.
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maximizes utility without agreeing that it’s morally permissible to perform the
action.
So much for what we want. Before we see how much we can get, it makes
sense to take stock of what we already have: the essential parts of earlier attempts
to characterize domination. For starters, we’ve already come across the idea that
domination is a variety of social power. The nature of power and of social power
in particular are obviously complex, but I’ll work here with an essentially
Hobbesian view of the former, and an essentially Weberian view of the latter.
Power in general, said Hobbes, is an agent’s “present means to obtain” what they
perceive as worth having (2004, 50). Such “present means” are wildly diverse:
money, physical strength, guile, beauty, charm, guns, etc. Social power is just the
“present means” to get what we want, when getting what we want requires
interaction with other agents (and usually their cooperation). How much social
power an agent has is measured, said Weber, by “the probability that [they] will
be in a position to carry out [their] will despite resistance” from the relevant
others (1978: 53). I’m happy to agree with Lovett that domination manifests
strategic relatedness between agents, where A and B are strategically related just
in case what it’s rational for A to do “depends in part” on what B does (2010, 34).
I think Lovett is certainly correct that an imbalance of power between A and B is a
necessary condition on domination (2010, 120). How much social power, how
great the imbalance of power must be for domination to occur, is a matter of
considerable import. We’ll come back to that. But for now we’re right up against
Pettit’s preferred idiolect. Pettit usually prefers talk about interference with choice
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to talk about power as such; but talk about social power leads naturally to talk
about interference with choice. Why? To exercise social power over someone
requires the means to overcome their resistance. But having the means to
overcome their resistance requires the means to raise the cost of that resistance.
But when A raises the costs of B’s resistance to A’s projects and plans, A
interferes with B’s choices by worsening B’s choice situation.
Interference with choice, on Pettit’s taxonomy, takes three broad forms: I
can interfere with your choices by removing potential objects of choice, by
replacing them, and by misrepresenting them. Suppose I blow up your bicycle. I
just removed the option of riding your bike. Suppose instead I knife your rear tire.
I just replaced the option of riding your bike with another option: riding your bike
after you replace or repair the rear tire. Both examples involve objective removal
and/or replacement of options—really, out there in the world, options have been
removed or replaced. Misrepresentation of options is cognitive rather than
objective: e.g. I lie to you and say that somebody switched your bike seat for one
made of black licorice, and you hate that stuff. In this case, if you believe me,
options have been removed or replaced only in your head; but the interference is
real enough.
One of Pettit’s central contentions, and perhaps the vital center of
contemporary republicanism, is that the capacity for a certain kind of interference
with choice, not necessarily any actual interference, is sufficient for domination.
Dominators may find you generally pleasing; they may leave you alone. If you’re
used to subjugation, you may learn your subjugator “by heart” and not require any
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active interference. Domination, in such cases, is manifest by invigilation, not
interference.37 If I invigilate your choices, I stand ready to interfere even if I
don’t.
Marilyn Friedman (2008) and Ian Shapiro (2012) have challenged this
element of republicanism. Friedman wonders how it can be appropriate to
minimize the capacity of some to interfere with others. After all, aren’t such
capacities all over the place? “Big and strong people can physically overpower
weak people. Smart people can outwit those with less intelligence” (2008, 251). If
we think, as Pettit certainly does, that the state should minimize such capacities,
won’t this mean punishing people merely for being strong and smart when others
aren’t?
A more complete answer to Friedman will take us through the end of the
next section, but this much can be said right now. Minimizing the capacity to
interfere need not involve limiting the extent to which someone is strong or smart.
What matters is what you can use your strength or smarts to do without penalty.
When Pettit and others say that you shouldn’t have the capacity to interfere, they
mean that significant costs are attached to using your powers in certain ways: in
the relevant sense, however physically strong you may be, you won’t have the
capacity to beat people up so long as you can’t go and knock someone around
without running a considerable risk of imprisonment. It will be true that you have
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the capacity in some other sense to beat people up, but you won’t have the
capacity to do so without serious sanctions.38
But both Friedman and Shapiro have a deeper worry. Even if we confront
capacities only as suggested above, why think that domination can be housed in
mere capacities at all? Instead, Friedman says we should concern ourselves only
with “actual or attempted arbitrary interference” (2008, 252).39 Likewise, Shapiro
recommends that we shift our attention from “having the capacity for arbitrary
interference in the lives of others”. Says he: “having [the] capacity does not itself
constitute domination; rather it creates the potential for domination”, which is
manifest in the illicit use of power.40
Here’s why I think we should disagree with Shapiro and Friedman: it’s a
straightforward matter to construct variants of our paradigms that don’t involve
any “actual or attempted” interference, or the use of actual power in illicit ways.
For example, imagine you’re married to a sufficiently enlightened husband in
18th Century America.41 He might grant you complete autonomy, treating you
day by day with sweet respect. None of that looks like power turned to
illegitimate purpose. But do we really want to say that this husband does not

I think clarifying Pettit’s concern for capacities in this way helps with Friedman’s concern that
limiting the “capacity to act in ways that harm” is also to limit the “open, adaptable capacity” of
caretakers to “help another person”: “the capacity to clean someone’s wound,” she points out, “is
also the capacity to infect it” (2008, 253-254). When we limit potentially dominating capacities, as
I understand Pettit, we attach costs only to infecting wounds, not to cleaning them.
39
Here, Friedman follows Kittay (1999, 33-34).
40
Shapiro offers no argument except what he takes to be everybody’s intuitions about whether a
bully known to his classmates to beat up only black children dominates the white children as well
just because he’s strong enough to (2012, 324). This is an interesting case, but my intuitions about
it are much wobblier than Shapiro seems to think they will be. I have questions like, is there adult
supervision? By racists? Is the bully penalized by third parties only if he attacks white children? If,
after such questions are answered, it turns out that the white children are at the mercy of the bully,
I’m inclined to stick by my guns and say they’re dominated too.
41
Pettit has deployed similar examples on several occasions.
38
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dominate you? You are nigh completely at his mercy if in any of a thousand ways
you cease to please him, or if he turns to drinking, or a nastier sort of religious
fundamentalism.42 We can imagine similar cases with “enlightened” or indolent
slave masters. Imagine a master who lived with his slaves on a secluded island, so
there was no question of escape and coercive force to prevent such was never
necessary. Imagine that he left his slaves alone except to prevent violence. Does
he cease to be a master? Preventing violence looks like a generally legitimate
purpose. But there is something strange about the idea that someone could cease
to be a master, and his subjects to be slaves, just because of an inner commitment
only to use his power in certain ways. (Lovett puts it starkly: “To have a master—
good, bad, or indifferent—is to be dominated.”) If you agree, you’ve got reason to
think that domination involves a certain kind of power, not just illicit use of
power. This is just to say that domination is about how social relationships are
structured, to use Lovett’s language, rather than what outcomes they have—like
whether or not one party actually uses their power illicitly. Exactly what this
structure is concerns me for the rest of the paper.
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As I understand Shapiro, he would say that the wife in this case is subject to possible
domination, but is not actually dominated. Even so, he sometimes talks like living with the
possibility of domination gives you a real complaint from the perspective of justice (2012, 324).
An editor at Ethics suggested that a distinction between dominating positions and dominating acts
might be the best approach to such cases. Then we could say that the man in this case holds a
dominating position but does not actually dominate. That’s an attractive suggestion, but I’m
moved by the argument of this paragraph to resist it. If you’re inclined to accept the distinction,
you’re welcome to think of the chatper’s remainder as an account of what it takes to occupy a
dominant position. At any rate, I think apt indignation should be aimed at those who occupy
dominant positions as well as active dominators, if the occupiers pass up the chance to abandon
their position.
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§2

Here’s what we’ve got so far: in the main, A can’t dominate B unless A

and B are in a strategic relationship, so that what it’s rational for B to do is
contingent to some degree on what A does; A can’t dominate B unless A has social
power over B, so that A can get B to go along with A’s plans even if B would
prefer not to; A’s domination of B is a function of the power A has, not what A
does with it. All this is arm-in-arm with the main lines of contemporary
republican theorizing about domination. But here I have to part ways. Both
Lovett’s and Pettit’s way of characterizing domination allows a great many
ordinary, apparently blameless social interactions to count as domination. Of
course, I’m not the first to worry about this. We’ve already noted Friedman’s
concern that Pettit’s conception of domination is too wide-scope; Shapiro too
complains about Pettit’s failure to “[attend] to the nature or the importance”
(2012, 321) of the choices dominators might interfere with.
Before we get to my own fix, we need a preliminary tour through what
Pettit and Lovett have to say about what makes domination an unacceptable form
of social power—a subject I will address more thoroughly in §3.
It’s agreed all around that whatever else domination is, it involves “social
power wielded according to the will or pleasure of the power holder” (Lovett,
2010: 112)—this is the famed “arbitrariness” of domination. Lovett and Pettit
disagree about what arbitrariness is: Lovett has dubbed the split a difference
between his “proceduralism” and Pettit’s “substantivism”. The former identifies
arbitrary power with “social power . . . that is not reliably constrained by effective
rules, procedures, or goals that are common knowledge to all persons or groups
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concerned (2010: 96, 112 and 2012: 139). Lovett highlights two elements here:
arbitrary power lacks “reliable” and “effective” constraint. If it’s widely known
that police searches and seizures require a warrant, and the issue of warrants is
subject to judicial review, and the reviewing judge just happens to be impervious
to bribes, police power is to that extent effectively limited; when all the judges
who do the reviewing are famously impervious to bribes, the limits are also
reliable. The great value of procedural non-arbitrariness, according to Lovett, is
that power so checked is predictable power. A may possess more social power
than B, but if this power is subject to procedural constraints, B is in a position to
know just how A will wield A’s power. This reduces the extent to which B must
curry A’s favor, and increases B’s ability to form plans and act on them.
And what of the substantive account? Its heart is the idea that nonarbitrary power is accountable to those under its sway. The “substance” which
Lovett opposes to “procedure” is just “the subjected groups’ or persons’ ideas
about their interests” (2012, 115).43 For substantivism, therefore, the presence or
absence of arbitrariness is measured by who has a say in when interference is
justified: power is arbitrary to the extent that those subject to it don’t have a say in
how it’s wielded—even if it’s wielded only in accord with widely recognized
procedures.44

Dividing up conceptions of arbitrariness as Lovett does—“proceduralism” vs. “substantivism”
— is perhaps infelicitous, given that Pettit’s way of guaranteeing substantive non-arbitrariness is
through broadly democratic procedures. Given that I will interact with Lovett at length in what
follows, I will stick with his labels.
44
For a selection of Pettit’s various formulations of arbitrariness, see (1997, 55-56). Bellamy
(2007, 58), Forst (2013), Friedman (2008, 265), Laborde (2008, 152-156), Maynor (2003, 37),
Richardson (2002, 47-52), and Young (1990, 37) also endorse some form of substantivism.
43
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But here’s the trouble: when we combine either the procedural or
substantive account of arbitrariness with what Lovett and Pettit say about the
nature of social power or of interference, we get what I referred to above as
“cheap domination”. To review, domination is supposed to be morally serious. If
an account of domination says that many ordinary, apparently innocent human
interactions are instances of domination, that’s a reason to reject it—at least as an
accounting of what dominated agents have legitimate cause to complain about.
Let’s start with Lovett. According to his conception of domination
(D1)

When A and B (i) are both social actors (ii) engaged in a
social relationship with each other, A dominates B to the
extent that (iii) B is dependent on this social relationship to
some degree, (iv) A has more power over B than B has over
A, and (v) their social relationship is structured so that A
can exercise arbitrary power over B. (2010, 120)45

The purpose of (i) is to rule out the possibility of domination without
agents (i.e. domination by social structures alone); (ii) we encountered above as
the claim that strategic relatedness between two agents is a necessary condition on
either dominating the other; the “dependence” mentioned in (iii) is a function of
B’s perception of exit costs from the social relationship with A; condition (iv)
obtains when A has at least some capacity to overcome B’s resistance to
cooperation with A’s B-including plans. Condition (v), should be interpreted along
proceduralist lines.

45

This is modified very slightly from Lovett, but not in any way that alters its content.
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How do we get from (D1) to false positives of the “cheap domination”
variety? Like this. Imagine you own a beautiful swimming pool, the only one for
a hundred miles. I live nearby. We’re acquainted and generally friendly, but not
so close that you allow me to use your swimming pool any old time. But I just
love swimming in beautiful swimming pools—not a pathological love, mind you,
but I really, really love a good swim in such environs. I approach and ask for
regular access. Given that you don’t especially care if from henceforth we
continue strangers, I can’t depend on your mere liking for access. Suppose you
grant it for charity’s sake.
Now, it’s clear enough that we’re both social actors in this case. We’re
also engaged in a social relationship with each other: given that you’ve granted
me access to your pool, what it makes sense for me to do going forward depends
in some measure on what you do. You might ask me to pick up your dry cleaning
on the way to the pool. This changes my practical context, so that what it’s
rational for me to do depends in part on your request that I pick up your dry
cleaning. (If I don’t, who knows how you might take that.) Am I dependent on
this social relationship? Given my love of swimming in beautiful swimming
pools, and that you own the only one for miles, I will likely perceive the exit costs
as relatively high (and Lovett requires only that my dependence be “to some
degree”). Do you have more power over me than I have over you? Why not? You
have a beautiful swimming pool that I want to swim in; I don’t have anything you
especially want. Am I exposed to your will in the sense that matters to Lovett?
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Are there common knowledge rules and procedures that constrain you in granting
or withholding my access to the pool? We can just stipulate that there aren’t.
If (D1) is an adequate conception of domination, it apparently follows that
you dominate me. But I can’t see that you do. This becomes clear once we ask
whether there’s anything about my relation to you that might ground a legitimate
complaint. You don’t owe me pool access. If you denied me access at any
moment, for whatever reason, you’re within your rights. That you can get me to
run the occasional errand looks innocuous. I can always refuse to pick up your dry
cleaning; I just can’t refuse without the risk of souring your spirits. Now, if I was
a swimming pool junkie, and you made me a kind of servant on pain of losing my
pool-privileges, that starts to look like domination.46 But that’s not what’s
happening. I just like pools, and you’ve let me use yours out of the goodness of
your heart. I’m “dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or
group wields arbitrary power over me”, but am I dominated? Not if domination
picks out a morally problematic form of social power.
Conjuring similar trouble is straightforward for something closer to
Pettit’s conception of domination, reconstructed along Lovettian lines:
(D2) When A and B (i) are both social actors (ii) engaged in a
social relationship with each other, A dominates B to the
extent that (iii) A may interfere with B’s choices by removing,
replacing, or misrepresenting options otherwise available to B,
and (iv) in a manner B does not control.

46

I’ll try to explain why that’s true below.
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As we’ve seen already, Pettit claims that we go about interfering with choices by
removing, replacing, or misrepresenting the options of other agents. But such
interference doesn’t count as domination, on Pettit’s account, unless it’s a form of
invasion. What does the invading is just other wills: “I can impose my will on you
in a choice between X, Y and Z by taking steps, uncontrolled by you, that change
the cognitive or objective profile of the options” (2012, 59).
Does (D2) let us say that the pool owner doesn’t dominate the wood-be
swimmer? I don’t see how. Clearly, the owner can remove the option of a swim at
any time. Furthermore, the owner can replace the option “visit the pool” with
“visit the pool only after picking up the dry cleaning on pain of souring the
owner’s charitable spirits”. The would-be swimmer doesn’t control the owner’s
power of removal or replacement. So, the pool owner apparently dominates on
(D2).
Pettit admits “we may not think that invasions of that type ought always to
be prohibited in a free society.” That’s true. What’s also true is that invasions of
this type have no obvious connection to the aptness of reactive attitudes like
resentment and indignation. Again, if what we want from a conception of
domination is an explanation of what victims of domination have to complain
about, it’s hard not to see Pettit’s conception as rather prodigal. His version of
domination is ubiquitous. Anytime you’re sitting in a café they may be down to a
few napkins, straws, empty chairs, electrical outlets to charge devices, etc. You
will thus have a capacity to interfere with the choices of your fellow patrons that
they do not control, insofar as you may appropriate said napkins, straws, chairs,
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and outlets before they are able to do so. But that’s just normal life. It’s not
domination.47
If you agree that the pool owner doesn’t dominate our would-be swimmer,
and you agree that masters and despots and traditional husbands dominate their
subjects, what’s the difference? (And we’ve already seen that the difference
doesn’t look like one of arbitrariness vs. non-arbitrariness. The fact that the pool
owner can deny access to the pool in accord with their whims looks
unobjectionable.) If just any kind of power—e.g. the kind the pool owner has—
isn’t suited to domination, what kind of power must A have over B in order to
dominate B?
To begin, the most obvious difference between paradigm dominators and
small-time power holders like our pool owner is what they can do if you cross
them. Go along to get along with a tyrant or a slave master or a traditional
husband, or else you’ll get a beating and maybe worse; go along to get along with
the local pool owner, or . . . well, you may lose your pool privileges. The latter is
obviously far less severe a fate. This suggests that we might banish the specter of
cheap domination just by insisting that dominators have enough power to enforce
their will with severe penalties, according to some widely applicable metric for
severity. Shapiro’s appeal to “basic interests” supplies such a metric, and a very
plausible one. “[V]ulnerability to domination is operationalized” he claims,

47

We should keep in mind that Pettit makes a distinction between dominated choices and
dominated persons, as opposed to free choices and free persons. The focus of his moral concern is
on dominated vs. free persons; as a consequence, it’s open to him to say that the pool owner in this
case dominates a range of your choices, but does not dominate you, though in a real sense you are
a victim of domination and she is the dominating party.
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“principally by reference to the notion of basic interests. People have basic
interests in the security, nutrition, health, and education needed to develop into,
and live as, a normal adult” (2012, 294). Such interests are especially vital
because, unless they are secured, it will be very difficult to “function adequately
and responsibly in the prevailing economic, technological, and institutional
system, governed as a democracy, over the course of their lives” (2001, 85-86).
Along similar lines, Cécile Laborde claims that “domination refers” to power
structures and inter-personal relationships that “significantly threaten or deny
basic capabilities” and “basic interests” (2013, 284).48 That seems generally right
to me. If A can compromise B’s basic interests or capabilities along these lines,
and in accord with A’s whims, A will almost always be able to dominate B.
Why not stop here? Why not conclude that for A to dominate B, A must
have sufficient power to compromise B’s basic interests and leave it at that? It
may be true (and I think it is) that this gives us a very high degree of extensional
adequacy. Furthermore, an account like Shapiro’s or Laborde’s rules out
domination-on-the-cheap: nobody has a basic interest in swimming in nice pools,
and your access to nice pools, in any but the most fanciful scenario, will have
nothing to do with your ability to function “adequately and responsibly” as a
democratic citizen. Also, if we want to know what institutional arrangements
most effectively minimize domination, I think that a focus on basic interests is the

At the bottom of such talk is Sen’s (1983, 1985) and Nussbaum’s (1992)48 work on “basic
functioning capabilities”. Similar use could be made of the capacities represented by Rawls’
primary goods (1971) or Pettit’s “basic liberties” (2008, 2012).
48
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best course.49 But even if a basic interests account is enough for practical politics,
there are reasons to try and be more comprehensive for theoretical purposes.
Why? Because it’s plausible to think a capacity to compromise basic interests
[even on an arbitrary basis] is sometimes neither necessary nor sufficient for
domination.
The case of our aforementioned swimming pool junkie may be one where
domination doesn’t require that a power-holder be positioned to compromise
basic interests. If the swimmer’s lust for well-apportioned pools is sufficiently
pathological, the pool owner who grants them occasional access may be able to
wield considerable power—perhaps enough to dominate them—but I doubt many
would say that anybody has a basic interest in being able to swim in a pool, no
matter how pathological their impulse to do so. There are obvious real-world
parallels. If I’m addicted to hard drugs, and you control my access to them, you
are probably in a position to dominate me; but whatever interest we have in the
use of recreational drugs is not plausibly basic. Shapiro offers another “not
necessary” case, suggesting that someone who threatens to out a closeted gay
person, or expose someone’s secret affair, might be able to dominate them
without compromising their basic interests (2012, 294).50
There may be “not sufficient” cases too. It’s probably impossible to
dominate a human being answering to Aristotle’s description of someone with the

49

Indeed, you can think of the remainder of this section as an attempt to provide further theoretical
underpinnings for such an emphasis on basic interests.
50
I’m actually not sure I follow him here. We might think an interest in sexual privacy is basic.
And to be clear, I don’t think that the existence of such “not necessary” cases is a problem with
Shapiro’s conception of domination: he claims only that domination is “operationalized . . .
principally by reference to the notion basic interests” [italics mine]. I’m just more interested than
he is about what’s going on in cases where domination isn’t operationalized like that.
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excessive vice beyond courage: “a sort of madman, or someone immune to pain,
if he feared nothing, not even an earthquake or stormwaters” (2002, 134). Even
arbitrary power sufficient to compromise their basic interests wouldn’t be enough
to dominate someone truly without fear. The insanely fearless cannot be ruled.
They can be shot or starved or whatever, but you can’t bend them to your will.
And someone who cannot be bent to the will of another, I’m inclined to say,
cannot be dominated.
Where are we? We’ve seen that power suited to domination often
corresponds to power sufficient to compromise basic interests, but not always.
Now, if we could find some feature or features that the “power sufficient to
compromise basic interests” cases have in common with the “but not always”
cases, we’d be getting somewhere. And I think there are such feature[s] to be
found.
To spot them, let’s back up a bit and recall the Weberian notion that A’s
social power over B is a function of A’s ability to secure B’s cooperation even
when B would rather do otherwise.51 How do you secure cooperation in that way?
Well, you try to make cooperation more attractive than non-cooperation by
attaching costs to the latter higher than the costs of the former. Obviously, the fact
that cooperation has lower costs than non-cooperation contributes to the case that
cooperation is practically rational.

I don’t think I need a full-blown theory of cooperation. As I’m using the term, handing over
your wallet at the highwayman’s demand, allowing your hand to remain in your lover’s when they
grasp it under the table, and passing the potatoes to a diner across the boarding house table all
count as cooperation. If you’ve got a feel for what such examples have in common, you’ve got
enough for my purposes: essentially, anytime you go along with what someone else wants you to
do, you’re cooperating.
51
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Now, small-time power holders have only a modest ability to attach costs
to non-cooperation. Think again of a choice between cooperation and noncooperation with our pool owner. Let x stand in for cooperating; ¬x for not
cooperating. Let Cx represent the costs/risks associated with xing; C¬x the
costs/risks associated with ¬xing. When the would-be swimmer’s love for the
owner’s pool is within a range consistent with sanity, C¬x > Cx only for a rather
constricted range of substitutions for x. Why? Because the pool owner’s ability to
attach costs to the swimmer’s non-cooperation is only her ability to take away the
latter’s pool privileges. Assuming the sanity of the swimmer, this will be a higher
cost than a few substitution instances for x: the swimmer is likely to think that
xings like “Pick up the owner’s dry-cleaning upon their request” are lower-cost
than ¬xing and souring the owner’s spirits. But again, assuming a relatively
normal psychology in our swimmer, it’s easy for the owner to overdraw her stores
of social power. If the owner asks the swimmer to do all the owner’s laundry as
needed, it is highly likely that Cx > C¬x, despite the swimmer’s well-documented
pool preferences.
You can see how we go on from here. When the choice is cooperating/notcooperating with one of our paradigm dominators, the set of plausible
substitutions instances for x where C¬x > Cx explodes outward: if C¬x is death or
a beating or the condemnation of society, C¬x > Cx for a very wide range of
possible xings. Even if Cx is very high—say working in the fields every day
harvesting a master’s crops instead of pursuing the vocation of your choice—
that’s still lower than the costs slave masters have usually been empowered to
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place on recalcitrance. Most any instance where some A is empowered to
compromise B’s basic interests will have a similar structure, and this is the reason
Shapiro’s and Laborde’s insistence on the centrality of basic interests has so much
going for it. If C¬x involves the compromise of basic interests, Cx will be lower,
again, across a very wide range of possible substitutions for x. Take a plausibly
basic interest like that in gainful employment. If a boss can take your job on a
whim, and jobs are scarce, cooperation with that boss might involve staying after
work every day of the week, or passing up the chance to file a complaint about the
boss’s persistent sexual harassment, etc., and staying on and passing up will often
be less costly for you than losing your job.
And what about cases where A is plausibly well-positioned to dominate B,
but they don’t have power over basic interests? What about unscrupulous drug
dealers, or Shapiro’s blackmailers? The same dynamic is at work. The threat of
losing access to (e.g.) heroin affects an addict in the same way that the threat of
losing food, shelter, employment, physical safety, et al., affects persons happily
sans addiction. What effect is this? If a dealer can cut off an addict’s access to
heroin, that dealer will be able to attach penalties to the addict’s non-cooperation
with almost anything the dealer asks that are worse, from the addict’s perspective,
than cooperation would be. Likewise, blackmailers get their power from the same
ability to make ¬xing costlier than a great many ways to x. If you’re afflicted with
a pathological attachment to lovely pools, unscrupulous pool owners may be able
to do the same: given your pathology, losing pool access might be so high-cost
from your perspective than even substitutions for x like “Do all the owner’s
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laundry all the time, as per their request” or “Provide free childcare for their
toddlers” might be comparatively low-cost. In such a case, it will be considerably
harder for the pool owner to overdraw her stores of power.52
A bit of additional terminology surfaced in the last paragraph: costs “from
the perspective” of the one subject to social power. Is this the right measure for
the costs of xing/¬xing? I think it is, and I think the case of Aristotle’s madman
shows us why. The madman can’t be dominated. Why not? Because, from their
perspective, whatever costs you attach to ¬xing, however enormous from some
third-personal frame of reference, are lower than xing. You can bend normal
people to your will, (e.g.) when you can compromise their basic interests, because
given an ordinary psychology—and thus an ordinary perspective—noncooperation can be made too costly to be borne. But if Aristotle’s madman is at
least conceivable, that pushes us some way toward the view that the appropriate
metric for Cx/C¬x is the perspective of the agent on the receiving end of power.
It looks like paradigm dominators, with other agents sufficiently
empowered to compromise basic interests, have this in common with agents
empowered because of more unusual circumstances (subjects possessed of the
desire to protect secrets, addictions, or pathological pool-love) to wield significant
social power: all can attach costs to non-cooperation higher than the costs of
cooperation for a wide range of forms cooperation might take. Small-time power-
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You might think that domination is less severe in some such cases than it is in the case of
ecumenically recognizable basic interests, given that it is at least sometimes, with rehabilitation or
therapy, possible to change your perspective on the costs (e.g.) a dealer can impose so that they
lose their power, while it’s doubtful that anyone can be rehabilitated so that they cease to care
whether they are beaten or starved. You might think this, and if you do, I think you’re right.
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holders—the operatives of “cheap domination” cases—can attach costs to noncooperation higher than the costs of cooperation for only a narrow range of
possible cooperatings.
We wanted a principled way of sorting power enough to dominate from
power not enough, and we’ve got at least the beginnings of one. The obvious
question now is “How wide a range is wide enough?” or “How narrow a range is
too narrow?” Of course, it’s doubtful that we can answer these questions
quantitatively, at least with any precision. I suspect we’re asking the wrong sort of
question to expect such. The difference between power enough and power not
enough to dominate looks to me like the difference between stamina sufficient
and stamina insufficient to run a marathon.53 But we can say this: when an agent’s
ability to raise the costs of non-cooperation is high enough so that cooperation,
over a sufficiently wide range of ways to cooperate, is comparatively lower-cost,
certain things will tend to be true about that agent, her power, and those subject to
it. To the extent that these “certain things” obtain, we will have good reason to
conclude that we’re in the presence of dominating power.
For starters, Scott Anderson has recently pointed out that at least the most
potent forms of coercive power—power backed by the threat of physical violence
being foremost—are “suited to stop a person from pursuing her aims regardless of
her motives or reasons” (2010, 28).54 Obviously, we’re concerned with
dominators, not coercers as such, but there’s something instructive here. Some

There may even be what Timothy Williamson (2000, 18) calls a “buffer zone" between power
enough and power not enough such that within this zone, A might have power enough to dominate
but could not be known to have such power.
54
So long, we might add, as we’re talking about ordinary folks, not Aristotelian madmen.
53
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kinds of social power draw the attention of the power-holder to the “motives or
reasons” of possible cooperators: when the pool owner thinks about how to wield
her power over the (non-pathological) would-be swimmer, she will have to
deliberate a bit about how much the swimmer wants to swim in her pool. Do they
want to enough that they’ll cooperate if asked to get the dry cleaning? This kind
of deliberation is prompted by the narrowness of the range of xing the pool owner
can render C¬x > Cx, as noted above. But sufficiently empowered agents don’t
have this problem. Their power decreases or even eliminates the extent to which
they must pay attention to some B’s “motives or reasons”. If A is empowered to
assault B, or cut them off from a substance they’re dependent on, or fire them
from the only job they can get, A won’t have to think much about what else B
wants or how much. When it comes to the contents and arrangement of B’s
motivational set, A will barely have to look.55 Although B’s perspective is the
relevant metric for what counts as high or low costs, sufficiently empowered A’s
won’t need to take much consideration of this perspective.
From here on out, I will refer to this kind of power as a power of
imposition or impositional power. Whatever A’s will for B, if A can compromise
B’s basic interests, or cut B off from that thing B most wants (for however terrible
reasons), or expose B’s most closely guarded secrets to the world, inter al., A may
indulge in a rational assurance that their chances of successfully imposing that
will on B are high.56 Lesser power-holders can only place their will before the

Such talk originates, as far as I know, with Bernard Williams (1981). I don’t mean to endorse
any substantive view of reasons by using language like this.
56
Suppose a pool owner lives amongst pool junkies. Is mere geographical proximity enough to
dominate them? Enough to give the junkies legitimate complaint? I don’t think so. Here’s why:
55

48
relevant B as one option among others, others which may very well be lower-cost
from B’s perspective. Such A’s may have power sufficient for effective attraction
and strong negotiation, but it stretches languages to think they can impose.
To have impositional power is obviously a feature of A, but other
indicators that such power is present occur in the affected B. According to Pettit,
nondomination requires that “people should securely enjoy resources and
protections to the point where . . . they can look others in the eye”. We can
repurpose this as a measure for when A can make C¬x > Cx for a sufficiently wide
range of possible x to enable domination: in brief, that the range of x for which A
can make C¬x > Cx is suited to domination when, even in the absence of unusual
temerity in B, it tends to be the case that B cannot “look [A] in the eye without
reason for fear or deference” (2012, 105). Many—maybe most—forms of social
power aren’t like this. Unless I have a very strange psychology, it won’t affect my
capacity to hold my head high if you can interfere with my choice situation and
set the conditions under which I have access to your pool according to what seems
best to you. On the other hand, if you’ve threatened to tell the world my dearest
secret, I should probably not walk too tall when you’re around.
I think what’s already been placed beneath the ægis of impositional
powers captures most of what’s going on with domination-suited power; but we
should introduce one more complication. A power of imposition has the following
additional feature: it is not effaced by the threat of use. Consider. It might be that

just living near you isn’t enough to put us in a social relationship. The junkies have a complaint
only if the pool owner tries to get into a situation where they can adjust the junkies’ practical
context: e.g. granting pool access knowing that this will put them under the owner’s thumb.
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our friendship means a great deal to you. You might be willing to go through
quite a lot to maintain it. Does this mean I am well positioned to dominate you?
After all, you might be willing to cooperate with me in all kinds of ways so that
we stay pals. Here’s why I may not dominate you even so. Obviously, if I start
asking you to do all kinds of things, holding over you the explicit or implicit
threat that our friendship depends on it, I’ll start to weaken the very currency of
my power.57 Power suited to domination seems different in kind. If I dominate
you, threatening to raise the costs of your non-cooperation will have no effect on
your willingness to accept those costs. In sum, impositional power is declarable:
it’s a form of power that dares speak its name.
At last let’s put all of the above together as an alternative to (D1) and
(D2). Keeping as much of Lovett as we can:
(D3)

When A and B (i) are both social actors (ii) engaged in a
social relationship with each other, A dominates B to the
extent that (iii) A has impositional power over B, and (iv) A
can exercise this power over B in an arbitrary manner.58

Some forms of impositional power ought always to be minimized. We ought to do
our best to attach steep costs to attempts to undermine someone’s mental health,

I think sometimes lovers and “friends” do dominate. Sometimes lover A will hold ending the
relationship over the head of lover B to secure B’s cooperation, even openly. When B is
psychologically constituted so that A’s behavior does not loosen A’s power over them, we often
think that something is wrong with the relationship. We resent A for the power they wield over B,
and think B has a legitimate complaint against A. This is all reason to think a [perhaps low-grade]
variety of domination is at work.
58
I think we can fold Lovett’s treatment of dependence into our measure of A’s power. If A has
power over B in the sense of (iii), that’s just to say that B’s exit costs are high: A can penalize B’s
attempts to exit A’s sphere of influence—that is, A can replace “try to exit A’s sphere of influence”
with (e.g.) “try-and-be-roughed-up”.
57
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access to nourishment, shelter, necessary medical care, etc. But I don’t see any
reason to deny that some forms of impositional power—power enough to inflict
physical harm, access to employment, free association, transportation (et al.)—
may rightly be possessed and exercised. Impositional power amounts to
domination only when it's arbitrary.59

§3

That someone has impositional power, and can wield it as they please

(according to their arbitrium in classical republican parlance), looks a lot more
like legitimate grounds for resentment and indignation than the mere fact that they
have any sort of discretionary power over you. Hopefully you agree. It remains to
figure out the nature of arbitrariness itself. What’s going on in condition (iv) of
(D3)? This figuring will take us beyond (D3).
As noted, there’s disagreement among theorists of domination about
arbitrary power. Lovett endorses proceduralism, which identifies it with “social
power . . . that is not reliably constrained by effective rules, procedures, or goals
that are common knowledge to all persons or groups concerned (2010: 96, 112;
2012: 139). Most everybody else60 endorses some variety of substantivism: that
power is arbitrary to the extent that those subject to it don’t have any say in how it
gets wielded. Lovett has recently argued that all variants of substantivism are
deficient, and that we should see procedural constraints as not just necessary but
sufficient for non-arbitrariness. A central claim of this section is that he’s wrong
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Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me for important clarifications/expansions about
(D3, iii) and the supporting arguments.
60
See note 24 above.
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about this, but there’s a way to acknowledge his central insights while preserving
commitment to a variety of substantivism.
Lovett’s argument against substantivism starts with our intuitions about
the following case:
Suppose that for various historical, economic, and cultural reasons,
one group in some society manages to acquire a preponderance of
social power, which it wields over the other groups in that society
directly and without constraint, much to its own benefit. Since the
subordinate groups are in no position to challenge directly the
preeminence of the powerful group, they instead demand only that
the various rights and privileges of the latter be written down,
codified, and impartially enforced by independent judges. In time,
let us suppose, the powerful group accedes to this demand, on the
view that since the rules will be designed to benefit them, after all,
there will be no significant cost in their doing so. (2012, 147)
Lovett makes the following claims about this case. (a) Substantive accounts of
arbitrariness can’t fund the intuition that the domination of the subordinate group
is reduced by the new arrangements in their society. Why? Because the reforms
don’t require the powerful group to give any say at all to the subordinate group.
But, (b) the subordinate group is, in fact, less dominated post the powerful
group’s accedence to their demands. Why? Because, “the introduction of
externally effective constraints on the holders of power itself constitutes a
reduction of domination, and something to be desired” (2012, 147). Finally, (c)
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the nasty elements of the subordinate group’s situation should be explained by
deficits in political values other than nondomination.
All of this is puzzling. Regarding (a), while it’s true that the reforms don’t
require giving the subordinate group a say, the reforms are themselves a response
to that group’s “demand” and so represent some conformity to their judgments,
however minimal. This looks like reason for substantivists to agree with (b): that
domination is, in fact, reduced by the reforms, and so a reason to think (a) is false.
Thus, even if we agree with Lovett that arbitrary power is reduced in his case, it’s
not clear that we need to abandon substantivism in order to do so. With this in
mind, we could adjust the case so the reforms were enacted without prompting
from the subordinated group. That’s a way things could go, and it looks more like
a problem for substantivism because it’s an apparent reduction in the arbitrariness
of power without an increase in the say-so of the subjected.
Let’s grant that Lovett is right about our intuitions. Let’s grant that a
satisfactory account of arbitrary power must support these intuitions. But whether
or not we think the subordinate group is less subject to arbitrary power post the
procedural reforms Lovett describes, it’s far from clear that (c) is true, and none
of their continuing woes are domination-complaints. Doubts about (c) are just
doubts about whether the procedural account provides sufficient conditions for
fully non-arbitrary power, even if it tells us one way to reduce power’s
arbitrariness. Maybe we can sharpen these doubts with the following bit of
counterfactual history:
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In 1853, in an effort to stave off a civil war, the slaveholders of the
American south decided to shape up. In future, no more brutality;
sufficiently uncooperative slaves would be brought before a judge,
tried in accord with widely publicized laws and, if convicted,
punished humanely—perhaps with imprisonment during their off
hours. These reforms are known all around amongst the concerned
parties, and the arrangement is externally constrained by an
effective legal system allowing the slaves to contest violations.
Onesimus is a slave under these conditions. He wants to leave his
life as a field hand and receive medical training. But Onesimus’
master needs field hands, not doctors; when asked, he turns
Onesimus down. When Onesimus subsequently refuses to do his
work in the field, his master has him arrested and charged with
insubordination. He is convicted and a judge sentences him to
spend his off-hours in a correctional facility for six months.
All parties to debates about domination I know of, including Lovett, agree that
having a master is enough to put you under arbitrary power. But it really seems
like the words “master” and “slave” in the above case are entirely consistent with
their ordinary use. Onesimus’ master is constrained in certain ways. But are such
constraints, however necessary, also sufficient to render the master’s power nonarbitrary? Lovett is committed to an affirmative answer: he is perfectly explicit
that, according to his proceduralism, so long as power is constrained by “various
provisions [that] are carefully instantiated in public laws and institutions
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rigorously adhered to by all parties” (2012, 141), that’s both necessary and
sufficient for non-arbitrariness. Now, I can’t see how Onesimus’ sad condition
fails to involve such laws, institutions, and adherence. But I also cannot see why
anyone would deny that Onesimus has a master, and is thus subject to arbitrary
power and domination. Consequently, it looks like proceduralism is at
loggerheads with the first of our adequacy conditions on an account of
domination: proceduralists apparently must look squarely at one of our paradigms
and declare: “That isn’t domination”.61
Where does this leave us? It really seems like Lovett’s subordinate group
is less exposed to arbitrary power post procedural reforms than ante. We can say
the same about Onesimus. But it also really looks like Onesimus is still exposed
to arbitrary power despite procedural reforms. What we need is a way of talking
about arbitrary power that explains all of this at once.
I think there is a way. Even if arbitrary power decreases due to the
procedural reforms Lovett favors, this does not entail that the procedural reforms
are explanatorily basic. We can still ask why such reforms reduce arbitrary power.
Given the way the case is described, it looks like, ante-reforms, individual
members of the powerful group could oppress the subordinate group according to
their whims. There was no third party to whom a member of the subordinate
group could appeal. But once “the various rights and privileges of the
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Lovett comes very near to admitting all this at (2010, 101), where he grants the possibility of
“rigorously legal systems of discrimination” that nevertheless display “genuine procedural nonarbitrariness”. Furthermore, there’s additional trouble for Lovett if you want to link domination to
political freedom. If proceduralism provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for the
absence of arbitrary power, and the absence of arbitrary power is both necessary and sufficient for
political freedom, Onesimus counts as a free man in this case. That strikes me as deeply counterintuitive.
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[empowered]” are “written down, codified, and impartially enforced by
independent judges” a standard other than the whims of individual members of
the privileged class exists. If A is a member of the powerful group and B is a
member of the subordinate group, the procedural reforms decrease the extent to
which some A could exercise their considerable power over B while consulting
only A’s sense of what was best. (Otherwise, it’s difficult to see the function of
the “independent judges”.)
From now on, I’ll refer to the extent that A can exercise power over B
while consulting only A’s sense of what is best as the extent that they can exercise
their power in deliberative isolation. How do we tell when power is wielded in
deliberative isolation? At an extreme, power is isolated in this way when an
empowered person isn’t accountable to anyone else with regard to how their
power will be used. If the empowered A thinks r is a good reason for B to φ, A
need not reflect at all about whether anybody else thinks so.
I think degrees of deliberative isolation explain why Lovett is right about
the reduction of domination in his case, but also why there’s reason to doubt that
there’s no domination at all in the case he describes and in Onesimus’. Let’s think
about the latter first. It’s very plausible to think that Onesimus is exposed to
arbitrary power, and so dominated, even in the presence of “effective rules,
procedures, or goals that are common knowledge to all persons or groups
concerned” because it is still true that his master has impositional power over him,
and his master can wield this power without accountability to any other sense of
practical reason than his own. Of course, it’s also true that Onesimus’ master is
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limited in ways he was not before: he can no longer punish Onesimus from a
position of deliberative isolation. It might have seemed best to him for Onesimus
to be sold down the river or beaten because of his intransigence; now he must
content himself with Onesimus’ six months of off-hours in a correctional facility.
In Lovett’s case and mine we can see how arbitrary power can be reduced without
accountability to the subjugated parties, but we are also positioned to say that a
considerable amount of arbitrary power remains. Both reduction and remainder
are explained in terms of deliberatively isolated power.
At last, let’s update (D3) with the conception of arbitrariness that’s
emerged so far.
(D4)

When A and B (i) are both social actors (ii) engaged in a
social relationship with each other, A dominates B to the
extent that (iii) A has impositional power over B, and (iv) to
the extent that A can wield this power from a position of
deliberative isolation.

Of course, just like impositional power comes in degrees, A might be more or less
deliberatively isolated, as when A need only consult someone who agrees with A
about almost everything before wielding A’s power over B. Also, notice that (D4,
iv) is entirely consistent with A’s actually taking B’s sense of applicable practical
reasons into account: what matters is that they do so only insofar as they think it’s
best. Slave masters and despots and traditional husbands might regularly consult
their slaves and subjects and wives, but they remain deliberatively isolated from
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them because the decision to give any weight to what they hear is entirely their
own.62
In (D4) we have a conception of domination that doesn’t depend on the
claim that A’s arbitrary power over B cannot be reduced without increasing
accountability to those under its sway, and so isn’t vulnerable to the objection
embodied by Lovett’s case. But (D4) is obviously limited. It applies only to
individual social actors: particular As who dominate particular Bs. Furthermore, it
tells us how to track the intensity of arbitrary power—by the extent of its
deliberative isolation—but it doesn’t tell us what power looks like when it’s fully
non-arbitrary. Now, that’s not necessarily a problem. After all, you don’t need to
know what it takes to be wealthy in order to know what poverty is or how to
reduce it. In the same way, admitting the possibility that B may be made less
subject to arbitrary power without making that power more accountable to B is
compatible with the clam that we can’t eliminate the extent to which B is subject
to arbitrary power without making that power accountable to B.
But can we ever minimize the extent to which some B is subject to
arbitrary power without making that power accountable to B, at least in some
way? Perhaps. Ensuring that a young child is not subject to arbitrary power may
be more a matter of ensuring that their caregivers are accountable to third party
advocates for that child’s well-being, rather than to the child herself. We might
want to say something similar about how to protect the sufficiently mentally
disabled from arbitrary power. But these are obviously exceptional cases, and

Thus I disagree with Friedman’s claim that domination requires that power be wielded “contrary
to the ideas or judgment of the one who is subjected to it” (2008, 261).
62
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even here we need to tread carefully. Our interactions with children or the
mentally challenged should seek to develop and honor what deliberative
capacities they have. What minimizing domination looks like in such exceptional
cases is more than I can do here.63 As it is, I won’t be able to say a great deal even
about the non-exceptional cases.
But what about them? (And from henceforth any reference to a potentially
dominated B will assume that the B is at least ordinarily “deliberatively able”.)
There’s good reason to think that some kind of substantivism holds here. As we
just noted, (D4) addresses only the domination of one individual by another. As a
result, it’s somewhat uninteresting as a way to evaluate real world power
relations. In the real world, dominators usually go in packs. Suppose we can
reduce (and I think we can, however marginally) the extent to which some
individual—call them A1—has arbitrary power over B by making A1 accountable
to someone who thinks pretty much just like A1 does—call them A2. Even if A2
didn’t have power over B before, they can come to have power over B by having
some degree of control over A1’s power over B. I don’t see any way around the
following: If A1 has power over B, and A1’s power over B is held accountable
to/controlled by/subject to the evaluation of A2, then A2 also has power over B.
Furthermore, I don’t see any reason to deny that if A1’s power over B is suited to
domination, A2’s control over this power make A2’s power suited to domination as
well. Think about it this way, if B had reason to keep A1 sweet, B now has reason
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For a more complete reckoning with how to protect children from domination, see Howard
(2010).
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to keep A2 sweet too.64 But then we can ask what it would take to minimize the
deliberative isolation of A1’s power over B and A2’s power over B. The isolation
of A1’s power over B is reduced by the presence of A2. But what about the
deliberative isolation of A2’s power? It looks like B’s domination is only slightly
more diffuse. Of course, what often happens in the real world is that both A1 and
A2 have independent sources of power over B, and that power is accountable only
to agents who share some emblem of power with the As: e.g. whiteness, maleness,
straightness, etc.
What does a conception of domination look like when adjusted to take in
B’s domination by multiple agents, individually or as a collective? It’s hard to see
why we shouldn’t go ahead and accept
(D5)

Suppose A1, A2 . . . An make up the members of set SA.
When SA and B (i) are all social actors, the members of SA
dominate B to the extent that (ii) the members of SA are
engaged either individually or collectively in a social
relationship65 with B, (iii) SA individually or collectively
have impositional power over B, and (iv) SA may wield this
power from a position of deliberative isolation.66

64

Do A1 and A2 now constitute a single group agent? Perhaps, but not necessarily. The case as
described could be one where each have sufficient power—A1 in his own right, and A2 via their
control over A1 power—to dominate as separate agents. See note 46 below.
65
The members of SA will rarely be socially related to B to the same extent. (ii) has been adjusted
to reflect this. For example, because Onesimus’ master oversees Onesimus’ day-to-day activities
directly, where the judge may never think of Onesimus again after passing sentence, it’s clear that
Onesimus’ master is the primary locus of his domination. (D5) is consistent with this.
66
I don’t think the members of SA must constitute a “group agent” in order to speak of domination
by SA. While I have agreed above that domination is only possible between agents, and while I
agree that group agents may be sources of [especially intense] domination, there is a difference
between domination by a group agent and domination by agents identifiable in some way as a
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Given what’s gone before, we have some idea of what it is for an individual
member of SA to be deliberatively isolated: such an individual An can wield An’s
power in accord only with An’s own best lights. We can reduce that Ans isolation
with accountability even to some An+1. But what is it for the power of SA to be
deliberatively isolated? Can it be anything but the degree to which the members
of SA need look only to other members of SA for checks on their power? If that
seems right to you—and it certainly seems like an apt description of how realworld dominators often behave67—then it looks like the only way to reduce SA’s
deliberative isolation is by introducing checks on their power from outside SA.
Suppose that check comes from some agent other than B. That might reduce the
isolation of SA’s power just like the advent of A2 reduced A1’s. But then the
question arises again, as in the case of A2: what’s to keep this outside check on
SA’s power—this SA+1—from deliberative isolation? Isn’t SA+1, as in the case of
A2 above with regard to A1’s power, yet another with dominating power over B,
and for the same reasons as A2? Furthermore, if SA is populated with all those
agents who have some degree of social relatedness to B and who possess

group. The conditions for the latter are much less demanding than the conditions for the former.
On all accounts of group agency I’m aware of, counting as a group agent requires [among other
things] joint intentions and/or beliefs among the group’s constituents. But members of SA are
constituted only by the fact that they are social actors, their social relatedness to B, their sufficient
social power, and their deliberative isolation within SA. The deliberative isolation of SA requires
only that members of SA need not look to non-members for any kind of accounting for their power.
This says nothing about what deliberation looks like within SA: i.e. whether the members of SA
share intentions/beliefs/etc. In sum, while SA might be a group agent, or might contain group
agents, it need not be one for my purposes. For a helpful summary of the conditions for group
agency see, Mendola (2006, 33-42). See also Pettit & List (2011). Much thanks to an anonymous
referee for prompting clarification here.
67
As when the power of white South Africans over black South Africans during Apartheid was
checked only by rules and procedures designed exclusively by white South Africans, or when
white southerners in the Jim Crow era of the American South made sure that, as much as possible,
the laws governing black southerners were made only by whites.
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sufficient power over B for domination, in what sense is SA+1 even outside of SA?
It’s hard to see how they could be, given this way of populating SA. But if that’s
the case, the addition of SA+1 cannot decrease, much less minimize, the extent to
which the power of SA is less deliberatively isolated, and so less arbitrary.
Therefore, at the end of the day, it looks like minimizing the deliberative
isolation, and so the arbitrary power, of SA requires giving B some kind of say-so
about how the power of SA will be used against B.
That “some kind of say-so” for B is necessary to minimize the
arbitrariness of the domination-suitable power arrayed against B is enough to stick
us with some kind of substantivism. But what kind? For the merest start, it looks
like the story will have to involve what we might call deliberative sensitivity to B,
but there are obviously many forms that might take, and sensitivity—like
isolation—comes in degrees. The variety of substantivism I favor links sensitivity
to B with B’s capacity to ensure that any power wielded over B is in accord with
terms of social cooperation as justified to B as they can be given the requirement
of justification to all B’s fellow cooperators, but the details will have to wait until
chapters 4 and 5.

§4

To conclude: I think (D4) is the right account of what domination amounts

to when we’re talking about individual dominators. I think (D5) is the right
account of what domination amounts to when we’re talking about dominating
power possessed by groups of individuals (or by individuals qua members of
groups). For both, not just any power differential can underwrite the domination
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relation. The power required for domination and the arbitrariness of dominating
power are suited to each other: the arbitrariness of power is measured by its
deliberative isolation, and power sufficient for imposition enables deliberative
isolation. If A has power in the sense of (D4, iii) or (D5, iii), A has enough power
over B that A can pay scant attention to the details of what B thinks are reasons to
cooperate or refuse. As a consequence, A will be able to proceed largely on the
assumption that B will go along with A’s deliberatively isolated notions of what B
should do.
I began with two desiderata for a conception of domination. Did we get
what I think we have reason to want? According to the first, we want a conception
of domination that doesn’t force us to say that actual, or counterfactual but
recognizable, instances of mastery, or despotism, or patriarchal husbanding (et al.)
aren’t instances of domination. Are there cases where our concept of domination
clearly applies but the conception of domination given in (D4) and (D5) cannot
say so, or must say otherwise? I think we can conclude, at the very least, that
(D4)/(D5) are well positioned to diagnose the domination in the most
paradigmatic cases. Masters, despots, traditional husbands—all have impositional
powers, and all may wield such power in more-or-less extreme deliberative
isolation. Furthermore, (D5), I believe, makes lucid the ways powerful groups
dominate the disempowered (as in Lovett’s case). In places like the American
south under Jim Crow, South Africa under Apartheid, and the many, many
patriarchal societies that have existed since time immemorial, powerful groups
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managed to limit their accountability to other group members, and to isolate
themselves from the claims a subjected class would make on its own behalf.
I think that the results of §2 and §3 combined put us in position to say that
the dominated always have a legitimate complaint against their dominators, and
thus that the second adequacy constraint is satisfied. The extent to which B is
exposed to deliberatively isolated power sufficient for imposition is the extent to
which B must live in fear of other social actors. If that’s an overstatement, it must
be a modest one. That other social actors [avoidably] seek and maintain such
power looks like cause for apt indignation and resentment if anything ever is.
Once domination is on our moral horizon as a damning feature of social
power, I think most of us will find it plausible to think of our rights and duties
over against other social actors as bound up with rights and duties against
domination. If domination is a name for what slave masters and patriarchs and
dictators all have in common, perhaps most of us will agree right away that we
should avoid social relationships structurally identical to these paradigms. After
all, paradigm cases of domination are also paradigmatic failures to respect
freedom and equality; therefore, if the freedom and equality of other human
persons generates any rights and duties at all, rights and duties against domination
must be deep in the mix.
Now, if Pettit and his fellow travelers are right, the absence of domination
is both necessary and sufficient for political freedom.68 If that’s true, whatever
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I admit that the account of domination offered here is not well positioned to assist the project of
analyzing free choice simpliciter in terms of nondomination: if (D4)/(D5) are correct, the pool
owner negatively affects my freedom of choice, but doesn’t dominate me. However, (D4)/(D5) fit
very comfortably within attempts to analyze political freedom in terms of nondomination. If, on
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duties we have to promote freedom will turn out to be duties to reduce domination
as well, insofar as nondomination is [at least] necessary for freedom. If we have
any duties to constrain our actions by respect for the freedom of others, the same
considerations apply.
Of course, that there is an analytic connection between increasing freedom
and reducing domination has come in for criticism. Ian Carter (2008) and
Matthew Kramer (2008) have argued that the elements of Pettit’s account worth
caring about can be accounted for without linking unfreedom conceptually to
domination. Carter thinks that the connection is a matter of regular correlation,
and thus subject to empirical confirmation.17 I won't sort out the debate between
Pettit and devotees of “pure negative liberty” like Carter and Kramer here.
Instead, let’s just grant Carter the claim that domination and unfreedom only
happen to pair up consistently in the real world without the benefit of conceptual
linkage. Would it follow that we have no freedom-promoting or freedomrespecting obligations to minimize domination? Why would it? If unfreedom and
domination are regularly though not conceptually linked, a concern for the former
will most always prompt concern for the latter. Psychological disorders among
veterans and post-traumatic stress disorder are conceptually distinct. They just
happen to pair up an awful lot in the real world. Despite this, anyone who wants

Laborde’s gloss of the republican approach, “I am free only if I am recognized by others as
enjoying a status that protects me resiliently against arbitrary interference and guarantees my equal
status as a citizen living in community with others” (2008, 2), understanding “arbitrary
interference” along the lines of (D4)/(D5) binds the two sides of this conjunct even closer together.
After all, it’s hard to see what effect your ability to ban me as you please from using your pool has
to do with “my equal status as a citizen living in community with others”; but it’s easy to how
your ability to impose your will on me, across a wide range of possible forms your will might
take, might affect this status, and not for the better.
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to address psychological disorders among veterans would be insane not to make a
priority out of addressing PTSD. We might say something analogous about
diseases in the developing world and malaria. In both cases, neither is necessary
or sufficient for the occurrence of the other, but that hardly matters. Even if it
doesn’t follow from semantics that worrying about disease in the developing
world requires worrying about malaria, or vice versa, this doesn’t shift things
very much when it comes to practicalities.
If anything, the conception of domination given by (D4)/(D5) looks like
an even more intimate companion of real world unfreedom, even if conceptually
distinct. Freedom, according to Carter and Kramer, is measured by the scope of an
agent’s “conjunctively exercisable opportunities”. What opportunities are those?
The scope of my conjunctively exercisable opportunities, roughly speaking, can
be gauged by my ability to say truly that I can do one thing while also doing
something else: e.g. I can quit my job while keeping my health insurance; I can
have my cake while eating yours; I can keep my money and my life. How will the
deliberatively isolated capacity of one agent to exercise impositional power over
another tend to restrict their conjunctively exercisable opportunities? Suppose A
can give B a beating just in case B ceases to please A. In this case, B will be able
to φ only in conjunction with A’s approval, on pain of a beating; thus, the choice
of φing without A’s approval is not exercisable without increasing B’s risk of a
beating. Using the language introduced above, A can reduce B’s conjunctively
exercisable opportunities severely, given A’s capacity to attach costs to B’s noncooperation higher than the cost of B’s cooperation for a wide range of possible
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forms of cooperation. The wider the range of possible forms of cooperation, the
more narrow the range of B’s conjunctively exercisable opportunities. Because
my account of domination requires that this range be significantly wider than
Pettit requires, it stands to reason that it will track unjust limitations of freedom
much more closely.
The connection of anti-domination commitments to the basic promotion
of/respect for equality is, if anything, more straightforward than the connection of
the same to freedom. We all know it's common in the western tradition of political
discourse to say we have an obligation to respect each other as equals—or, at
least, not to contradict this out loud. I don’t have anything like a fully worked out
theory of what such respect requires. But we don’t need much of a theory to see
that, whatever else follows from basic egalitarian commitments, it’s inconsistent
with such commitments to think that I treat you as an equal when seeking out or
maintaining impositional power I can use as I see fit. Even in the flimsy way
citizens of contemporary democracies refer to each other as equals, if someone
said “I am attempting to make sure he’s at my mercy all the while treating him as
my equal” we would suspect them of bad-faith grandiloquence if we couldn’t
chalk it up to joking. All told, if we have any kind of duty to respect each other as
equals, we’d better eschew domination. The premises of any argument I might
construct for this conclusion, it seems to me, could not be more plausible than the
conclusion itself. I will let the claim shine by its own light.
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CHAPTER 3
NATURAL DUTIES AGAINST DOMINATION

I’ve promised to put my account of domination to work figuring out
central problems of political legitimacy and justification. These problems, to put
things very generally, are about what it takes for political power to be morally inthe-clear. Now, if I’ve told the right story about what domination is, then I’ve told
the right story about what social power in general looks like at its worst—even
when it's not being put to the worst use. If I’ve told the right story about social
power at its worst, then we can say something about what power in general, and
political power in particular, must be like when it’s morally in-the-clear. At the
very least, it must not be like that: it must not share the distinguishing features of
the worst kinds of social power, the power of masters and despots and patriarchs.
Also, if we’ve got a fix on the central features of domination, we’ve got the
beginnings of a fix on what it takes to minimize it or at least to reduce it.
This chapter applies and expands the results of the last chapter to address
perhaps the most ancient and venerable question of political philosophy. The
world is chockablock with states. These states are very often extremely powerful.
Fair to say, states aspire to power that is paradigmatically impositional. Refusal to
cooperate with the state brings with it very significant costs, up to and including
the loss of life.69 What could possibly legitimize so powerful an entity? (And
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Even those [like me] who think that capital punishment is never justified might think that
deadly-force from state agents (police/military) might sometimes be justified.
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there’s our ancient and venerable question.) Once we’ve started to worry about
domination, and have seen the intimate connection between domination and
power like the power of states, how can our response to this question be anything
but “Nothing—nothing could legitimize an entity with so much power”?
Nonetheless, anarchism is a minority position among political philosophers, even
and especially among political philosophers who share the post-Enlightenment
conviction that all political power is unnatural in the sense that no one is born to
rule or to submit, and so all political power must be justified.
I'll not abandon the majority report here. My primary task in this chapter is
to show how duties against domination can generate a duty to accept states, at
least under certain conditions. “Accept” here has a somewhat technical meaning.
To specify what it is, I'll need to take a quick tour through the usual ways of
examining the moral claims of states and citizens on each other. What I mean by
"accept" is best seen in relation to these usual ways.
The usual ways go along three tracks. It’s standard to ask questions about
the legitimacy of states, the obligations of citizens, and whether or not at least
legitimate states have authority over citizens. A state’s legitimacy concerns
whether or not it’s entitled to do what states typically do: inter alia, make laws,
apply them, and enforce them by exercising a monopoly on certain forms of
coercion within a territory. Political obligation concerns whether, and to what
extent, the people who are born in and live out their lives in that territory (the
“citizens”) are morally obliged to cooperate with/support/not undermine the state
as it goes about doing what it typically does. Perched between questions of
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legitimacy and questions of citizen obligation are further questions of political
authority. Questions about political authority concern whether states can put
citizens under new duties by telling them what to do. Obviously, states tell us
what to do: “Pay your taxes by April 15” and “Don’t drive without a license” and
all the rest. Do imperatives like this alter the moral context of those they’re
addressed to? In other words, are citizens bound to regard their state’s commands
as duties, at least pro tanto?
It’s common nowadays to treat a state’s possible legitimacy, its authority,
and the broader story about the obligations of that state’s citizens as at least
conceptually distinct.70 It seems possible that a state might be entitled to force
citizens within a territory to refrain from theft and murder, and yet lack the ability
to create new duties. Also, it might be that citizens have some kind of obligation
to cooperate with the state, but do not have a general obligation to regard
commands from the state as duties.71
Furthermore, we shouldn't confuse the legitimacy of states and the
legitimacy of particular state actions. If some officer of the state forced you at
gunpoint to stop breaking into your neighbor’s house, I'm inclined to think of this
as a legitimate action by a state functionary, and so in some sense a legitimate
state act. But it isn't clear that the moral legitimacy of this action tells us anything
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See Copp (1999), particularly 10-17.
Generally speaking, it’s plausible to think that an agent(s) entitlement to use force doesn’t track
the obligations even of the other agents who are intimately involved. For example, even if I’m
morally entitled to push a fat man in front of a runaway trolley because that’s the only way I can
stop the trolley from mowing down a herd of schoolchildren, I doubt that the fat man in question is
thereby obliged not to resist me. Furthermore, even if a representative of the most legitimate state
imaginable commanded him to throw himself in front of the train, it’s not obvious that the fat man
would have any obligation to obey beyond whatever moral obligation he might have to prevent
disaster by extreme personal sacrifice.
71
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about the legitimacy of the state. Here’s another way of putting it: there’s nothing
political in the legitimacy of the officer's action. The officer's action may be
legitimate just as it would be legitimate for a civilian to stop someone from
breaking into their neighbor’s house. We’ll revisit this kind of case later.
If you want to talk yourself out of thinking that any actual states are
legitimate, it's effective to ponder how actual states accumulated enough power to
convince us that they are. Given that most states have their origins in theft,
violence, and even genocide, it is difficult to consider their claims to legitimate
rule without a sneer. Taking seriously most any state’s claim to legitimacy
requires a kind of historical myopia. We will have to adopt something like Pettit’s
forward-looking gloss on legitimacy as an obligation to accept a state: “The
acceptance of the regime means, I propose, that attempts to change unjust laws
should be restricted to measures that are consistent with the regime’s remaining in
place” (Pettit 2012, 137). On this conception of legitimacy, there is a logical
connection between legitimacy and at least one political obligation: i.e. “the pro
tanto conditional obligation, if you oppose the laws, to oppose them within the
system” (Pettit 2013, 138). Of course, it's difficult to see what it could mean for
"the system" to "remain in place" without maintaining its monopoly on powers of
coercion and command far beyond an ordinary civilian's.
When I spoke above of a moral duty to accept the state, I have in mind a
moral duty of Pettitian acceptance. This is obviously a weak endorsement of some
actual state. It does not require that the state has admirable origins. But though I
aim to demonstrate only that some of us owe tepid allegiance to some actual
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states, my arguments for this claim contribute to a much more enthusiastic
endorsement of possible states. The reasons some of us may have to accept some
actual states are intimately related to the reasons all of us have to think that a
certain kind of state, rather than any non-state alternative, is at least an element of
what we might call the social ideal. If confronted somehow by the choice between
a particular kind of state and any kind of anarchy, we should choose the former.
Even though vanishingly few human beings are ever confronted by such a choice,
this is an interesting result, if for no other reason than that anarchism has able and
interesting philosophical defenders nowadays.
The primary reason I think some of us may have obligations to accept
some states is that we have a duty not to enter into or maintain dominating social
relationships, and state oversight makes it possible for us to discharge this duty.
The primary reason only states of a certain kind have a claim on our support is
that states of the wrong kind, as acknowledged above, produce domination worse
than the domination a better state is necessary to overcome. But because states of
a particular kind are necessary to keep common social relationships from
becoming instances of domination, the anti-domination spirit provides strong
motivation for accepting statism as a social ideal. Anarchist social arrangements
lack mechanisms necessary for the prevention of several forms of domination, as
I'll try to show. As a consequence, even if we have every reason to resist our
particular states, and the means to do so effectively, the aim of such resistance
would not be anarchy, but the establishment of the right kind of state.
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Liberal luminaries like Kant, as well as republicans both paleo and neo,72
have thought of our moral duties to the state as a function of our duties to each
other. I'll try to advance from this precedent along three fronts. In §1 I situate my
broadly republican, anti-domination first, approach within what I think is the best
liberal account of political legitimacy: the tradition of Natural Duty Theory. There
are specifically domination-centered reasons to think that this situating will
require some adjustments to the tradition, and I'll spend a lot of §1 finding fault
with some prime liberal exemplars. This fault-finding will unearth three primary
problems: first, we need a more convincing explanation than Natural Duty
theorists have yet provided for why we cannot discharge our moral duties to each
other unilaterally, and thus without the aid or instrumentality of second or third
parties. Second, we need an answer to the question of why the aid or
instrumentality available through possible anarchist social arrangements might not
be just as good as that of states. Third, we need to know why we don’t have a duty
to accept regimes that make it possible for us to fulfill our duties to each other but
are otherwise even paradigmatically oppressive. The remainder of the paper will
be organized around these problems. In §2 I’ll use my theory of domination to

Pettit’s general approach to legitimacy is revisionary. He argues that our individual states don’t
owe us a justification for the bare fact that they have enormous power over us given that, in their
absence, some other state—an equally enormous power—would take over. The idea seems to be
that if some enormous power must hold you in thrall as a matter of cold, unavoidable, social fact,
then the reality that a particular enormous power holds you in thrall need not be justified. Thus, he
concludes, legitimacy is all about demonstrating that the particular enormous power that holds us
in thrall is subject to proper democratic controls (2012, chapter 3). I’m troubled by this approach.
In brief, the fact that Barb will inevitably treat you in a certain way, even if Abe abstains, strikes
me as completely independent of whether Abe may treat you in that way. Perhaps Abe is
somewhat less blameworthy in such cases, but morally in the clear? At any rate, I think we can say
something interesting, and something motivated by specifically anti-domination commitments,
about legitimacy conceived of more traditionally.
72
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show how a duty against domination generates duties to second or third parties
who prevent us from having certain forms of power—forms of power that we
cannot be rid of unilaterally.73 My primary engagement with the anarchist
tradition happens in §3, where I examine the possibility that second or third party
checks on domination could emerge without state instrumentality. As far as I
know, contemporary anarchism has yet to reckon with important republican
insights. If nothing else, I'll try to show why they need to do so. In §4, I address
the Natural Duty tradition’s inability to explain why we don’t have duties to
oppressors, and provide a fix from my conception of domination.

§1

Once you adopt a certain conception of human persons, worries about state

power are unavoidable. This conception is fairly ubiquitous in the liberal
tradition, even if Simmons (2002, viii) calls it specifically "Lockean". The central
commitments of this perspective are "(1) that all persons, whenever and wherever
born, begin their moral lives . . . with a substantial body of moral rights and
duties, and (2) that the rights in question centrally include, and perhaps add up to
no more than, a broad right of self-government or independence (both from other
persons and groups and from states)" (2002, vii). However we work out the
details, accepting this conception obliges us to tell some kind of story about why

It’s worth pointing out too that my approach involves much leaner commitments than Pettit's
recent republican account of political legitimacy. Pettit's arguments depend on the claim that we
cannot redistribute the material resources necessary to guarantee his republican vision of social
justice without a state. Now, I'm deeply sympathetic to his vision of social justice, and inclined to
agree that full non-domination requires what he thinks it does; but I will work here with a much
more modest account of our duties to reduce domination, one that does not require a fully worked
out account of non-domination or its institutional conditions. In fact, I will rely on not much
beyond what I expounded in the previous chapter.
73
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state attempts to govern citizens don't make a hash of our "self-government or
independence"—obliges us, that is, on pain of anarchism. Given that all of us are
born with a "broad right of self-government", and are thus by nature equal and
free, how can it possibly be okay for states to govern us?
The most famous answers to this question comes from the voluntarist
strain of social contractarianism: voluntarist because grounded in various appeals
to the will of the governed. How can we be morally required to go along with the
subjugating attempts of states, even though we’re natural self-governors? Easy.
We contractually oblige ourselves to do so via consent. Or maybe not our actual
consent, but at least our implicit consent as manifest in our continued residence in
said states. Or maybe not our implicit consent, but at least our hypothetical
consent: we would actually consent if fully informed and rational and that's as
good as real world consent.74
Nowadays all such visions and revisions of legitimacy through consent are
on the outs. There are still eminent theorists who bind legitimacy (even
analytically) to consent—Simmons being the most eminent—but this is only to
show that there are no legitimate states and/or cannot be. Voluntarism as a
premise in arguments for other conclusions than anarchism has few devotees.75
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Locke (2005) is of course the most famous representative of this voluntarist strain; see also
Simmons (1993), in particular chapters 3-4, and Simmons (1999). Its most famous critic is, of
course, Hume (1994, 164-182).
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For a helpful taxonomy of anarchisms, see Simmons’ “Philosophical Anarchism” in (2001b).
Simmons uses “philosophical anarchism” as a tag for his own view (2001b, 102-103). What does
it take to be a philosophical anarchist? At least, Simmons claims, you must believe that all existing
states are illegitimate. Philosophical anarchism differs from standard anarchism, says Simmons,
insofar as philosophical anarchists don’t think the fact of state illegitimacy has much practical
upshot: i.e. state illegitimacy doesn’t entail anything about an obligation to try and interfere with
the operations of said states. Michael Huemer’s anarchism, which I’ll consider briefly below, is
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Besides, voluntarism—at least understood as the general claim that
consent is a necessary condition on legitimate power/authority or an obligation to
submit—is vulnerable to counterexamples. Jonathan Quong offers a case where A
and B both witness a traffic accident. A is a doctor and B has no medical training.
Several victims of the accident are badly hurt. Now, suppose A says “Apply
pressure to the wound here!” It's very plausible to think B has some kind of duty
to cooperate. Furthermore, it’s even plausible that B should not resist certain
forms of coercion from A. If B was dazed from shock, and so hesitated to follow
A’s directions, A might justifiably grab B’s hand and force B to place it on a
wound just so.76 This looks a lot like a case where legitimate coercion/authority
comes apart from consent. At least sometimes, A can come to have authority over
B, in the sense that if A commands B to “φ!” A should φ, even though B has not
consented to A's authority. Also, A’s use of limited force looks permissible
whatever A's antecedent relation to B, contractual or otherwise.77
Of course, there is some sense in which B ought to consent to A's
coercion/authority, but why? It seems like the answer to this question, and not the
consent itself, is the source of A's authority/legitimacy. Quong claims that the
answer is B's duties to the accident victims, and the instrumental connection
between Dr. A's commands/coercion and the fulfillment of these duties: "One way

much more closely allied to practicalities. Huemer is much more inclined to think that we should
work toward anarchism as social ideal.
76
See (2011, 127).
77
Here’s a reasonable precissification of Quong’s NDT. For action , agents A and B, and context
c: If B has a duty to , and B is more likely to  in c if B submits to A’s commands/coercion, then
A has a moral right in c that B treat A’s commands as enforceable pro tanto obligations, and thus A
has authority in c over B.
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to establish that a person has legitimate authority over another person involves
showing that the alleged subject is likely better to fulfil the duties of justice he is
under if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively
binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to directly fulfil the duties
he is under himself" (2011, 127).78 But if Dr. A can come to have authority and
license to coerce in this way, why not other entities? Why not states?
Quong's arguments motivate one variant of the Natural Duty Tradition of
theorizing political legitimacy, authority, and obligation.79 Natural Duty Theories
connect our duties to a state with that state’s instrumental role toward the
fulfilment of other moral, “natural” duties. When is a duty “natural”? The best
way to understand the “naturalness” of a duty is probably through a quick via
negativa: duties are natural when they don’t come from promises you made or
contracts you signed or jobs you accepted, or through any other transactions or
role-assumptions. Suppose we have a duty to aid the victims of car crashes, at
least when they are immediately to hand. If we have such a duty, what explains
that isn’t some promise we made to aid accident victims so situated, or that we

This is an obvious descendent of Raz’s “Normal Justification Thesis”, according to which “the
normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves showing that the
alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged
authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively
binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him
directly” (1986, 53). Whatever its merits as an account of practical authority, I tend to think that
the Normal Justification Thesis is hopeless as a theory of legitimate power. The financial adviser
case on page 27 above is good reason to think as much. Quong’s shift of language to “duties of
justice” is in part a response to just these sorts of cases.
79
What I’m calling NDT sometimes goes by other names. Quong calls it “instrumentalism”
because his focus is authority—although he clearly means to justify coercion as well. When the
focus is on political authority rather than legitimacy/obligation, the “instrumentalism” handle is
more common; when the focus is legitimacy/obligation, NDT is more the standard moniker, as far
as I can tell.
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joined a club the purpose of which is to aid such, etc. Wherever that duty comes
from, its origins are deeper; certainly pre-institutional.80
We can extract from Quong’s case a sense of how to structure a plausible
Natural Duty theory. (a) It has got to give an account of what natural duty (or
duties) is (are) in play. In Quong’s case, it’s a natural duty to aid those in terrible
need when we are uniquely well positioned to do so, or something like that. Could
the same duty fund any duties to the state? What other duties might? (b) The
theory must give an account of the potential authority’s or legitimate coercer’s
instrumental link to the fulfillment of the duty/duties. In Quong’s case the
authority/legitimacy comes from the fact that Dr. A is the only one on the scene
who knows what to do, so her legitimacy/authority comes from some amalgam of
proximity and expertise. Does the state play an analogous role for any duty we
have? (c) Finally, the theory must tell us what particular duties are generated by
an authority’s/coercer’s instrumental link to our natural duties. Obviously, Dr. A’s
instrumental role toward the discharge of B’s duties can lend authority only to
certain commands. B would seem to have only the Dr. A-regarding duties suited
to Dr. A’s instrumental role. If Dr. A suddenly commanded, “Take off your pants
and do a dance” B would have no duty at all to heed or comply. If A suddenly
tried to force B to do jumping-jacks, B would no longer have any duty not to
resist. So, if we can locate some natural duty of ours, and a role for the state to
play in the fulfilment of that duty, we still have to specify how that translates into
state-ward duties.

80

See Rawls (1971, 114-115).
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Christopher Wellman’s version of NDT is perhaps the closest analog to
Quong’s case. Wellman thinks we can extract a duty to obey the law, along with
the legitimacy of state coercion, from natural “Samaritan” rights and duties.
Samaritan rights permit Samaritans—those trying to rescue others from
significant peril—to coerce others insofar as this coercion is necessary to the
rescue: e.g. Dr. A’s permission to force B to put pressure on the wound.81
Samaritan duties require us to accept “moral duties”, even when they are
“unilaterally foisted upon us” by Samaritans, provided we are “in extreme
circumstances, when others are sufficiently imperiled and we can help them at no
unreasonable cost to ourselves” (2005, 31): e.g. B’s duty to comply with Dr. A’s
command, “Apply pressure to the wound here!”
Supposing all this is true, how do we get legitimate state coercion and a
duty to comply with the state from the existence of Samaritan rights and duties?
Wellman thinks that at least decent and broadly democratic states “rescue” us
from the horrors of lawless existence in a state of nature. This is a “vital benefit”
and “cannot be secured by any other, non-coercive means” (2005, 23). Thus,
states have a Samaritan right to force us to abide by the law given that this rescues
those within a particular territory from the state of nature, provided that such force
doesn’t go beyond “reasonable” limits. The citizens of that territory have a
Samaritan duty to support the state’s rescue efforts via obedience and compliance,
again, within reasonable limits.

81

See Wellman (2005, 21-34).
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There are a number of questionable elements here. Obviously, there is the
question of whether rescuing the occupants of a particular territory from the state
of nature counts as a properly Samaritan endeavor. If the state of nature isn’t as
bad as Wellman envisions, that undermines his case for the permissibility of
coercive Samaritan intervention by states. Even if life without states is
undesirable in some respects, would it be undesirable in the ways that justify
coercive remedies? Think about how bad things would have to get at your nextdoor neighbors’ to justify you in forcing other neighbors to join you in a coercive
intervention. Things would have to get pretty bad, by my reckoning; otherwise,
it’s plausible that you shouldn’t charge next door and get involved yourself, much
less force other neighbors to assist you. Is life without a state bad enough to
legitimize a massive Samaritan rescue?
I don’t know who would deny that medical emergencies can generate
Samaritan rights and duties. However, there’s a long and respectable anarchist
tradition that denies the need for the kind of rescue Wellman has in mind. Among
many possible exemplars of this tradition, take Michael Huemer’s recent portrayal
of anarchist social arrangements in The Problem of Political Authority. He argues
at length that subscriber-funded protection and arbitration agencies are an
effective and morally superior alternative to the protection and arbitration services
now [purportedly] provided by states. As will become clear, I find many aspects
of Huemer’s account deeply problematic, and intend to make trouble for him later
in this chapter if I can, but he—and other anarchist fellow travelers—has
succeeded I think in showing that anarchic social arrangements need not be a
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horror analogous to bleeding out unaided on the side of the road, or roasting alive
in a burning building, while those who might have rescued you stand idly by.
Remember, things have to be awfully, obviously bad at the neighbor’s house to
justify coercive intervention. Even a fairly high degree of dysfunction won’t
justify it. Wellman may have shown that the state of nature would likely involve a
fairly high degree of dysfunction, but I’m not convinced he’s shown, contra
Huemer and other anarchists, that it must be awfully, obviously bad and so
worthy of the kind of intervention states represent. Returning to Quong’s case,
instead of Dr. A forcibly directing B to stop someone from bleeding out,
Wellman’s Samaritan state might be more like some A forcing B to get out of
their car and help A put out the roadside engine fire of a random stranger. No
doubt it’s bad for the random stranger to have an engine fire. Perhaps there’s even
some sense in which B should offer to help, if it’s not too much trouble. But it’s
implausible to think A has any Samaritan right to use force in this case, or that B
has any Samaritan duties to comply.
The other contemporary mainstream of NDT doesn’t connect duties to the
state with duties of mutual aid or rescue, but instead to “natural duties of
justice”—as Rawls’ put it in A Theory of Justice. Here, he claims we have a
natural duty to “comply with and do our share in [reasonably] just institutions
when they exist and apply to us” and “to assist in the establishment of just
arrangements when they do not exist” (1971, 114-115).
Much contemporary discussion of NDT has been a response to these
claims, though Rawls’ own post-Theory discussions of legitimacy were
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constructed from another vocabulary entirely—as I’ve noted and will discuss
further in the next chapter. Probably the most influential response is Simmons’ in
Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Here, and in subsequent work,
Simmons pressed two82 worries against Rawlsian NDTs. First, there’s the worry
about what Simmons called particularity83 (what Jeremy Waldron later called
‘special allegiance”).84 Here’s the marrow: how can a general duty to act justly
and promote justice generate duties of support and compliance with a particular
state? This state instead of that one? Simmons summarizes:
Just Swedish political institutions merit support as much as, and
for the same reason as do, just political institutions in the United
Kingdom. But because this is true, it is difficult to see how a
natural duty could ever bind citizens especially to their own
particular laws of domestic institutions. (2005, 166)
Second, there’s a worry about what conditions specify when “just institutions . . .
apply to us”. Waldron calls this the application problem.85 The two objections are
intimately related. Maybe the best way to put it is to say that the application
problem comes from one way of addressing the particularity problem. One reason
we might have special obligations to the [approximately just] political institutions

Ostensibly two, I should say: they’re treated as two in the literature. They seem to me deeply
similar.
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See Simmons (1979, 31-35; 155-156).
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Dworkin (1986, XXX) presents a version of the particularity objection too.
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Waldron has a nice summary of the difficulty with Rawls’ version of Natural Duty theory: “The
Rawlsian theory offers no account, or a plainly inadequate account, of the existence of political
and legal institutions. The problem is that if we try to articulate a satisfactory account of
“application,” we tend to end up abandoning what is distinctive about the natural duty account.
The temptation is to say that an institution “applies” to me only if I have voluntarily brought
myself under its auspices, or to impose some other similar condition (such as the receipt of
benefits) or any inference from the justice of the institution to a duty of obedience” (1993, 7).
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we’re born to, as opposed to “Swedish” institutions, is because the former, unlike
the latter “apply” to us. We need to figure out a story about why particular
political institutions apply to us, and not others; then we’ll have an answer to the
particularity problem too. At any rate, I will focus on the application problem, and
consider the particularity problem solved if we’ve got a workable solution to the
application problem.
Waldron’s own version of NDT, and his approach to the application
problem, is distinctively Kantian. Where Wellman talks about the lawlessness of
the state of nature like it’s a threat from parties undisclosed or undiscovered, for
Kant I am always in a position to know at least one threatening party in the state
of nature: me. However dead-set I might be against behaving with hostility toward
those around me, however determined I might be to avoid actively wronging
them, it’s still true, Kant claims, that I am a “permanent threat” to them, and
wrong them just “by coexist[ing]” in a lawless condition (1970, 98). With a
stereotypical lack of concern for the empirical—“It is not from experience that we
learn of the maxim of violence in human beings”—Kant claims:
[H]owever well-disposed and law-abiding human beings might be,
it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition [i.e. in
the state of nature] that before a public lawful condition is
established individual human beings . . . can never be secure
against violence from one another, since each has his own right to
do what seems right and good to it and not to be dependent upon
another’s opinion about this. (1996, 455-456)
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Thus, “the postulate of public right”…
[W]hen you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you
ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a
rightful condition (1996, 451-452)
It should be clear enough that Kant offers here a version of NDT. We
have, he thinks, a natural duty not to live amongst each other as mutual threats.
How can we discharge this duty? Only, says Kant, by refusing to remain in or
return to the state of nature, and submitting to the coercive presence of a state.86
The trouble with Rawls’ version of NDT, says Waldron, and the
advantage of Kant’s, is that the latter shows us how some individuals can become
“insiders” within the purview of “range-limited” principles of justice: “An
individual is within the range of a principle if it is part of the point and
justification of the principle to deal with his conduct, claims, and interests along
with those of any other persons it deals with” (1993, 13). For example, the
citizens of the United Kingdom have duties to each other that they don’t have to
the citizens of Sweden insofar as the citizens of the United Kingdom—living
amongst each other as they do—are much better candidates for “living side by
side” status than are the relatively far-off citizens of Sweden. So legally enforced
principles can be both just and range-limited insofar as they are meant to prevent
a particular people who [at least nearly] rub shoulders with each other from
lawlessness and thus from living each as a threat to each. The application
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Of course, Kant is notoriously bad when it comes to showing how this coercive presence can be
prevented from becoming a threat as bad as any in the state of nature See most not (1996, 296304), but I’m not interested here in how he works out his theory.
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objection is answered by showing which political institution(s) actually plays the
role of enforcing such principles: the government that keeps A from being a threat
to B, and vice versa, “applies” to A and B. Now we can see too how a solution to
particularity worries might follow from a solution to application worries:
supposedly, the government of the United Kingdom plays the role for its citizens,
while the government of Sweden plays this role for its citizens.
Waldron gives us more about just what this role entails. Suppose a
principle like “Don’t assault someone unless it’s necessary for self-defense or to
defend innocents”.87 Obviously, in some sense this is not a range-limited
principle. It’s plausible that everyone everywhere should follow it. Even so, some
A might become an “insider” within the purview of this principle insofar as “an
institution L” regulates A’s behavior toward some nearby B, who is also thereby
an insider, but not A’s possible behavior toward some distant C, who is far enough
removed from A’s powers that A is no threat to C. In order for L to regulate A’s
behavior in the light of our “Don’t assault” principle—I’ll follow Waldron and
call that principle “P1”—L will have to make certain demands on both insiders
and outsiders to P1. First, L must “supervise and enforce” A’s conformity to P1
itself: that is, demand that A abstain from assault except under the specified
conditions. Second, L would have to supervise and enforce A’s conformity to a
further principle, P2: “Accept the supervision of L with regard to the
implementation of P1” (1993).88 Finally, L will have to make demands on both

I would have called this a rule, but Waldron calls them principles and I’ll stick with his
language.
88
“Acceptance” might be misleading. No state can force anybody to have the cluster of mental
states suggested by the word. Waldron must mean the outward trappings of acceptance.
87
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insiders and outsiders to P1 and P2 in the form of P3: “Do not undermine the
administration of P1 by L.” (1993, 17). So P3, unlike P1 and P2, is a general duty
owed to all institutions that promote justice.
Now, I think we can make something of the basic machinery of the
Kant/Waldron approach to NDT. I agree that many of us, in the course of a
normal social life, have or come to have certain duties we cannot discharge
without the right sort of state, and I agree that this duty has to do with avoiding a
certain kind of threat agents can pose to each other. Having said as much, three
problems stand in the way of making this machinery functional.
First, the whole Kant/Waldron approach turns on the idea that individuals
outside the purview of states pose some kind of essential threat to each other.
Simmons calls this the “wrongful threat premise”:
Those who refuse to sign up, denying the authority of the salient
justice-enforcing institutions, wrong those around them by being
threats to them. (2005, 178)
But, says Simmons, this crucial premise is false.
Being a threat to others in a way that wrongs [those around us] is
an objective notion. We do not wrong others simply by virtue of
their subjective feeling of being threatened by us (which is,
perhaps, the source of the mistake). I can, conceptually, feel
threatened by anything (say, the robin on my lawn), provided only
that it appears dangerous to me. But the dangerous-looking man
who passes me in the dark alley surely does me no moral wrong
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simply because he is the object of my fear. He must actually be
likely (in a special way) to harm me before he could possibly be
accused of wronging me. (2005, 175)
But on any familiar “objective notion” of what it is to be a wrongful-threat to
someone, it’s hard to see why we need states. If I abstain from objectively
threatening behavior, why should I think I have further obligations of acceptance
or support to some local state?
Second, even if we grant that individuals in the state of nature as
envisioned by Kant and Waldron do pose some real threat to each other, we need
to show that there’s no way to ameliorate such threats without resorting to states.
If there are possible anarchic social arrangements that deal with the threats as well
as states do, the argument from a natural duty not to pose a threat to those who
live around you to a preference for political institutions over the state of nature
won’t go through.
Third, the fact that A prevents some B from defaulting on one of B's duties
clearly does not always underwrite further duties of B to A. Imagine that Jay, Kay,
and Ray live in a part of town where the cops don’t venture very often. Jay is 50
bucks in the debt of Kay. Jay has the money, and Kay needs the money in order to
pay her own debts. Sadly, Jay won’t pay. Kay doesn’t want to get the police
involved, but Kay has an especially muscular friend, Ray. When Ray hears about
the situation, he shows up at Jay’s door, “Pay Kay what you owe, or else” he says,
arms crossed, drumming fingers across his biceps. [Jay is not especially
muscular.] Now, it may be, in Quong's language, that Jay is likely better to fulfill
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the duties of justice he is under if he accepts Ray’s directives as authoritatively
binding and tries to follow them, rather than trying to directly fulfill the duties he
is under unassisted. [Perhaps, as a matter of habit, he cannot be motivated to pay
his debts.] It may be that, given the facts on the ground, Ray is the best guarantor
of range-limited principles taking in both Jay and Kay. But Ray is at best overzealous in a good cause. Vigilantes and bullies don’t deserve our support.
The trouble identified here is akin to the particularity problem encountered
above, only instead of exploding outward to render any decent state legitimate
with regard to any particular agent, we have a possible proliferation of legitimacy
within the familiar structure of individual states. So long as the actions of any
fellow citizen make it more likely that I will deliver on some natural duty of mine,
I must treat that citizen as an authority, and her coercive activities as justified. I
think that’s implausible, for reasons I will revisit below.
For the rest of this chapter, I'll address these three problems in order.

§2

The first problem with the Kant/Waldron version of NDT is the supposed

implausibility of the "wrongful threat premise". If it's just not true that we have a
duty not to threaten each other in any way Kant and/or Waldron have identified, it
can't be that we owe support to particular states because they circumvent the
threat. Simmons argues that we wrongfully threaten others only if we are "likely
(in a special way) to harm" them. He doesn't offer a theory of what this "special
way" amounts to, but that one agent merely feels threatened by another isn't
special enough. Certainly, Simmons thinks that whatever the rights and duties
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bound up in his Lockean account of moral personhood—the natural rights and
duties of mutual independence and self-governance—a right not to feel
threatened, or a duty not to cause the feeling of being threatened, is no part of
them. So long as I don't actually point any guns at anybody, so long as I don't
actually howl and rage and brandish my musculature, so long as I make no
demands on anyone of the your-money-or-your-life variety, haven't I discharged
whatever duties against threatening I have? But I don't need a state or any other
kind of supervision to discharge such. All I have to do is comport myself in a
generally peaceable way.
But what if we reinterpret the basic ideas embedded in Simmons' Lockean
rights and duties through the lens of anti-domination commitments, as I claimed
we should at the end of the previous chapter? If to enter into or maintain a social
relationship that instantiates (D4)/(D5) is to deserve resentment and indignation,
if such social relationships fail to promote or respect the central values of freedom
and equality, it's very plausible to think that whatever other duties we have just in
virtue of moral personhood, we have a duty to abstain from entering into or
maintaining dominating social relationships; whatever our other rights, we have a
right against such domination. Furthermore, if A has power over B sufficient for
imposition, and A can put this power to work in deliberative isolation, this looks
to me like one way for A to represent a threat to B. If I dominate you, I am a threat
to you. Why? Because if I dominate you, I can attach high costs to your failure to
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cooperate with me—high enough that I don’t have to think very much at all about
whether you’ll be very motivated to go along with what I want.89
Once we've enriched our account of rights and duties with anti-domination
commitments, we're in a position to see how A has duties to B that A cannot
discharge even by studiously avoiding "threatening behavior". Here’s the vital
point: if we have duties against domination, we have duties not just to refrain
from certain kinds of action, we have a duty to refrain from having certain kinds
of power. Instead of just a duty to refrain from killing innocents, we have a duty
against having an arbitrary power to kill innocents. This point generalizes to the
other standard varieties of interpersonal violence and aggression. If A has duties
against domination, A has not only a duty not to steal from B, A also has a duty
against having the unchecked power to steal from B.
But how can you refrain from having an arbitrary or unchecked power to
φ? Of course, given that we’re talking about domination here, we’re talking about
arbitrary or unchecked impositional power; for simplicity’s sake, though, I’ll talk
generally about powers.
For starters, one way to refrain from having an unchecked or arbitrary
power is just not to have that power at all. We need to say a little bit about not
having power in general before we can talk usefully about refraining from having
power. It’s possible not to have power because (and this isn’t meant to be an
exhaustive taxonomy) you lack either the material or the social basis of that
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I suspect we should reject the stronger claim that anyone who is a threat to me dominates me. At
any rate, I don’t need to defend it here. It’s enough to rescue at least an attenuated form of the
“Wrongful Threat Premise” if all dominators pose threats.
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power. What I mean by power’s “material basis” is just whatever resource A
possesses or controls that, in a particular context, enables A to have power over B.
If Dealer A has heroin that Addict B doesn’t have and wants, the heroin is the
material basis of A’s power. For A, in this case, not to have the power in question
might be simply for A not to have the heroin.
When I talk about power’s social basis I mean the way that how much
power one agent has depends on facts about agents around her. Another way for
Dealer A not to have power over Addict B is for some third party to come along
who sells better heroin more cheaply than A: that will decrease A’s power even if
A has just as much heroin as before.90 Both these cases involve what Pettit calls
“option removal”. A used to have options involving the use of power over B, but
due to shift in the material and/or social bases of their power, these options have
been removed.
Can A refrain from having power over B, where this involves the removal
of options? In the above case, sure. Why? Because it’s possible for A to alienate
herself permanently from the material or social basis of her power over B. E.g.
She can flush the heroin down the toilet. She can give the heroin to B. Etc.
However, if A cannot alienate herself permanently from the basis of her power
over B, A cannot remove her own options involving the use of that power.
Remember, how A intends to use her power over B does not change anything
See Lovett (2011, 69) Another easy example of power’s social as opposed to material bases is
the way a particular A’s impositional power is often the enforcement apparatus of a state or other
social group: e.g. SA will have impositional power over B if A and B are members of a social group
that allows A to have property in persons like B, so that A can depend on other members of the
social group to respect if not enforce A’s claim to have B as property. In this case, A’s impositional
power can be removed by changing the terms of cooperation in the social group so that claims to
property in persons are no longer recognized.
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about whether or not A is empowered. Suppose A promises to give B heroin
whenever B wants it; so long as it’s up to A whether or not this promise is kept,
A’s power remains unaltered.91
The other way to refrain from having unchecked or arbitrary power, in the
idiolect developed in the previous chapter, is to decrease the extent to which your
power is exercised in deliberative isolation. Decreasing power’s deliberative
isolation, generally speaking, is a matter of replacing rather than removing
options, and of altering the social rather than the material basis of power. Imagine
that A has power over B because B is an elderly person living in a nursing home
and A is B’s caregiver. If B’s family visits the home regularly to ensure that B
receives adequate care, and stands ready to penalize inadequate care, this will go
some way toward replacing the A’s option “neglecting B with impunity” with
“neglecting B on pain of retribution from the family”.92 It’s obvious how this
reduces deliberative isolation: “treat B only as I see fit” gets replaced with “treat B
in ways acceptable to the family”.
Can A refrain from having deliberatively isolated power over B? As we
saw in the last chapter, if A can do this, it’s not just because A decides to talk to B
or B’s family every once in a while out of the goodness of A’s heart, and weigh
their counsel if it suits A. This is clear too from talk about B’s family’s power to
replace A’s options: if A listens to B’s family when it suits A and only when it
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The main argument for this claim is at 40-42.
I’m speaking loosely here of “option replacement”, but obviously it will have to be a significant
power—a power to replace one options with another that’s attached to significant costs. “Neglect
B and we’ll all pout” doesn’t attach “neglect B” to a sufficiently significant cost to really reduce
A’s deliberative isolation.
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suits A, it’s clear that B’s family lack a real power of option replacement.
Therefore, for A to refrain from having deliberatively isolated power over B
requires that A ensure that B or some third party acting on B’s behalf have a
certain power over A. The only way to do this is for A to make sure that B or the
third party in question has a power that A herself cannot remove. If B has the
power to replace A’s options only by being invested with some power A herself
controls, A’s options are not thereby replaced: it will be up to A to remove B’s
power, and thus B’s power to replace A’s choices.93 As with option removal, A
can only refrain from having deliberatively isolated power when A can insure that
power is alienable from A’s own control—in this case, the power of second or
third parties to attach costs to options otherwise available to A.
On the table as of now, we’ve got two ways to refrain from having
unchecked or arbitrary power over someone else. First, you can refrain from
having power by permanently alienating yourself from the material or social bases
of your power. Second, you can reduce the deliberative isolation of your power,
by making sure that second or third parties have a real power of option
replacement. Now, what does all this tell us about whether or not we can refrain
from having certain kinds of power in a state of nature? To review, suppose I have
a duty not to kill innocents. Suppose I have a duty not to do violence to the
persons of others. Suppose I have a duty not to steal. (Easy suppositions all, I
To make all this slightly more concrete, recall Pettit’s case of the alcoholic and the liquor
cabinet (2012, 57). In this case, A invests B with the power to control A’s liquor consumption by
giving B the key to A’s liquor cabinet, with the instructions that B is to return it only after a two
day notice. This decreased A’s deliberative isolation about the choice of when to drink only if B
really does retain power over the key. If B is scared of A, so that B will cough up the key after a
sufficiently impassioned plea for its return, A’s deliberative isolation about when to drink is
functionally intact.
93
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reckon.) I can observe those duties just be studiously abstaining from the actions
in question. Good enough. But if I’ve got duties against domination, I have duties
not to have a certain set of powers. I have a duty against having a deliberatively
isolated power to kill innocents; I have a duty against having a deliberatively
isolated power to assault you; etc. Why? Because if I can kill or assault you just
according to my whims, I dominate you. If it’s true that I have a duty against
having those sorts of unchecked powers, is it just up to me whether or not I have
them or not? That’s just to say, can I abstain from such powers unilaterally?
Abstaining by removing the physical and mental capacities that enable violence
and theft is not a realistic option; therefore, refraining from such powers by
removing their material basis is not an option.
See where this leaves us. All that remains is to alter the social basis of my
power by ensuring that someone else is in place to check me. If no one is there
with power enough to check me, I have an unchecked power regardless of what I
choose to do with it. What matters for now is this: whether or not second or third
parties around me are sufficiently empowered to check me is a fact about my
social environment. It’s not just a fact about me. Therefore, it’s not just a fact
about me whether or not I have an unchecked power “to kill, to steal, and to
destroy”94. But if I have an unchecked power to kill, steal, etc., I am a threat to
you. If I could refrain from being such a threat, and refuse, I am wrongfully a
threat to you. That all looks like a perfectly “objective notion” of being a
wrongful threat. It follows that it’s not just up to me whether I am wrongfully a
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threat to you. If Simmons thinks we can’t wrongfully be a threat to each other
without actually aggressing, I think I’ve given us reason to suspect otherwise. Just
having certain kinds of power is enough.
According to the “wrongful threat premise”, “Those who refuse to [submit
to state supervision], denying the authority of the salient justice-enforcing
institutions, wrong those around them by being threats to them.” Clearly, the
“salient justice-enforcing institution”—or institution guaranteeing checks against
domination—could be a state. States can provide the third-party checks on power
necessary to reduce or eliminate domination in cases where agents cannot
accomplish this unilaterally: e.g. states can penalize certain uses of physical
strength against the weak, thus replacing an option like “Beat my child with
impunity” with “Beat my child only at risk of state sanctions” by enforcing rangelimited principles forbidding child abuse. It follows that submission to state
supervision is one way to reduce such forms of domination. But this is not enough
by itself to justify the “wrongful threat premise” as it stands and thus not enough
to make NDT a workable justification of states—even an NDT equipped with
heightened sensitivity to the evils of domination. If there are other ways to
provide checks against domination without submitting to state oversight, we have
to show why they won’t do just as well. I’m about to try.

§3

Here’s where we’ve gotten so far: attention to domination shows us that

we can’t always discharge our “Don’t threaten” duties on our own. But the
conclusion we’ve reached so far doesn’t show a lot. Obviously, the mere presence
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of second parties is usually some kind of check on our power, even in a state of
nature, and the fact that we can’t discharge a duty on our own obviously doesn’t
show that third party assists should come from a state. This is the second problem
with Kant/Waldron-style NDT I identified above. Before I try to solve it, I’ll
bring the problem better into focus by looking at some proposed alternatives to
state-based solutions. In so doing, I’ll have a chance to expand what we’ve seen
so far about the possibilities of domination-reduction.
Anarchic societies have very few real world exemplars, and such recent
examples as we have are recognizable all around as pretty terrible.95 Regardless,
there is an interesting tradition of political theory behind the claim that anarchic
social arrangements can do whatever states can do—or what states should do,
anyway. What I want to know is whether or not anarchic social arrangements
could provide effective checks on domination, so that we could always discharge
our duties not to dominate without recourse to states. This is not, unfortunately, a
question that anarchists have themselves taken up, at least with direct attention to
recent republican excavation of domination and its institutional requirements.
As I pointed out at the top of the chapter, anybody worried about
domination should worry about states. The power of states is almost always
impositional, and so domination-ready. The claim that it’s possible to live without
states is thus prima facie attractive from an anti-domination perspective. Michael
Huemer’s work (2013) has the best claim to being state-of-the-art anarchism, so
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Recognizably terrible, I should say, except to Jan Narveson, who is willing to offer Somalia as
an example of a real-world anarchy, in an argument for anarchy. See Narveson (2008, 196).
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I’ll focus on him. As far as I know, there are no better presentations of the best
case for anarchic social arrangements than his.
“We ought to reject a social system”—like states—“if and only if we can
identify a superior alternative” (2013, 186), says Huemer. We evaluate
alternatives, he goes on to say, against the background of some basic assumptions
about human nature. (1) Human beings are approximately instrumentally rational,
so that we can generally rely on them to do what best advances their goals, given
their present set of beliefs. It follows that a proposed social system is clearly
inferior if it assumes either that humans are not even approximately
instrumentally rational, or that humans are perfectly instrumentally rational. (2)
Humans tend to have “a great deal of accurate and practically relevant
information about their environments and about the potential consequences of
their actions” (2013, 188). (3) Humans are reliably selfish—not beyond all
possibility of altruism, but we can count on humans to be selfish in a way we
cannot count on them to be altruistic. (4) We should expect fairly wide variation
in human beliefs, goals, motivations, and dispositions: in particular, human nature
is not so uniform that we can rule out individuals who are “unusually aggressive
or reckless” (2013, 195). I’m content to work within the framework of these
assumptions.
Given this background, how might we expect stateless agents to confront
domination? In the society Huemer imagines, guards against domination would
come from one of two sources: either you’re protected against domination
because you’re sufficiently powerful to protect yourself, or you have sufficient
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resources to purchase protections against domination for yourself and/or those
you care about. Safeguards against domination can be purchased from “protection
agencies” and “arbitration firms”. The former would provide protection from the
ineliminable minority of the aggressive and/or reckless that exist in any
sufficiently large collection of humans.96 Arbitration firms provide services
analogous to the criminal and civil court system. The protection and arbitration
services Huemer describes are not expressly intended to prevent domination, but
it’s easy to see how they could. Suppose your stateless society is plagued by
roving gangs of murderous thieves. Suppose you don’t have the skill or hardware
to oppose them directly, threat-to-threat and force-to-force. In the absence of
protection from a third party, such a gang might come to dominate you. If a gang
lord demands that you hand over some chunk of your worldly goods, and you lack
the skill or hardware to oppose him, they will be able to attach costs to your noncooperation so high that handing over is the lesser of evils, and they will be
checked in such demands only by their whims. Now, suppose you have sufficient
resources to hire a protection agency. Assumedly, if an agency is able to attract
paying customers, it must have sufficient threat-to-threat and force-to-force power
to raise the costs of the gang’s attempted impositions high enough that they’ll
leave you alone.
Huemer thinks that enough people would subscribe to protection/
arbitration services, and those services themselves would be sufficiently wellbehaved, for his stateless societies to be at least as peaceable as contemporary
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western democracies.97 Certainly, you don’t need to assume very much about
human nature to think that people will freely deploy some of their resources to
purchase protection against domination if it’s for sale, and purchasing it is the
only way to get it. This is plausible given Huemer’s modest assumptions about
human nature. Let’s suppose he’s right. Let’s suppose too that he’s right in
thinking that domination-preventing protection and arbitration services would be
available to the poor as well as the rich, and without such a difference in quality
that the rich can easily dominate the poor. In short, let’s assume the best case
scenario in terms of domination-prevention via individuals either having the
capacity to ensure their own protection against potentially dominating forces, or
having the resources to hire others to do so.
Here’s how I’ll proceed. I grant Huemer his admixture of modest
suppositions about human nature and his [perhaps] immodest suppositions about
the possibilities for effective free market distribution of protection/arbitration
services. I give him the best case scenario for individuals funding their own
protection against domination by others. Here’s the trouble. Even Huemer’s best
case scenario leaves us areas of likely domination that either cannot be, or are
highly unlikely to be, remedied. I’ll start with a form of domination relatively few
of us embody, and move on to form of domination almost all of us do.

Of course, we shouldn’t forget that even contemporary democratic states are often very, very
bad at providing protection and arbitration services: the protection services now provided to
citizens in many American cities via local police departments are often turned against the most
vulnerable and historically oppressed citizens, and that the arbitration offered in American courts
is often brutally vindictive against the same citizens, and deeply skewed in favor of the wealthy
and powerful. All this makes it reasonable to imagine that even if the life we could have with nonstate alternatives is inferior in some respects to life within states, it may not so bad that coercive
intervention is justified to prevent it. See Alexander (2010) and Greenwald (2011).
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First consider unscrupulous employers. Modest assumptions about human
nature may get you employers who are willing to purchase protection and
arbitration services aimed at preventing their domination by others, but how many
employers would be motivated to purchase protection and arbitration services to
protect their employees from their own possible domination? Not many, I suspect.
Perhaps Huemer would say that it’s the employees’ responsibility to purchase
protection against their bosses, if they desire it, but this assumes that many
employers will be willing to hire and/or continue in their employ those who have
purchased such protection. Of course, unionization might be possible in some
instances, but not always. Especially workers at the margins are likely to be
sufficiently replaceable that employers would simply refuse to give work to any
who attempted to protect themselves against their domination. They would only
be protected if the employers themselves financed protection against themselves.
But for reasons we introduced above, it’s far from clear that financing
domination-protection against yourself is even possible. Suppose A hires
protection agency C to protect B against A’s potential domination. It’s hard to see
how this really alienates A from their power. Assumedly, C will protect B just as
long as A pays them to do so. That’s how Huemer’s subscription services are
supposed to work. But if that’s the case, B ultimately depends on A for protection
against A. If they were at A’s mercy before C was hired, how are they
substantially less so now? If B loses A’s favor, all A has to do is stop paying C,
and that’s the end of B’s protection. Perhaps the only way is for C to offer to
prevent A’s domination of B for a onetime payment—perhaps a payment that
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covers the protection of B from A until B exits their social relationship with A.
That might be possible, but it’s very unlikely given the operative assumptions
about human nature. The higher the costs of protecting others from your
domination, the more unlikely it is that many will pay.
It seems to me this employer/employee case has a structure we’re likely to
find repeated in an anarchic society. In some instances human nature can be relied
upon to minimize domination via the mechanisms Huemer describes: most people
are probably likely to protect themselves against domination as much as they can.
But human nature cannot always be trusted to reduce domination. Many people, if
not most, are unlikely to be nearly so careful in protecting others against their
own domination. After all, as Huemer has told us, we are reliably selfish, not
reliably altruistic. Then, of course, there’s the conceptual and practical difficulties
of auto-funding real protection against your own domination.
Here’s another case where it’s difficult to see how Huemer’s subscription
model could allow particular As to keep their duties against domination. Huemer
is bullish about the “liberal beliefs and attitudes, particularly on the subject of
violence” common among “Members of modern, Western societies” (2013, 203).
However liberal standard beliefs and attitudes may be hereabouts, there remain
significant amounts of domestic violence and child abuse. Again, it may be the
individual parents or “heads of households” will be motivated to purchase guards
against their domination by others, but how many would be motivated to purchase
protections against their own domination of their children and/or domestic
dependents? Obviously, many of these children/dependents will not be able to
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purchase their own protection. How can a child be expected to purchase
protection and arbitration services? With their allowance? Again, even if
parents/household heads are inclined to purchase protection for their dependents,
you run up against the same problem just raised in the employee/employer case.
Given that more of us have domestic dependents than have employees, this kind
of case is likely to be much more common.98
Here’s another case with the same structure. It is notoriously difficult to
describe the moral relation those of us now alive stand in to future generations.99
What matters for my purposes is how we answer this question: Is it possible for A
to have impositional power over B, when B is yet to be born? Given the
conception of domination assembled in the previous chapter, the answer would
seem to be, “No”. For A to dominate B, both must be social actors: you can’t be a
social actor if you haven’t been born. But B will be a social actor, on the
assumption that there will be future generations of humans. What’s clear is that
those of us alive now certainly can alter the practical context of future
generations. What it makes sense for future Bs to do—indeed, what it is possible
for future Bs to do—depends in part on what we As do now. There is excellent
reason to think that our collective choices may alter the planet so significantly that
there is a literal sense in which we impose our will on future generations. Given
their as-yet-unborn status, it is obviously impossible for future generations to hold
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It is telling, I suspect, that the highest rates of domestic abuse are in locations where access to
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be a victim of domestic violence during her lifetime. For details and references, see
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us accountable for the way we wield our power over them. I submit that if it isn’t
true that we dominate future generations because (on my conception of
domination) you can’t dominate someone who isn’t an actual social actor—
though they will be soon enough in the scheme of things—it’s near enough to true
that if domination is an injustice, whatever relation we stand in to future
generations is also unjust, and for most of the same reasons.100
Suppose for the nonce we call our relation to future generations
domination-like. Suppose we have a duty against standing in this domination-like
relation to future generations. The same difficulties that kept Huemer’s anarchic
societies from providing plausible mechanisms against the forms of economic and
domestic domination we canvassed in the previous paragraphs show up here.
Future generations cannot protect themselves against us. Can we fund third-party
agencies that would provide sufficient protection? Perhaps, in the once-for-all
manner we’ve already considered. But again, how likely is such auto-funding
given our shaky altruism even toward those now alive? “Not very” is the only
plausible answer.
It looks to me that we’ve got at least two forms of domination, and one
form of something very like domination [if it isn’t actually domination], that
Huemer’s anarchic mechanisms for domination-reduction won’t cover, at least

E.g. It won’t be, obviously, because future generations suffer the conscious indignity of not
being able to look us in the eye; but it could be because we don’t treat them as free and equal.
Again, I realize that it sounds odd to say that I could culpably fail to treat someone as, say, an
equal when they don’t exist. Even so, our treatment of those who will but do not yet exist is
plausibly dictatorial: we are in danger of fundamentally altering the world to our benefit, without
proper consideration of how this will affect the world in which future generations will make their
own lives. For more about domination as a relation between those now alive and future
generations, see Nolt (2010). For some broadly sympathetic criticism, see Jamieson (2014).
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given his assumptions about human nature. Of course, all along we’ve been
assuming the best case scenario for his anarchic mechanisms.
Suppose we don’t assume the best, but still a pretty good scenario. That’s
to say, suppose that there are protection and arbitration services available in
Huemer’s anarchic society accessible to poor as well as rich, and the services
accessible to the poor are good enough to render the most egregious forms of
oppression—rape, murder, obvious pillage, etc—too costly for the rich to indulge
in them very much. Given that there is no reason to suppose that impositional
power cannot exist without the power to rape, murder, and pillage, many
possibilities for class domination will remain. If that’s true, and we assume a duty
against domination, it would seem incumbent on those with better
protection/arbitration services to insure that they do not thereby have dominating
power. But that leaves us with just the problems with auto-funding identified
above.
It may very well be that it is possible in a stateless society to avoid the
worst solitary-nasty-brutish-shortness of Hobbes’ state of nature, or a state of
nature sufficiently bad to justify Wellman’s Samaritan rights and duties. We can
grant all this and still have good reason to think that anarchic social arrangements
will lack—perhaps even must lack, given reasonable expectations about our
psychology—certain anti-domination mechanisms. Why? The problem arises
from one of the primary attractions of anarchism: protection and arbitration
services in a stateless society are funded voluntarily. If you want protection and
arbitration services, you pay for them; and you get as much and as good as you
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pay for. Of course, if you can’t or won’t or don’t pay, you don’t get protection
and arbitration; and if you can’t or won’t or don’t pay for better, you get worse.
That’s all well and good if we imagine a social world of agents who can protect
themselves, or with resources they can choose to deploy for protection and
arbitration, but I can see very little reason to suppose that the social world will
ever be so populated. We’ve just seen some very likely examples. Children,
domestic dependents, the very poor, workers at the margins, those yet to be
born—all are often or even always unable to fund their own protection against
those best positioned to dominate them; and, as I’ve argued, there are conceptual
and practical difficulties with auto-funding protection against one’s own
dominating power, and these difficulties loom even larger given Huemer’s own
assumptions about human nature.101
In order to reduce the domination of those unable to fund their own
protection, it seems that we need social institutions that do not depend on
voluntary subscriptions. Such social institutions would have to maintain their
existence without reliance on the good will of those whose domination they
prevent. States, of course, have managed to do this, at least from time to time. The
protections a state can provide against domination are funded coercively
[primarily] via taxation; as a consequence, they at least have the potential to
remain in place across many variations in the willingness of potential dominators
to fund them. There are, so far as I can tell from anarchists’ best efforts, no
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comparable mechanisms is the best imaginable stateless societies. This is not to
say that anarchists may yet devise some. As I pointed out, the set of anarchist
political philosophers who are attuned to the specific dangers of domination,
especially as illumined by recent broadly republican insights, is now null.
What follows? If we have a natural duty against dominating others, and
there are forms of domination that cannot be reduced unilaterally, and the relevant
second parties cannot always protect themselves, a natural duty against
domination sometimes requires the presence of third party checks on power. So
we can derive a duty to accept the supervision of third parties from a duty against
domination. This derivation proceeds in the manner common to ND theories.
Given the fact that, for several familiar forms of social power, the third parties
must be able to maintain their “checking” powers whatever the willingness of the
“checked” to fund it, states look like the most viable candidate for the role of third
party—or, at the very least, anarchists have yet to suggest a workable non-state
alternative.
Of course, all of the above has concerned only our duty to reduce our own
domination of others; none of the above hinges on an obligation to reduce the
domination of others by third parties. If it turns out that we have a general duty to
minimize domination from whatever source, we will obviously have a duty to
minimize our own domination; but I assume here it’s possible to have a duty only
to minimize our own domination of others. The claim that we have a duty to
minimize our own domination probably has broader appeal than the claim that we
have a general obligation to minimize domination. After all, it’s part of
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commonsense morality that negative duties not to harm others ourselves is far
stronger than our positive duties to aid—again, the sort of duties that Wellman’s
account depends on. I don’t happen to endorse this bit of commonsense morality;
but, obviously, assuming it here gives me less work to do. If it turns out that we
have duties to aid others by reducing their domination, I can’t see how that will do
anything but bolster the argument of this section.

§4

Here we are with an advance on liberal variants of NDT. Attention to

domination shows how we might be a threat to our neighbors without actually
aggressing, and so gives us a way to motivate the Kant/Waldron “wrongful threat
premise”. We can’t always stop dominating others just by swearing off
domination; third party protections are sometimes necessary. But some forms of
domination cannot be reduced without states as third parties—or something so
much like a state as to almost certainly deserve the name.
By way of introducing NDT, I said NDTs need (a) an account of what
natural duty (or duties) is (are) in play; (b) an account of the state’s instrumental
link to the fulfillment of the duty/duties.; and (c) an account of what particular
duties are generated by the state’s instrumental link to our natural duties. We’re in
a position now to see how anti-domination commitments fill out (a) – (c). The
duty I’ve focused on, with regard to (a), is the duty to refrain from and/or exit
dominating social relationships as far as we can. I don’t mean to suggest that
other duties might not be most effectively discharged by specifically political
institutions; but again, duties against domination seem to me to be the best
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candidate for a natural duty that, across a wide range of possible worlds, cannot
be met without the state’s instrumentality. As to how that works—(b)—and
limiting myself here to the broadest generalities, the basic idea is that states, as
opposed to non-state alternatives like subscription-based protection and
arbitration services, can provide checks against potential domination that do not
depend on the altruistic tendencies of potential dominators. These “checks”
amount to the replacement of options otherwise open to particular agents with
options-with-a-cost: “discipline my child as I see fit” replaced by the state with
“discipline my child as I see fit only at risk of prosecution for child abuse”.
What about (c)? What particular duties are owed to the state given (b)?
Certain duties of compliance apparently come into play here. For example, if a
state prevents an employer from dominating their employees by enforcing a
range-limited principle against firing them at will, the employer would seem to
have a duty to the state in the form of Waldron’s P2: “Accept the supervision of L
with regard to the implementation” of the principle in question. Prima facie, this
seems to entail a duty of Pettitian acceptance: it’s tough to see how you could
“accept the supervision of L” while refusing to change L only in ways consistent
with L’s continued existence. This suggests that the employer would also have
duties in the form of P3: “Do not undermine the administration of P1 by L.” (1993,
17).
But I say “prima facie” and “suggests” and “seems” for a reason. There is
yet the final problem with NDT identified above: the fact that A enables B to fulfil
one of B's duties clearly does not always underwrite duties of B specifically to A.
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As a consequence, the instrumental connection of political institutions to the
fulfilment of our duties is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for any duty
to accept them. If we have a duty to support agents or institutions anytime they
make us less likely than not to dominate others, or to violate other duties we have
toward such others, it’s possible that we’ll end up with duties to support bullies
and vigilantes like the aforementioned Ray, not to mention tyrannies and
dictatorships and other paradigmatically illegitimate regimes. The problem, of
course, is that A might prevent B from dominating third parties while A dominates
B. For example, an oddly enlightened variety of tyrant might reduce a man’s
domination of his wife by penalizing spousal abuse. When state agents, in this
case, forced a man to stop abusing his spouse, they would be in an obvious sense
doing something right, and the man in question would be obliged to go along with
them, but the agents in question might just be a tyrant’s goons. Tyrants and their
goons don’t deserve our support. If we can undermine the regime of a tyrant, we
should. This means we can’t get an obligation to support a state just from pointing
out that state’s instrumental role toward the prevention of private domination.102
There is the appearance of a puzzle here. How can it be true that the
abusive husband in question is obliged to go along with the tyrant’s goons and yet
be entitled to undermine the tyrant’s regime if he can? The answer, I think, is just
that the husband should not resist any force necessary to keep him from abusing
his spouse—not from tyrant’s goons, the butcher, the baker, et al. Obviously, that
he should not resist such coercion from agents stopping his spousal abuse says
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nothing about those agents’ broader entitlements. Similarly, the fact that the man
should stop beating his spouse when a goon shouts “Stop beating your spouse”
doesn’t mean the shouting goon has political authority. Any person so shouting
would have had just as much authority as the goon—the ordinary moral variety.
There are no specifically political rights, duties, or obligations in play here; just
basic moral rights to stop aggression, duties not to abuse one’s spouse, etc.
We need a variety of NDT that doesn't legitimize vigilantes and bullies.
Not surprisingly, I think the way to get one is to apply the lessons of the previous
chapter about what it takes to render power non-arbitrary.
The trouble with Ray is that his musculature is constrained only by his
own concern that Kay get what’s coming to her, and is not accountable to Jay in
any sense. It is thus a kind of impositional power exercised in deliberative
isolation. Jay has no say in how Ray uses his power. This seems a promising way
of capturing what’s wrong with tyrants and dictators as well as vigilantes and
bullies, even when they use their power for good—even to prevent other varieties
of domination. All such, for good or ill, wield their power only at their own
discretion, and without any accountability from those they subjugate.
That such accountability is necessary for a state’s meriting our acceptance
and support is natural, if we think of such support as limiting ourselves to
changing the state only “within the system”. Dictatorships and tyrannies cannot be
changed within the system because, insofar as they constitute systems at all, they
are insulated against change from those they subjugate. The deliberative isolation
of a dictator or a tyrant just is one measure of how impervious they are to such
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change. If the legitimacy of a state is that it merits our restraint, so that we oppose
it only in ways consistent with its continued rule, a regime organized so that it
cannot be changed from within but only, as it were, from above, is trivially
illegitimate. It is not even entered in the legitimacy stakes. States that are even
possibly legitimate must be susceptible to adjustment from those it governs. Pettit
and many republican fellow travelers may or may not be right about the analytic
connection between freedom, non-domination, and democracy;103 but if the
legitimacy of a state is that it merits adjustment-only-within-the-system, it’s very
plausible that there is an analytic link between legitimacy and democracy.
It follows that the success conditions for NDT identified above as (a) – (c)
need to be amended. We need not only to know (a) what natural duties call for a
state, (b) how the state works instrumentally to make it possible to fulfil those
duties, and (c) what duties to the state follow from its instrumental role; we need
also to know (d) how the state is to be held accountable so that it does not wield
the power necessary to fulfil its instrumental role in deliberative isolation. It
seems to me that any version of NDT—Quong’s, Waldron’s, Wellman’s, et al.—
must be amended along the lines called for by (d) in order to avoid endorsing
obviously illegitimate regimes.
First, if a state really enables us not to dominate, we cannot construe its
accountability to us in voluntarist terms; to prevent domination, a state must in
some instances exercise power precisely when consent is withdrawn. That
domestic abusers who want to dominate their families retract their consent from a

103

Such connections are perhaps the central theme of Pettit’s (2012).

111
state does not change the fact the state in question might merit their support, and
may justly prevent their abuse. The domestic abuser may be entitled to retract his
support from a regime that actually prevented his familial domination but
potentially used its power however it wanted; this does not entail that he is
entitled to retract his support from a regime unless it does whatever he wants.
But neither should we let our non-voluntarism carry all before it. The
proceduralist about non-arbitrary power might suggest that a state is properly
accountable anytime its subjects can contest when it transgresses certain bounds,
however those bounds are specified, even if they are specified entirely without
consulting the subjugated. If you accept the central contentions of the previous
chapter, you’ve reason enough to disagree. Remember Onesimus’ case. Those in
power are accountable to him insofar as he has a right to contest if he is, say,
beaten instead of imprisoned for his obstinacy. If you were inclined to say he was
still dominated, I think you should be inclined to say that suitable accountability is
substantive accountability. But what’s that? Here’s the short answer: states are
suitably accountable to their citizens when those citizens can effectively hold their
states accountable so that state power is exercised only in ways justified according
to the standards I will introduce in the next chapter. So, wait and see.
Let’s sum up. The legitimacy of a state, where we conceive of legitimacy
as Pettitian acceptance, is a function of whether that state (i) enables us to observe
our duties against domination (and perhaps other duties), but (ii) only via power
that’s suitably accountable to us. To the degree that a state’s instrumentality is not
required for the discharge of our duties against domination (and perhaps others)
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and/or to the degree that the state only does this as a function of its
undomesticated power, we are morally entitled to resist that state. This funds only
a modest account of our political obligations or of the state’s general authority.
Certainly, I don’t see how to get from my arguments thus far to a general
obligation to treat a state’s directives as obligations, even pro tanto. Observing a
duty not to alter a state in ways inconsistent with its continued existence is, as far
as I can see, entirely consistent with all kinds of petty uncooperativeness. As a
consequence, more particular questions of political obligation, like “Do I have a
duty to pay my taxes?” are only partially addressed by my approach. Of course, if
a state cannot function as a domination-checker without your tax dollars, you
have a duty to pay up generated by your duty to accept domination-checks. In
other words, if a state is instrumentally necessary to the discharge of some duty
you have, and your refusal to pay taxes actually will undermine that state, you
must pay your taxes. For most of us, however, who pay relatively little taxes, a
duty to pay taxes would be a function of the state’s legitimacy and (perhaps) a
duty not to defect from cooperative schemes or group acts when those
schemes/acts make it possible to discharge other duties we have. I don’t think
anything I’ve said here (or will say later) does much to advance the second half of
that conjunction.
Do any of us live in legitimate states, even by the relatively weak standard
of Pettitian legitimacy? I doubt it. I doubt it primarily because so much state
power, even in democracies, is barely accountable to most of us, and not
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accountable at all to the weakest of us.104 Despite this, I think it’s plausible that, if
we have anti-domination duties, and thereby have duties to those entities
instrumentally necessary to discharging those duties, we have further duties to
construct such entities in the most efficient and effective way available to us,
when they don’t exist already. I suspect that, for most of us, the most “efficient
and effective way” is through attempts to reform existing states, rather than
through revolution. This is true because, as Pettit says, a “regime may still be
capable of being made legitimate by being treated as if it were legitimate: that is,
by being opposed only within the system” (2012, 139). Unless the overthrow of a
state is the most efficient and effective way of getting to a state worthy of
acceptance, we should choose other means, even if overthrow would otherwise be
within our rights.
I said at the top of the chapter that my arguments here would help fund the
idea that states are generally preferable to anarchy, as a social ideal. That states
are preferable to anarchy as a social ideal could remain true, of course, even if we
had a moral duty to seek the overthrow of every existing state. Here’s how I think
my arguments work as an endorsement of statism-qua-ideal. If it’s true that states
can prevent forms of domination that anarchic social arrangements cannot, and
it’s true that states can be suitably accountable in their domination-preventing
powers, it follows that states offer our best chance of instituting our antidomination commitments. I do not think I have shown here—or will show in what
follows—that we have a good chance of achieving such a state anytime soon. I
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believe achieving such a state is what Rawls might have called “realistically
utopian”,105 but I won’t rule out here that it’s the other kind.
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CHAPTER 4
A REPUBLICAN CONCEPTION OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION

We worry about political legitimacy because the power of states is at
apparent odds with our self-understanding as free and equal. In the previous
chapter I tried to show how the legitimacy of possible states could follow from the
conditions of respect for our mutual freedom and equality, provided that we
understand the connection of these conditions with swearing off domination. If we
have duties against domination, we can come to have duties not to undermine
those institutions that make is possible for us not to dominate. Sometimes those
institutions are states.
It follows that we can have duties to states even when we have not
voluntarily endorsed them. Why? Because it doesn’t follow from our natural
freedom/equality that withholding consent delegitimizes political power in cases
where that political power makes it appropriately high-cost for us to impose our
will on others. However, it does follow from our natural freedom and equality that
such power must be accountable to us. Legitimate states must, in some sense, be
held accountable for the ways they prevent our domination.
There are [at least] two ways to interrogate this last claim. We could ask
questions about how to design a state so that it’s accountable to its citizens. Also,
we could ask questions about what principles and ideals should guide citizens as
they hold their states to account. I will concern myself here with the latter sort of
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question. My answers are pieced together from refurbished materials drawn from
the public reason tradition of liberalism—refurbished in accord with the neorepublican, anti-domination framework I’ve developed in the previous chapters.
Public reason liberalism, in all its permutations, orbits this claim: the
power of the state must be acceptable to everyone who has to live under it, on
some sense of “acceptable” and some sense of “everyone”. I’m not happy with
this claim as it stands, mostly because I don’t think there’s a useful sense in which
political power must be acceptable to everyone. Perhaps with some apparent
mystery, I also don’t believe that political power must be acceptable to everyone
to be publically justified. How this can be so is the subject of the final two
sections of this chapter.
First I’ll rehabilitate the public reason tradition’s insistence that political
power justified by appeal only to sectarian worldviews is not justified in the sense
that matters. This claim, safe to say, is the element of the tradition that has
provoked the most ire.106 After all, it’s something like political commonsense that
all we owe to other citizens is just to vote our consciences, without regard for
what they might or might not think. Before I provide materials for public
justification in accord with liberal restraint, it’s important to see we should bother
with restraint in the first place.
I’d like my arguments in this chapter to accomplish three things. First, I
want to show how a commitment to liberal restraint follows from a commitment
to oppose domination; second, I want to show that it follows from anti-

And “ire” is the right word. For prime examples, see Robert George and Christopher Wolfe
(2000), and John Finnis (2000).
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domination commitments more clearly than it follows from un-refurbished liberal
ones; third, I want to introduce a theory of political justification consistent with
restraint. Un-refurbished liberal defenses tend to proceed along one of two tracks.
The first appeals to the promotion of political values like social cooperation and
civic friendship; the second appeals to a norm of respect for fellow citizens,
variously expressed. Yet another defense can be assembled from one of Gerald
Gaus’ central arguments in The Order of Public Reason. In §1 I will survey these
first two defenses and provide reason to think both are suspect. In §2, I’ll turn to
Gaus’ arguments, which are considerably more sophisticated; but, while
suggestive in important ways, I think they are ultimately unworkable. Then, in §3
I explain how a commitment to liberal restraint fits within anti-domination
commitments. Finally, in §§4-5 I construct the outlines of a positive account of
public justification by connecting public reason to the deliberative sensitivity
condition on non-arbitrary power.

§1

First some review. Liberal political philosophers tend to think that only

some kinds of reasons should figure in political justifications—the public ones.
The details of what I think public reasons are, and how to unearth them, are to
come later. For now, let’s talk about the non-public ones.
It’s obvious that contemporary democracies are chockablock with bundled
claims about the right and the good—the bundles Rawls called “comprehensive
doctrines” and I call “worldviews”.107 About as obvious as the fact of various
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divergent worldviews is the fact that none of them has the market cornered on the
commitment of decent and intelligent people—Rawls’ “reasonable pluralism”
again. As a consequence, all worldviews in contemporary democracies are
sectarian.
As a first pass, we might identify non-public reasons with considerations
that count in favor of φing only if a particular sectarian worldview is true. For
example, that the pope108 says we should φ is not a reason to φ unless Roman
Catholic doctrine is (at least mostly) true; that we cannot universalize the maxim
of not φing is not a reason to φ unless particular forms of Kantianism are true.
Specifying exactly how such worldview-embedded considerations cannot figure
in political justifications is a bit tricky. Christopher Eberle suggests the following:
[A] citizen in a liberal democracy ought not to support (or reject)
any coercive law for which she enjoys only a religious
justification. (2002, 14)
This is too narrow, given that there are obviously secular worldviews. Prima
facie, it’s not clear why we should think the imposition of Kantianism is any
better than the imposition of Roman Catholicism, if what we’re worried about is
just the imposition of worldviews. If my reasons for supporting a law are just that
it gives citizens the chance to realize their true nature as autonomous beings, a
great many religious citizens will not be able to see the law as justified without
abandoning their own worldviews. With this in mind, we can revise Eberle thusly:

Qua pope, of course. You don’t have to be a Roman Catholic to have a reason to put a coat on
when your old friend Jorge Bergoglio mentions that it is cold outside.
108
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A citizen in a liberal democracy ought not to support (or reject)
any law for which she has only a worldview-embedded
justification.
. . . where a “worldview-embedded” justification is just one that depends on
considerations that count as reasons only if a particular sectarian worldview is
true.
Good enough? Not quite. Think about a case where A supports a law
because she’s is a faithful utilitarian, and she wouldn’t support the law otherwise.
It just happens that the law enjoys massive support from people of all sorts, across
the spectrum of other minimally decent worldviews abroad in A’s society. Should
A refrain from supporting the law? The restraint principle offered above would
seem to say so. But surely there’s something backward about that. Indeed, Kevin
Vallier (2011) talks like once we see that there’s something backward about that,
we can have done with any kind of restraint requirement at all. Once we admit the
possibility that democratic citizens might converge on a law via separate
justifications, some of which are religious and some of which are not, he
maintains that we can abandon principles of restraint (2011, 275).
I think this is a mistake. Even if A has no reason for restraint in cases
where A has only a worldview-embedded justification for her support for some
law, but the whole array of other citizens have justifications of their own ready
and waiting, should we think this will always be the case? Vallier seems to think
that his account of public justification won’t restrict “the reasons that individuals
may legitimately act upon in public political life” and won’t “[restrict] the range
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of reasons citizens may use to block the passage of coercive laws” (2011, 264265). But surely even he will have to restrict the range of reasons in cases where
no convergence is to be expected. In cases where the laws A would support
because of specifically utilitarian justifications aren’t justifiable from the
perspective of a sufficiently wide range of other worldviews, even Vallier will
have to hold A to some kind of restraint principle. He will have to tell our
utilitarian she can’t just go ahead and vote her worldview. But because I agree
with Vallier—and Gaus (with Valier, 2009), (2011)—that there’s nothing wrong
with voting your worldview when it’s part of what Rawls would have called an
“overlapping consensus” around a law,109 this is the version of the restraint
principle I’ll defend here:
A citizen in a liberal democracy ought not to support (or reject)
any coercive law when she has good reason to believe that other
citizens will not be able to regard the law as justified (or
unjustified) without adopting her worldview.
Hereafter, I’ll call this principle (LR) for “liberal restraint”.110
Even refined like this, (LR) is deeply controversial. Many conscientious
citizens of contemporary democracies have strong reasons to reject it. It is
opposed even by some who agree that citizens should offer each other public
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reasons for policy.111 Suppose I cannot even think about abortion without
reference to my belief that fetal life is sacred. Is it fair to ask me to regard this
belief as politically inert? Suppose I’ve shaped my worldview over the course of
years by laborious inquiry into the deep nature of the right and the good. Why
should my exercise of political power be tempered by deference to worldviews I
have good reason to think are false? Perhaps most troubling of all, suppose I am
underprivileged and unschooled in secular ways of thinking about morality. Is it
just to ask me to observe restraints on exercising the modicum of political power I
possess (tiny as it is) just because I have only ever thought of morality as a
function of my religion? These are hard questions.
So, liberal restraint needs to be justified. Here is one way to go about it
(the first of the aforementioned “primary tracks”): maybe the reason we should
practice political justification in accord with (LR) is just because doing so
promotes what Rawls called the “very great values” of achieving a society based
on “fair social cooperation” (1996: 157).112 According to Rawls, reasonable
citizens recognize that the value of achieving this political ideal is so great that it
“normally outweigh(s) whatever values” might come into conflict with it (1996:
139)—specifically, values and reasons native to unshared worldviews (1996: 168169, 218). This way of justifying restraint depends on the idea that the promotion
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of social cooperation takes general precedence over whatever values the citizens
of contemporary democracies might cherish besides. If the promotion of social
cooperation comes into conflict with values I have as a devotee of some
worldview or another, the promotion of social cooperation must “normally” come
out on top.
But why? Now, I value what Rawls values [at least in this case], but it’s
hard to see why the promotion of this value must outweigh all others, even most
of the time; especially when the “others” belong to the faith of my fathers or the
fruit of my laborious inquiry into the deep nature of the right and the good.113
Giving so much weight to the value of social cooperation among equals seems to
require devotion to a sectarian albeit liberal worldview—an unsavory result for
Rawlsians.114 Besides, citizens will be most tempted to abandon liberal restraint,
even if they value social cooperation, when up against the very issues liberals
most wish to settle by public reasons alone: e.g. the legal status of abortion, inter
alia. It is hard to see why there is something amiss in an ordering of values
favored by a devout Catholic according to which the protection of what they
regard as innocent human life trumps the promotion of social cooperation, even
when the same devout Catholic regards social cooperation as an important and
even overriding value most of the time.
Even defenders of restraint like Kyla Ebels-Duggan urge us to recognize
the outer limit of public reasoning in such cases. While liberal restraint embodies
a commitment to civic values all reasonable citizens will share, she claims that
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[There] is no reason to think in advance that (public justification)
is always available. It is not available when people committed to
the ideal of co-operation nevertheless have conflicting views about
what justice requires. When forced to choose between fulfilling
perceived obligations of justice and co-operating with their fellow
citizens in policies that do not meet these obligations, reasonable
people may opt for coercion. Given their commitment to the value
of co-operation, they will regret that this is the best they can do
(2010, 22).115
Such citizens “should admit their failure to realize an important value” but they
have not “violated an obligation to their fellow citizens”.
There are good reasons to doubt that the first of the two mainstream
attempts to justify liberal restraint is successful; especially if we think restraint is
obligatory even (and perhaps even more) in the hardest cases of political
justification. But what of the second mainstream attempt? Here the general idea is
that (LR) follows from a commitment to respecting other citizens’ personhood or
particular aspects of their personhood—perhaps their discursive capacity116 or
Rawlsian moral powers.117
Now, a commitment to respecting the personhood of fellow citizens is
almost certainly a necessary condition on any serious commitment to political
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justification. Why would someone who lacked such respect care about justifying
anything to fellow citizens at all? Fair enough. But there is an inferential gap
between the notion that we should respect fellow citizens and (LR). How have I
been disrespectful when I offer other citizens the self-same justification I have
found persuasive? (Assumedly I find my own worldview a persuasive source of
practical reasons.) Of course, they may not be persuaded, but so what? Why not
say that I treat them with the same respect I demand for myself when I offer them
the very best explanation for my position I can manage, even if it is just an
application of my worldview?118 Suppose I offer my fellow citizens the very best
arguments I can find, even when those arguments depend on reasons they do not
recognize as such. Suppose, furthermore, that I back my favored policies only
after trying my best to find considerations favorable to my position within their
worldviews, and am wracked with regret if I fail. It seems strange to accuse me,
after all this, of a failure to respect the personhood of my fellow citizens. It is
inconceivable that I would have expended so much effort on a pint glass or a
mop.119
There is a more general problem for respect-based defenses of restraint.
Respect for fellow citizens might actually motivate the abandonment of restraint.
Why not think that the best way to respect other citizens is to encourage them to
associate, advocate and vote in direct accordance with their worldviews, with the
understanding that we will do the same? This seems a more direct route to
honoring their discursive capacity/moral powers. In general, it is reasonable to
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think that the best way to respect a capacity is to encourage its free exercise. For
example, I respect the aesthetic capacities of an artist best when I refuse to
interfere with her creative process, rather than when I do my best not to show her
any art I do not think will move her. Analogously, we might think that respecting
the capacity of fellow citizens to weigh reasons and values, or to form a
conception of the good or a sense of justice, requires that I encourage them to
exercise these capacities by their best lights, while I do the same. If so, perhaps all
that respect requires is our sincere efforts to safeguard the inclusion of other
citizens in the political process. As Jean Hampton urged in an early critique of
Rawlsian liberalism, we might think that respect requires not that we rule some
perspectives “politically ‘out of bounds’”, but that we try to unearth a fair
“framework for discussion and decision making” that helps to reconcile the losers
of political conflict—those who do not manage to get social policy to reflect their
particular worldview—to the fairness of the process by which they lost, with the
knowledge that such losses are but for a season, taking place as they do in
“brawling and changeable” contemporary democracies. (2007, 179). If that’s true,
the only necessary restraints will be to prevent the exclusion of citizens from the
political process, not on reasons or worldviews as such.

§2

It’s possible to put together another interesting defense of (LR)120 from

Gerald Gaus recent efforts in The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom

I’m not sure Gaus himself would endorse what I construct here. His views on restraint are
complicated. Regardless, I think someone who agrees with Gaus would have strong reason to
favor (LR). See Wall (2013).
120
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and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World (hereafter OPR), and perhaps the
most sophisticated to date, ranging as it does beyond the bounds of political
philosophy into broader normative ethical concerns, as well as drawing from
latter-day work in moral and evolutionary psychology. There is no way I can
engage all this work’s complexities, but the central criticisms I will discuss here
don’t require me to.
Gaus begins by reminding us of Rousseau’s “fundamental problem”:
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and
protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each
associate, and in which each, while united himself with all, may
still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. (1988, 92)
Rousseau’s problem is usually regarded as merely political: i.e. it is the problem
of how to reconcile the state’s claim to possess authority in the name of the
common good with the freedom and equality of the state’s supposed subjects.
(This is certainly how I treated it in the introduction.) Gaus agrees that this is a
political problem: “the fundamental problem of a free moral order”, he says, is
“whether free and equal persons can all endorse a common political order even
though their private judgments about the good and justice are so often opposed”
(OPR, 2). But Gaus believes too that the Rousseauvian problem re-occurs at the
level of social morality. Whenever some A calls upon some B to observe one of
“the set of social-moral rules that require or prohibit action”, A’s call is
unacceptably authoritarian unless B has sufficient reason to endorse the rule in
question. In sum, in the realm of interpersonal morality as in politics, we have to
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show that an imperative issued from one agent to another is something other than
mere “bossing around”—a demand from A that B φ just because A says so.
Fortunately, Gaus claims, there is a way of reconciling moral authority
with mutual freedom/equality that’s built right into the practice of social morality
as it has evolved in our species; or, at the very least, built into “the core claims
implicit” in that social morality. These core claims represent a synthesis of
sentimentalist and rationalist ideas about our moral natures. The sentimentalism
Gaus has in mind is of the familiar Strawsonian sort: we have evolved into the
sort of being that attaches “very great importance” to the reactive attitudes; the
“attitudes and reactions of offended parties and beneficiaries; of such things as
gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings”. A social morality for
beings like us must “sustain” these reactive attitudes. In other words, among that
social morality’s core claims must be conditions for the aptness of the reactive
attitudes.
When we examine these core claims, Gaus says, we find a latent
commitment to what he calls the “Principle of Minimal Autonomy”. Our
interaction with each other as moral beings presupposes that the aptness of A’s
reactive attitudes toward some B is a function in part of whether or not B has the
capacity to “[care] about moral requirements and so can put aside the things that
she wants and, instead, conform to the rule’s requirements” (OPR, 203). This
principle is supposed to explain why we don’t blame toddlers for destroying our
personal property—at least in calmer moments upon reflection. A toddler lacks
the capacity to “put aside the things she wants” in order to “[care] about moral
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requirements”. ‘Round about here Gaus sees an aperture for rationalist insights.
Minimal moral autonomy is an essentially affective property of agents insofar as
it’s about what we have the capacity to care about. But B’s possession of minimal
autonomy, so conceived, is not sufficient to sustain reactive attitudes directed at
B. It must be the case as well that B can “evaluate the soundness of the reasons”
on which she acts (OPR, 218). When we blame you for acting in a certain way,
we presuppose that you were either aware of reasons not to act as you did, or you
could have become aware of such reasons after a manageable amount of
reflection.
Consider a typical citizen of Oceania [from Orwell’s 1984], who
has been restricted by Newspeak from grasping some reasons; . . .
suppose her range of concepts has been so restricted that she
cannot have some thoughts. Again, assume I demand that she φs,
and she wants to know why she should (assuming she can still ask
this question). I say that it is the moral thing to do, but she doubts
that it is; why is it the moral thing to do? Must I answer? Suppose I
deny that I must give an answer. It is the moral thing to do, and
that’s that. However, I know that she does not see that it is the
moral thing to do, and suppose I think her lack of appreciation is
quite genuine . . . If I think this, then again I cannot reasonably feel
resentment or indignation that she fails to φ. (OPR, 219)
According to Gaus, the judgment that indignation and resentment are inapt toward
the Oceanian citizen generalizes not just to other cases where an agent’s beliefs
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and values are “systematically perverted” but to a wide range of other cases where
“regarding my demand that she φ, [an agent] cannot grasp any reason that φ-ing is
obligatory for her” (OPR, 220). If A demands that B φ but B herself is unable to
see any reason to φ, even after a reasonable amount of reflection, feelings of
indignation and resentment on A’s part toward B must be inappropriate. How can
it be apt for me to resent your failure to φ when you are persistently nonplussed as
to why you should φ? If you think it can’t be appropriate, you have reason to
agree that Minimal Autonomy should be expanded to include the claim that “a
moral prescription is appropriately addressed” to B only if B has “sufficient
reasons to endorse the relevant rule” (OPR, 222). It is not enough, Gaus claims,
that there are reasons to comply with a directive “φ!” The addressee must have
those reasons if we are to feel apt resentment toward their failure to act on them.
What’s the difference between the reasons there are and the reasons we
have? That there is such a difference, Gaus claims, is easy to see in epistemic
cases. Are there reasons to accept the most recent findings of contemporary
physics? Of course. Did those reasons exist at the time of Aristotle? Sure they did.
Is there any sense in which Aristotle had those reasons? It’s hard to see how.
Given his evidence, there is just no way to tell a story about how Aristotle could
come to believe the most recent findings of contemporary physics without the
interposition of ecstatic visions, vertically lucky brain lesions, or other
epistemically disreputable forces. Furthermore, the existence of reasons to believe
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the most recent findings of contemporary physics doesn’t make Aristotle
blameworthy in the slightest for not having the reasons himself.121
But what about practical cases? Gaus considers whether or not Alaskan
Eskimos in centuries gone by had reason to refrain from genocidal warfare, the
point of which was to “annihilate the members of the enemy group, men, women,
and children” and so prevent unending “inter-regional hostilities since survivors
were always morally obligated to seek revenge” (OPR, 234-235). Of course, the
vast majority of us think that there are reasons to refrain from genocide, but Gaus
concludes that these Eskimos did not possess such reasons. Over against the
moral status of genocide, he thinks, they are in precisely the same position as
Aristotle over against contemporary physics.
To attribute a reason to these people, to say that they possessed a
reason not to eliminate other people groups, while acknowledging
that any justificatory force of this reason is inaccessible to them as
reasoning beings is, I think, not only a misuse of language, but
undermines the point of discourse about reasons and rationality
(OPR, 235).
So why do we have reasons to affirm the impermissibility of genocide when
Eskimo tribes of centuries past did not? According to Gaus, It must be that the
imperative “Don’t commit genocide!” can be addressed to “normal moral agents”

I will assume for the remainder of this chapter and the next that there’s something to this
reasons-you-have/reasons-there-are distinction. I won’t attempt to figure out exactly what this
something is. It seems to me that any theory of epistemic or practical reasons has got to make
some sense of the phenomenon Gaus has in mind here, even if that theory ends up restricting the
term “reason” to one side or the other of the have/are distinction.
121
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nowadays and hereabouts122 with the reasonable expectation that such agents can
cobble together reason to comply from their “basic moral convictions, reasons to
advance their values, their conceptions of the good, and their religion” (OPR,
255), and that the cobbling will take no more than the amount of deliberation we
can expect from even a “below average” agent.
This gives us, Gaus says, two ways we might address moral claims to
other human beings. We can address them from the position of “the imperious
private conscience”. This happens whenever A asserts that B must φ even though
B cannot see any reason why she should after a respectable amount of thinking
about it. In so doing, Gaus says, A claims that her “private judgment is
authoritative over B” (OPR, 11). But addressing other “normal moral agents” in
this way leaves our entrenched practice of assigning blame and responsibility
without foundation. If A’s imperative—“φ!”—is addressed to B with only the
backing of what A sees as reasons, A will be in the odd position of blaming B for
failing to do what B had no reason to do, even if there are reasons for B to
comply. Gaus argues instead that we allow the presuppositions of our ordinary
moral practice to push us toward an anti-authoritarian stance: that we issue moral
imperatives to other agents only when we have reason to believe that we are
calling them to comply with their own reason—or, at least, their own reason
minimally reconstructed to include what conclusive φ-favoring considerations
they would see after a modest amount of reflection. When we address other agents

I.e. agents who have internalized the implicit workings of our moral practice, that “there is an
internal ought, and that morality involves reciprocity and mutual benefit, and the appropriateness
of the moral emotions”.
122
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in this way, we reconcile the authority of social morality with the freedom and
equality of the agents it binds. Each is a “free moral person” because she is
“guided by her own sense of obligation based on her own reasons” and “equal
because her reasons are as definitive about what she can recognize as her
obligations as mine are about what I can see as mine” (OPR, 223). Rousseau’s
“fundamental problem” is resolved in our acquiescence to Gaus’ “Basic Principle
of Public Justification”.
A moral imperative “φ!” in context C, based on rule L, is an
authoritative requirement of social morality only if each normal
moral agent has sufficient reasons to (a) internalize rule L, (b) hold
that L requires Ф–type acts in circumstances C and (c) moral
agents generally conform to L (OPR, 263).
(LR) might seem a straightforward application of Gaus’ conception of
social morality, if that conception is sound. If A tries to get the state to coerce B,
when A has good reason to believe that B will not be able to regard the law as
justified without adopting A’s worldview, it’s hard to see that as anything but the
imperious private conscience at work. For the reactive attitudes to be sustained, it
must be the case that B has a reason, from the perspective of B’s own worldview,
to φ. If B does not share A’s worldview, and would not share it after a decent
amount of reflection, and cannot see any reason to φ after a decent amount of
reflection on the requirements of her own worldview, A will have no reason to
blame B for non-compliance.
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But there is a basic difficulty with the attempt to get (LR) from Guasian
premises. Gaus admits that the question of what reasons people have is “often
vague and always contextual” (OPR, 254). This vagueness plagues attempts to
answer questions about when A can rightly regard B as not “having” the reasons
required to see that B should φ. Obviously, Aristotle is not at fault for his inability
to see the reasons that justify the findings of contemporary physics. Perhaps
Eskimo tribes of centuries past are not at fault for their inability to see reasons
embedded in more universalistic moral ideals. But it is less plausible that
differences in worldview between some A and some B are always non-culpable on
both sides. Suppose A is a devoted utilitarian and B is an egoist. A, qua utilitarian,
supports some law that B, qua egoist, does not. It may be that B cannot see the
reasons A regards as decisive without converting to utilitarianism. But why should
A think that B’s refusal to convert is non-culpable? Is it obviously irrational for A
to think that B would convert if B thought more carefully about the idea that there
are simply no differences between B and the rest of humanity that could justify B
in regarding only B’s best interests as reason-giving? It’s hard to see why. After
all, I’ve seen undergraduates, to all appearances, reject egoism after the very
modest amount of deliberation it’s possible to conduct within a single 50-minute
class period.
The difficulty of figuring out what addressee B of moral claims has
sufficient reason to endorse becomes even more acute when we ask a more
specific question about what reasons particular addressor As have at their disposal
to orient their beliefs about addressee Bs’ reasons. Surely, the measure of whether
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some A has reason to issue an imperative to B has at least as much to do with A’s
reasons as with B’s. What reasons does A have? To the point, can A be brought to
see, through a modest amount of reflection on A’s commitments, that B does not
have reason to φ? For example, many devotees of religious worldviews have
doctrinal commitments that rule out innocent non-belief. From St. Augustine:
If the feeble mind of man did not presume to resist the clear
evidence of truth, but yielded it's infirmity to wholesome doctrines,
as to a health giving medicine, until it obtained from God, by its
faith and piety, the grace needed to heal it, they who have just
ideas, and express them in suitable language, would need to use no
long discourse to refute the errors of empty conjecture (1871, 48).
I think these sentiments are outrageous. But did St. Augustine have reason to
think that addressees of his moral claims rejected those claims non-culpably? Did
he have reason to think that anyone to whom he addressed some imperative—
“φ!”—would lack reason to comply if they would just open their hearts to the
“clear evidence” of gospel truth? It’s not remotely clear to me that he had such
reasons; but then it’s easy to see how he could maintain the reactive attitudes even
when the agent to whom his “φ!” is addressed will never accept the worldview
required to make sense of the imperative. He would maintain that B has reasons to
accept the Christian worldview—however unrecognized given B’s culpably lost
and blind condition. All this would remain true, of course, even if the B in
question actually had no reason to accept the Christian worldview. Plausibly, St.
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Augustine himself would have no reason to think this. I think we tell much the
same story about many of St. Augustine’s modern day ideological descendants.
All told, it seems to me that adherents of secular and religious worldviews
may not always possess reason to think that rejection of their worldview follows
an appropriate level of deliberation about what reasons the rejecter has. Perhaps
they believe there are simple arguments that lead some interlocutors to convert
after relatively little reflection. Especially for the religious, they may have
doctrinal commitments to the claim that those who reject their worldview
culpably fail to deliberate properly. In either case, it’s not hard to see how, from
their perspective, they could discard (LR) without much worry about the
continued aptness of their reactive attitudes toward those who refuse to φ on
command.
The angle of criticism contra Gaus’ just explored assumes that his account
of social morality and its connection to political justification is broadly correct;
but I have a deeper worry. Perhaps Gaus has given us the right answer to
questions about the public justification of social morality. However this may be,
this is clearly nothing like the whole story about the justification of political
power, when the worry about political power is its connection to coercion. Think
again about Gaus’ Eskimo tribes of old. Suppose he is right that the tribes in
question did not possess reasons against their genocidal practice of inter-tribe
warfare. Suppose this entails that indignation and blame are inappropriate toward
them. What all of the above surely does not entail is any kind of duty on the part
of outside parties to refrain from intervention, even by force. This strikes me as
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obvious. Recall once more the meat-axe wielding neighbor of paragraphs long
since passed. I may coerce the neighbor by locking him in a closet until the police
arrive or threatening him with a shotgun or even shooting him. All such looks
entirely permissible, however unfortunate, even if the neighbor’s pathologies may
prevent him from seeing reason to abstain from intra-neighborhood meat-axing.
That I can bring him to see that he has reasons to leave the meat-axe at home and
be reasonable is just a sort of decorative bonus, a bit of additional value I’m
certainly to be congratulated if I can achieve, but nothing remotely like a
condition on the permissibility of coercing him. In such cases, what justifies
coercion seems primarily, if not entirely, to be a matter of what reasons there are,
not what reasons anybody has. There are reasons that justify stopping genocidal
warfare if we can do so without causing something worse; there are reasons that
justify stopping a homicidal neighbor from killing someone. That’s why coercion
is justified in such cases; not what reasons are possessed by the
genocidal/homicidal.123

§3

It’s not like defense of liberal restraint has nothing to do with the

advancement of central political values, with due respect for others, or with
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For a similar line of criticism to the one I advance against Gaus in this paragraph, see Quong
(2014). Gaus ends up saying that when it comes to psychopaths like my imagined neighbor and
even the “significant number . . . within the general [noninstitutionalized] population”, we have a
“blameless liberty to act as we sit fit” (OPR, 463): i.e. to force them to abide by a social morality
they cannot see as justified. Gaus is even willing to extend such talk to those “who, because of
deep cultural differences, do not endorse some of our moral rules” (OPR, 464)—at least
temporarily. (It’s difficult to tell what he would have “us” do with more permanent cultural
minorities.) Of course, the psychopaths and cultural others we may blamelessly coerce have no
moral obligation to comply, given that our blameless coercion is not a function of justified moral
authority. This is just to say that, on Gaus’ reckoning, we fail to treat them as free equals.
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treating others as free co-equals. It’s just that the defense of liberal restraint in
each of these ways needs an assist from republican insights about domination.
Let’s move in the direction of understanding why by visiting an objection
to Gaus’ version of public reason liberalism from David Enoch. Gaus thinks we
need pubic reasons because, according to Enoch, Gaus conflates coercing
someone in the name of what they have reason to do with coercing them in the
name of what I believe they have reason to do. Suppose you could address Gaus’
genocidal band of ancient Eskimos. You say, “Don’t commit genocide!” Suppose
they won’t go along and you manage to keep them from committing genocide by
force. There’s no need, Enoch claims, to say your coercion was justified merely
by your belief that genocide is wrong, by reasons only you have, etc. What
justifies the coercion is that genocide is wrong. What you do or don’t believe,
what reasons you do or don’t possess, just doesn’t need to show up at all in the
coercion’s justification. (2013: 159-160)
Enoch thinks this objection to Gaus generalizes to public reason
liberalism. It’s easy to see why it might cause trouble for those who endorse
liberal restraint. A wants to force B to live in a particular way by passing a law
that will penalize B’s attempts not to. Suppose A came to believe that this
particular way to live is best because A is a Kantian. Suppose further that A has
good reason to believe that B won’t be able to see reason to live in this particular
way unless B becomes a Kantian too. Still, A might claim that the fact that A is a
Kantian and thus sees reason for B to live in this particular way is no part of the
justification for forcing B so to live. The reasons for forcing B so to live are just
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the reasons. They don’t depend on A in any way. If A ceased to be a Kantian she
would still want B to be forced so to live.124 But if A or A’s reasons are not part of
the justificatory picture, how can we say that A, or coercion in A’s name, is
unacceptably authoritarian or illegitimate?
There’s something to Enoch’s line of criticism. Let’s just grant that it’s not
necessarily authoritarian for me to issue moral imperatives to you, even if you
can’t see reason to accept them. Certainly, it’s not necessarily wrong to coerce
you in particular cases even if you can’t see the reasons that coercion is justified.
All well and good as far as I’m concerned. Nevertheless, when the worry isn’t just
about justifying particular imperatives or acts of coercion, but about justifying
power relations, I think Enoch’s counterargument is wrong-footed.
Recall again the tyrant’s goons and the domestic abuser from the previous
chapter. We noted at the time the obvious truth that the domestic abuser has a
duty not to abuse, and just anyone—tyrant’s goons included—has a moral right to
stop the abuse if they can. Furthermore, just anyone—tyrant’s goons included—
says something true when they assert “You should stop this abuse!” The identity
of the asserter need play no role whatsoever in the truth or aptness of this
assertion. Now, we can agree with Enoch that this assertion is not impermissibly
authoritarian just because the abuser it’s addressed to does not, and even cannot
after long deliberation, see that he has any reason to agree or comply. But, as
we’ve noted time and again, there’s something wrong with the power of tyrants
and their goons even when they’re only using that power in permissible ways: i.e.

This is Enoch’s counterfactual test for whether “the reasons” are doing the justificatory work,
or the fact that they’re A’s reasons.
124
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to stop abusers from abusing. It’s fine on occasion to coerce someone in ways
they cannot see as justified from their perspective on the relevant practical
reasons; but tyrant’s goons are up to something more.
What it takes to make it true that “You should φ!”, or what it takes to
make it true that I can rightly force you to φ, and what it takes to justify the kind
of power A has over B is not the same.125 It might be that A can permissibly force
B to φ, or that A says something true or apt when A says “φ!”, but also be true
that A stands in an immoral power relation to B.
Suppose a tyrant’s goon or a slave master or another one of our paradigm
dominators said, “Look, I’m very conscientious. I don’t force anyone to do
anything unless I know that it’s right, or force them to stop doing anything unless
I know they’re doing wrong. The fact that I said ‘Keep your promise!’ or ‘Don’t
steal!’ isn’t the reason I force my subjects not to break their promises or refrain
from stealing. That I think it or I said it just isn’t part of the justification. If I
didn’t exist, or if I suddenly started to approve of promise-breaking or stealing, I
would want someone else to keep my subjects honest.” If I’ve convinced you of
anything about the evils of domination, you’re not going to accept all that as a
justification of the power relation of this goon or master to those subjected to their
power. This imagined discourse from a goon or a master is just an attempt to
change the subject. When we accuse them of domination, we’re not accusing
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After all, I can successfully coerce you without it being generally true that I have more power
than you, much less dominating you. Suppose I manage to trip the meat-axe maniac, whereupon
he smacks his head on the floor and passes out. Suppose I tie him up while he’s unconscious.
Suppose I managed to do this even though he is generally much stronger and wilier than I am—I
just got lucky. It seems to me that I’ve at least played a part in successfully coercing him, but it’s
odd to describe me as standing in a “more powerful” relation to him.
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them of forcing people to do things who didn’t understand why they should;
though, of course, they have a kind of power that enables them to do so.
Now we can return to the question of whether liberal restraint is justified.
When a democratic citizen tries to use the state’s impositional power to force
other citizens to abide by a law they’d have to adopt her worldview to see as
justified, is she just engaged in the permissible kind of “It’s too bad you can’t see
the reasons” coercion Enoch has reminded us we often have to do? Or, is she
acting more like the tyrant’s goons? Well, how closely does this citizen’s attempt
to use the state’s power in this way resemble the structure of dominating social
power? I think there’s good reason to answer this last question: “Too closely.”
Recall (D5)—and I think (D5) is the appropriate metric insofar as the
citizen in this case obviously must act in concert with other citizens:
Suppose A1, A2 . . . An make up the members of set SA. When SA
and B (i) are all social actors, the members of SA dominate B to the
extent that (ii) the members of SA are engaged either individually
or collectively in a social relationship with B, (iii) SA individually
or collectively have impositional power over B, and (iv) SA may
wield this power from a position of deliberative isolation.
Citizens in a democracy are engaged in a social relationship with each other at
least to this extent: when we vote or pressure our representatives, or engage in
other forms of political action in pursuit of particular political outcomes, what we
do affects the practical context of other citizens. In this way, what it makes sense
for citizen B to do is in part a function of what SA (populated here by B’s fellow
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citizens, both actual agents of the state and of the ordinary variety) do or have
done. Of course, the impositional power at work here is the state’s, exercised
through its agents.
And what about condition (iv)? This, again, is the famed arbitrariness
condition for domination—most of the story about what makes the power of
tyrant’s goons, even when used to stop abusers from abusing, dominating. On the
conception unpacked in chapter 2, impositional power is dominating to the extent
that it’s exercised in deliberative isolation. At an extreme, such power is exercised
with absolute insensitivity to the deliberative capacities of those subjected to it.126
Is there any reason to think that power guided by democratic citizens
couldn’t instantiate (D5)? I see no reason to think so. Of course, we’re imagining
a scenario where there’s a division of labor in SA between those whose sense of
applicable practical reason are enforced and those who actually do the enforcing;
but that the guiders and wielders of power in this case are members of a
democratic citizenry and not more traditional dominators is no obstacle, as far as I
can tell, to a structural identity of power between the former and the latter.
Here’s the argument, in summary. To dominate someone is to exercise
social power sufficient for imposition over them, constrained only by what the
power-wielder regards as sound practical reasons. Power wielded in this way is
structurally identical to the exercise of social power in paradigmatically unjust
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The dream of complete domination is to substitute the deliberative capacity of another human
entirely by our own. See Aristotle’s discussion of “natural” slaves in the Politics (1984: 36-41).
Aristotle apparently agrees with me about mastery as involving “deliberative capacity
substitution”, he just thinks that some biological humans lack altogether or possess a defective
deliberative capacity, and so are justly dominated.
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ways (i.e., the power of masters, despots, et al.) That looks to me like excellent
reason to avoid the exercise of “power wielded in this way”. Now, citizens have a
joint responsibility to hold the power of the state to account so that it does not
become dominating. If that’s true, then individual citizens should not seek to
shape this power so that it reflects only what they regard as sound practical
reasons, because so to do is simply to use the state’s impositional power to
impose deliberatively isolated notions of how other citizens should live. All told,
in a society where no single worldview holds sway, the justification of political
power by reasons that have force only if my worldview is true amounts to
deliberatively isolated impositional power, and so domination.127
It follows that liberal restraint is necessary not just to achieve some golden
liberal vision of a well-ordered society where free equals cooperate in civic
friendship, although (fingers crossed) it may very well have this effect. Restraint
is necessary because otherwise we do what we can to place other citizens under
essentially master-like power. The justificatory basis for restraint is not simply the
promotion of liberal values among other values; restraint is necessary to prevent
an injustice—at bottom, the very same injustice we reject in the paradigm case of
the master/slave relation. The conscientious citizen who abandons restraint must
recognize that they are (at best) in the unenviable position of opposing one
injustice by promoting another, not just of maximizing one value at the expense of
another, or turning with regret from valuable activities and outcomes that the

It’s worth pointing out that no part of my argument depends on why no single worldview holds
sway. In particular, it’s no part of my argument that this is true because pluralism is reasonable, or
because of the burdens of judgment. The explanation for why you disagree with me is, I think,
independent of anti-domination reasons not to impose my will on you. So
127
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requirements of justice will not allow us to pursue. Perhaps Ebels-Duggan is right
that some citizens will be unable to abide by (LR) in good conscience and “should
admit (her) failure to realize an important value”. But, contra Ebels-Duggan, this
citizen will also have “violated an obligation to (her) fellow citizens” (2010: 22).
If I have any obligations to my fellow citizens, refraining from acting as their
master as far as I can looks like a very promising candidate.
And the connection between respect and restraint? The essential
contribution of theorizing domination is the idea that respect for persons as free
and equal requires us to refrain from attempts to dominate them. If mastery is
itself an injustice, it’s clear why respect requires more than that I merely articulate
the best arguments I know of for the coercive policies I favor. A master who
interfered with the choices of his subjects only after making sure they understood
the best arguments for his interference is only more conscientious than the typical
master: he is a master no less. Suppose, as Eberle recommends, I attempt to
coerce other citizens based on reasons that have force only if my worldview is
true, but only after I have tried and failed to find reasons within their own
worldview that favor my way of thinking. In so doing I demonstrate more respect
for my fellow citizens than if had I made no attempt to canvass their worldviews
for points of agreement; but insofar as I have attempted at the end of the day to
wield power over them based only on what I think are sound practical reasons
(after all, my canvassing failed), I have contributed to the absolute deliberative
insensitivity of impositional power, and so to domination. Remember the “very
strange master” of Chapter 2. He co-deliberates; he tenderly solicits counsel; but,
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qua master, he forgets all of the above to interfere based only on what he thinks is
best.
And why think that respect requires more than our best effort to secure for
all citizens free and equal participation in the political process, as per Hampton?
There is no reason to deny that a constitutional framework for maximally
inclusive democratic decision-making is required by respect for fellow citizens.
But eschewing domination requires something more. It may be that the most
effective means of minimizing any citizen’s capacity to wield the state’s
impositional power arbitrarily over other citizens is just to create and/or sustain a
maximally inclusive framework for collective, democratic decision-making, as
Hampton recommends. It may be that such a framework should not itself limit the
extent to which an individual citizen seeks to express their worldview through
politics. I do not necessarily grant this much, but it may be. But even if this is the
best we can do for legal protections against deliberative insensitivity, we should
acknowledge that the set of our moral obligations effectively/prudently enshrined
in law is but a subset of our total moral obligations. Just like I am under an
obligation to refrain from stealing even though it may be possible for me to do so
even under an ideal legal system, I may be under an obligation of justice not to
exercise impositional power over fellow citizens from a deliberative stance of
absolute insensitivity even if the only way this obligation can judiciously be
enforced is through constitutional safeguards ensuring fair, inclusive, democratic
procedures. If my arguments above are sound, and such absolute deliberative
insensitivity characterizes the paradigms of mastery, it is very plausible to think I

145
should abstain from such interference simpliciter, not just from those forms of
mastery and domination that democratic institutions can effectively minimize. 128

§5

Until now, I’ve tried to show that when A votes or advocates for laws, or

else votes against or opposes them, based on considerations that don’t have
justificatory traction unless A’s worldview is true, that’s at least attempted
domination. As a consequence, we shouldn’t do that. But what should we do
instead? Here’s another way of putting the question—At last, what does it take to
show that the state’s impositional power is exercised with due deliberative
sensitivity? If the role of the demos is to hold the power of the state to account, so
that the state’s power isn’t exercised in deliberative isolation, what standard do
we hold it to? The remainder of this chapter answers such questions by working
out the following claims. First, if the deliberative isolation and insensitivity of
power is measured by the degree that power can be wielded only according to the
wielder’s sense of relevant practical reasons, deliberative sensitivity must be
measured by the degree to which power cannot be wielded without due
consideration for what those subject to it regard as relevant practical reasons.
Second, it follows from a commitment to our mutual equality that each person has
the same initial claim on deliberative sensitivity as anyone else subject to the
same imposition-suited power. Third, not only do each of us have an equal claim
on deliberative sensitivity insofar as we are equally subject to impositional power,
we have a claim on maximal deliberative sensitivity consistent with the like claim
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After all, the standard claim among devotees of liberal restraint has always been that the
obligation in question is moral rather than legal. See Rawls (1996: 217).
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of others. The answer to how much deliberative sensitivity is always “As much as
possible”, where the measure of what is possible is the other features of due
sensitivity. Finally, because our claim to maximal deliberative sensitivity must be
consistent with the like claim of others, what counts as due deliberative sensitivity
to me is a function not just of my own sense of relevant practical reasons, but also
of the claims of others to due deliberative sensitivity. In other words, deliberative
sensitivity is reciprocal. All told, if we want to ensure that the state’s impositional
power is not domination, we must ensure that all those subject to it can effectively
contest that power when it’s exercised without respect for their status as equal
claimants to maximal deliberative sensitivity, where sensitivity is reciprocal in the
sense that proper sensitivity to each is a function of proper sensitivity to all.
I think we can at least begin to assemble an attractive conception of public
reason from these claims about deliberative sensitivity. In fact, for my purposes,
public reasons just are the reasons we use to show each other that the state’s
impositional power is exercised with due deliberative sensitivity. I’ll do what I
can to advance this conception in this chapter. In sum, I suggest a change of
aspect: the publicity of public reasons isn’t their acceptability to all; the publicity
of public reasons is their capacity to show that justice has been done to the
multiplicity of perspectives on how the state’s power should be held to account.
Given that liberal visions and revisions of public reasons have generated an
enormous literature, my republican engagement with the tradition is necessarily
partial. I will have to be more suggestive than analytically precise.
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The most challenging task for constructing a positive account of public
reason is to reconcile Rawls’ “fact of reasonable pluralism” (Gaus’ “evaluative
pluralism”) with the “publicity” of public reasons. The difference between public
and non-public reasons, for the public reason liberal, is that the former are
“accessible” in a way that the latter are not. Gaus’ account of “the reasons you
have” we encountered above is just an account of what reasons are accessible to
you. This insistence on accessibility is typical. Vallier, for example, says that “A
coercive action C is justified if and only if each and every member of the public P
has (a) conclusive reason(s) R to endorse C” (2011, 262. Italics mine). Enoch
thinks endorsing accessibility is a necessary condition on counting as a public
reason liberal at all: “They are all committed to some kind of accessibility
requirement . . . The thought that for a state (for instance) to be legitimate, its
authority must be justifiable to each of those subject to it” (forthcoming). The
state of play seems to be that public reasons just are “accessible reasons” which
are “reasons we all have” which exclusively figure in “justification-to” each of us.
I think we should abandon this picture, and that thinking of public
justification as a case of due deliberative sensitivity shows us how. It’s of course
true that public reasons figure in justifications-to: you can’t show that power is
exercised with due deliberative sensitivity to B without justifying that power, in
some sense, to B. But I think an account of public reasons is best conceived as an
account of what it takes to show that B’s conception of practical reasons has been
given suitable weight, consistent with the like claim of all others subject to the
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same impositional power, not an account of reasons are accessible to B in the
Gausian sense of being had by B.
Of course, there is another way of thinking about justification where we
just drop the “to” in “justification-to” altogether. That, I take it, is the sense a
liberal perfectionist (or someone considerably more unsavory) 129 would
recommend that we think about justification in political contexts: i.e. “Look this
law or policy is justified because it maximizes our citizens’ chances of realizing
their true nature as autonomous agents” or something along those lines.130
I hope it’s screamingly obvious by now why I don’t think this is an option
we can take while maintaining our anti-domination bona fides. But I think there is
another, perfectly sensible, way of thinking about “justification-to” that keeps the
“to” without requiring accessibility; a way of thinking about justification that
requires “some kind of engagement of the subjects as they actually are” (Enoch,
forthcoming) without requiring that this engagement include reasons the subject
“has” or recognizes. This way is open here in part because the normative force of
public reasons, on my account, isn’t a function of their surrogacy for consent. I’m
simply not trying to “realise some of the values of voluntary participation in a
system of institutions that is unavoidably compulsory”. If the gold standard for
permissible compulsion is what you permit via your consent, then it makes sense
to think that pubic reasons, qua public, have normative force just because of their
accessibility: i.e. they’re as close as we can get—or dare to get—to consent. But
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Grand Inquisitors and the like.
For this idea of justification marshalled into a critique of Rawls/Nagel varieties of political
liberalism see Raz (1998).
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consent is not the gold standard—or, at least, it’s not the standard at work here.
The standard for permissible compulsion is that the compulsion issue from a
power instrumentally necessary to the discharge of your duties that yet remains
accountable to you so that it does not turn that power to whatever use it pleases.
Instead of surrogating for consent in a broadly voluntarist story about legitimacy,
I’m trying to find out how we, the demos, can show each other that our attempts
to shape the institutions/exercise of state power is duly sensitive to each member
of the demos. “By appealing to public reasons” is an answer to that question. In
sum, the function of public reasons in my account allows me to say things about
them I doubt the standard public reason liberal can say.
To see how reasons can be offered to you, and thus become part of due
justification-to you, without necessarily being accessible to you, let’s revisit an
old story from Robert Nozick. I think it shows how thinking of public reason in
the way I want to has some workaday analogs, and also illumines what equal,
maximal, reciprocal justification looks like in practice.
Suppose some of the people in your neighborhood (there are 365 other
adults) have found a public address system and decide to institute a system
of public entertainment. They post a list of names, one for each day, yours
among them. On his assigned day (one can easily switch days) a person is
to run the public address system, play records, give news bulletins, tell
amusing stories he has heard, and so on. (1974, 93)131

Nozick gins up a counterexample to “fair play” conceptions of political obligation from this
case. Nothing I’m concerned about turns on whether he’s right about this.
131
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To begin, notice that this cooperative scheme obviously has terms: (1)
“Each of the 365 adults in the neighborhood has one day assigned out of the year
to run the PA system”; (2) “Your assignment on the assigned day is to contribute
to public entertainment”. Perhaps other terms would be implicit but common
knowledge: (3) Given the purpose of the PA system, don’t use your assigned day
to broadcast something patently un-entertaining: e.g. maybe a sermon or a reading
from a textbook on tax law; (4) Don’t interfere with someone else as they go
about their duties on the assigned day”. Perhaps there would be others.
Now suppose that you reject the terms of this scheme. Imagine that you
reject these terms because you have made a life-long study of entertainment. You
have traveled the globe and held multitudes in thrall. Furthermore, you’ve made a
thoroughgoing analysis of your neighbors’ tastes and preferences in
entertainment. So, you suggest alternate terms: you suggest that you be allowed to
run the PA system every weekend, all weekend long. But your neighbors don’t
accept your alternate terms. Everybody values a whole day at the mic more than
increased quality of content. Instead, they offer you a primetime slot, 8-9pm every
evening to display your gifts. You find this insulting. In the end, you drop out of
the scheme altogether. “Oh well,” say all your neighbors, and decide to offer the
vacant day to the highest bidder.
What lessons can we extract? First, there’s a sense in which your rejection
of the proposed terms for the cooperative scheme indicates that the terms are not
“justified-to” you. After all, you don’t believe they’re justified. But it seems to me
there’s a sense in which the terms—both in their original form and, a fortiori,
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your neighbors’ counteroffer—are justified-to you, and so a sense in which your
rejection of those terms doesn’t show that they aren’t. Here’s the question that
matters: Is there any reason to think your perspective on who should get to run the
PA system hasn’t made the right difference to the original/counteroffered terms? I
don’t think so. In other words, do either or both sets of terms do justice to you as a
fellow participant in the scheme? Why not? After all, given that you have no
special claim on the PA system—you didn’t donate it, you don’t own the land
where it’s situated, etc.—it’s plausible to think that you aren’t owed anything
more than the other 364 participants in the scheme. That you won’t be satisfied
with any terms other than your own is not necessarily evidence that the terms
offered and counter-offered by your neighbors fail to be as justified-to you as they
can be given the requirement that they be justified to all. Of course, you might
not think that your presence in the cooperative scheme has been duly reflected in
its terms. That’s unfortunate. [Not] thinking doesn’t make it so.
Here’s something else to notice. It might very well be that you would
accept the terms if you were different somehow—if you were less of a jerk,
perhaps. It might very well be that a suitably idealized version of you would
accept the terms. Fine. All well and good; but epiphenomenal from the
perspective of what’s justified-to all in this case and even from the perspective of
what’s justified-to you. That the terms are justified is a function of the fact that
your perspective has been taken seriously enough (if it has). What’s true in near
or far possible worlds populated by idealized agents doesn’t seem to play any
kind of constitutive, good-making role here. What reasons are had by such agents
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might play an illuminating role in helping us discover what’s justified in such
contexts—they might be, as Rawls eventually said about his veil of ignorance, “an
expository device” (1999, 19)—in fact, I think we should make a move like this.
Even so how we discover what’s justified and what’s justified shouldn’t be
crossed up.
And notice: that there’s an important sense in which the terms are justified
to you even though you reject them doesn’t show anything, really, about whether
or not you may be justifiably forced to abide by the terms. Whatever kind of
argument would show that force is appropriate, this isn’t it. Is this a problem? I
don’t think so, for at least two reasons. First, I don’t see why the question of
whether mutually-binding terms are suitably justified to all participants cannot be
interesting unless we answer it in a way that also legitimizes coercive action to
enforce those terms. Thinking our account of justification must do such doublework might be tempting if we had no other way to legitimize force in such
contexts, but that’s as may be.132 Second, as we’ve had cause to note before
primarily via engagement with Gaus, that coercion can be justified to you does
not always legitimize coercion, and that coercion can’t be justified to you doesn’t
always show that coercion isn’t legitimate. Suppose your fellow residents are
completely irrational for refusing to let you run the PA system every weekend:
that shows precisely nothing about whether or not you can legitimately force them
to.

132

Of course, I think there is another way, as I tried to show in Chapter 3. I would say that force is
inappropriate in the PA system case because you have no duty to cooperate in such a scheme that
could generate duties to submit to coercive institutions.
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I hope this revisiting of Nozick’s old case shows us at least this: when
we’re trying to justify mutually-binding terms of cooperation with other members
of a social group, it’s not clear why we should think the terms in question are
justified-to each member only if they’re justified exclusively in terms of
accessible reasons or reasons had by each agent. In this context, other norms
embody the necessary (and I suspect jointly sufficient) conditions for justification:
specifically, the norms bound up with the equality, maximality, and reciprocity
conditions of due deliberative sensitivity I canvassed above. Demonstrating that a
particular member’s perspective has adequately been taken into account doesn’t
require that the member in question be in a position to see that it has;
demonstrating that a particular agent’s perspective has adequately been taken into
account requires that we show how their perspective has made as much difference
to mutually binding terms as it can (the maximality condition), where “as much as
it can” is defined by the equal, reciprocal claim of all those bound by the same
terms. If this is what justification requires, the reasons that figure in such
justifications are reasons that there are as opposed to reasons everyone in the
relevant group has. They are reasons that show that mutually binding terms do
justice to the perspective of each member of a social group.133 This functional
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Now, doing justice to the perspective of each, and thus identifying what reasons there are to
think justice has been done, requires careful attention to the perspective of each, and thus to the
reasons had by each. Remember the counter-offer in the PA system example above. Obviously,
it’s suitability as a counter-offer is in part a function of its appeal to reasons the recipient possesses
in the sense that matters to Gaus: the recipient thinks his DJ expertise is reason to give more time
running the PA system, and the counter-offer reflects this. But it does not follow, again, that the
counter-offer is justified-to the addressee only if he recognizes it as such because of reasons he
has, or even would have after diligent reflection. It is justified-to him because of how it takes the
reasons he possesses seriously against the background of reasons possessed by others. Aiming to
offer accessible reasons—reasons the addressee will recognize as such—is instrumental to the task
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role—their capacity to show that mutually binding terms are equally, maximally,
and reciprocally justified to each member of a social group—is what makes them
public.134

§5

So far I’ve only considered the metaphysics of public reason: i.e. what

public reasons are and what they can do. But how do we know when we’re
dealing in public reasons? When do we “reasonably think”135 that we offer only
public reasons? What evidence can we produce that we’re promoting/opposing
the state’s power only in ways that do justice to the perspective of all those
likewise subject to that power?
Here, I think, the idealization/hypotheticalization maneuvers common
among public reason theorists can play a useful epistemic role. As I indicated
above, thinking about what mutually-binding terms of cooperation you would
accept in the nearest possible world where you aren’t a jerk, or what you would
accept if you weren’t steadfastly committed to getting exactly what you want,
may be a productive way to think about what mutually-binding terms of
cooperation are justified-to you. But obviously we have to tread carefully—and
far more carefully than some public reason theorists have tended to tread.

of forging equal, maximal, reciprocal justifications; but what we forge thereby need not be
justifiable in terms of what each member of the relevant group sees as reasons.
134
I think it’s clear that for me, public reasons—qua reasons that can figure in public
justification—work via convergence rather than consensus. That’s to say that a reason offered to
one citizen to show that the state is being held accountable only in ways suitably justified to her
might not be suited to showing the same thing to another citizen. We needn’t expect the same
reasons to be suited to showing every citizen that justice has been done to their perspective. This is
natural, given the diversity of perspectives. For arguments against consensus views, see Vallier
(2011); for arguments against convergence views, see Boettcher (2015).
135
Language from Rawls’ reciprocity criterion (1996, xlvii-xlix, 226-227, 381).
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Of course, the most common way public reason theorists talk about you
idealized, or hypothetical you, is to talk about you if you were reasonable. Now, if
the unreasonable are just the obviously unreasonable—Nazis and Klansmen et
al.—maybe that would be fine. But the tradition displays an alarming willingness
both to define reasonableness narrowly (or to define unreasonableness broadly)
and to use such narrow definitions to exclude people utterly from what Marilyn
Friedman calls “the legitimation pool”—the set of those “whose consent would
confirm the legitimacy” of liberal political arrangements and “whose rejection
would confirm its illegitimacy” (2000, 16). For example, it’s not uncommon for
public reason liberals to include the acceptance of liberal restraint as a necessary
condition on reasonableness.136 If that’s true, and the legitimation pool contains
only the reasonable, then it’s easy to see why the legitimation pool might turn out
to be a very sparsely populated place indeed.137
To see how to tread more carefully, let’s start with the most difficult case.
What, on my account, does justification-to look like when the target is the
flamingly awful: the Nazi, the Klansman, et al.? Is the whole idea of aiming
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Enoch (forthcoming) really goes into full cry about this. For the primary targets of his wrath,
see Dreben (2003, 326), Estlund (2008, 61), and Quong (2011, 235, fn 34; 240). As far as I can
tell, all three are concerned only to exclude the politically unreasonable—i.e. those whose
unreasonableness is a moral, rather than a primarily epistemic flaw. Others are happier to exclude
the philosophically [or epistemically] unreasonable. See Herman (1996) and Larmore (1996). For
discussion of this political/philosophical distinction, see Kelly & McPherson (2001).
137
Quong’s (2011) “internal” conception of political justification is, I believe, similar in upshot.
Money quote from Enoch: “Consider, for instance, Quong’s (2011, Chapter 10) discussion of the
question whether the unreasonable should get the same citizen rights as the reasonable. I am happy
to report that he answers in the positive (he thinks that the legitimacy of political arrangements
doesn’t depend on justifiability to the unreasonable, but that the arrangements themselves have to
accord to them equal rights, for the most part. But the mere fact that he conducts this discussion
with a straight face (and that he apparently has some interlocutors on the other side of this debate)
becomes unbelievable when we remember that he’s not just asking about the political rights of the
Nazis and the murderous psychopaths, but also about those of Richard Arneson and Bruce
Brower”.
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justification in their general direction a mistake? Will it inevitably corrupt the
terms of our social cooperation?
What do we owe the Klansman? The same, I think, as what we owe
everybody else: a good-faith effort to show that the mutually-binding terms of
cooperation are as justified as they can be to him138 in the presence of all other
claimants to equal, maximal, reciprocal deliberative sensitivity. Now, as I
understand Klan ideology, what makes you a Klansman, among other things, is
your commitment to claims like the following: Persons of color should not have
any say in the terms of white “cooperation” with them—much less an equal,
maximal say consistent with the like claim of others. As a consequence, when
we’re trying to figure out how to do justice to the Klansman’s perspective, we
might try to imagine the shape of his evaluative commitments in the nearest
possible world where he accepts that all others subject to the state’s impositional
power have the same status as claimants to justification. Given that he’s a
Klansman, the person in this nearest possible world will not resemble his actual
self very much. Not much of his theoretical and practical perspective on the world
will remain. It’s possible, I suppose, that he will remain some kind of racist in this
possible world; but an odd sort of racist who is committed to the status of all
fellow citizens (including religious, racial, and ethnic minorities) as equal
claimants to maximal, reciprocal deliberative sensitivity. Obviously, in this
possible world, he’s no longer going to be agitating against the protection of
voting rights for black Americans. How could he, given that the franchise is

Surely this is a case where we should male pronouns. Are there Klanswomen? I don’t want to
know the answer to that question.
138
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perhaps the most basic and elemental precondition of ensuring each citizen a say
in how power is wielded against them? This is not the place to make many claims
about what difference this odd sort of racist should make to the mutually-binding
terms of cooperation with him; probably basic protection of peaceful
demonstration and free expression even for his ilk.
But even for Klansmen, this is the limit of idealization/hypotheticalization:
If there is good reason to think an ideal/hypothetical version of you committed to
the status of all your fellow citizens as equal claimants to maximal, reciprocal
justification, and purged of just those epistemic and/or moral flaws inconsistent
with this commitment, would still reject proffered mutually-binding terms of
social cooperation, we have good reason to think those terms aren’t justified-to
you; that your perspective hasn’t made enough difference to the shape of those
terms; that we can do better by you. Again, the terms don’t count as justified
because ideal/hypothetical you accepts them; they count as justified because they
do justice to your equal, maximal, reciprocal claim to make a difference in those
terms.139

Enoch (forthcoming) has a test for the theoretical fitness of idealizations: they’re fit when
“motivated, and furthermore, when the offered motivation is consistent with the motivations for
going for the initial, non-idealized view”. He thinks that the standard roles idealizations play in
public reason accounts fail this test. If the initial view motivating public reason theories is just the
need to reconcile our liberty and equality with the legitimacy of the state in the absence of actual
consent, and idealization just shows that I would accept the state in a near possible world where
I’m reasonable, there I still am, in the actual world, with my liberty and equality unreconciled with
the claims of the state. Supposing without further argument the soundness of Enoch’s test, and that
public reason liberals tend to fail it, I think my account would pass. Idealization is motivated, on
my account, by the need to figure out what remains of your perspective on how the state should
wield its power once we’ve scrubbed away the moral and epistemic features of that perspective
inconsistent with the status of others as equal claimants to deliberative sensitivity. We want to
figure this out, not because power over you is legitimately exercised just when idealized you
would accept it, but because we want to know how much difference your perspective should make
to mutually-binding terms of cooperation. That looks to me like an idealization consistent with and
motivated by the original view.
139
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To the extent that you have certain beliefs, certain evaluative standards, all
of which inform your understanding of how our social cooperation should be
structured, there are at least two questions we must ask: first, are there among
these beliefs and evaluative standards any that are simply incompatible with the
status of others subject to the same power as equal claimants to justification?
(This is what will render inert for justificatory purposes so much of what the
Klansman would say for himself.) Second, of those beliefs and standards that
remain, we can ask to what extent they can be accommodated, or to what extent
they might function as a kind of lodestar toward a compromise.140
It bears emphasis that public reasons cannot justify not only (e.g.) outright
denials of status like the Klansman’s refusal to recognize the claims of nonwhites, but also any insistence on undercutting the ability of other citizens to
function as equal claimants to maximal, reciprocal justification. Enoch offers the
example of a fundamentalist father who cannot see the point of teaching his
daughters to read. That this father cannot see the point—and would not see the
point after sufficient reflection—does not mean he has a veto against being forced
to ensure his daughters’ adequate education. I agree, of course. Someone who
cannot read will have a terribly difficult time insisting on their status as an equal
claimant on maximal, reciprocal deliberative sensitivity. Idealization efforts to
discover what the fundamentalist father would look like in the nearest possible
I’m going to run with the astronomic metaphor here. Imagine that claimants to political
justification are like heavenly bodies, each of which has a certain amount of gravitational pull. The
force of their gravitational pull, for purposes of public justification, is just those elements of their
worldview which are compatible with justification to others. Terms of social cooperation are
justified to you when your worldview pulls or shapes the substance of the terms of our social
cooperation as much as it can, given its compatibility with like justification to all.
140
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world where he’s committed to doing justice to the status of others as claimants to
deliberative sensitivity will have to imagine that he can see the point of educating
his daughters.
It’s very important not to lose track of what’s being justified at this stage
of the theory. The point of justification isn’t to show why coercion is permissible
when instrumentally necessary to prevent domination and when properly
accountable. We legitimize such coercion by direct appeal to the injustice of
domination, with its connection to deficits in freedom and equality. As a
consequence, some citizen’s belief that they have no duties against domination
will not show up on a scan of what deliberative sensitivity to that citizen requires.
For this reason, I allow that idealizing the targets of public justification permits us
to ask what someone would see as a reason in the nearest possible world where
they accept duties against domination; but we shouldn’t go too far. Citizens who
believe they have duties against domination may disagree, consistent with their
anti-domination commitments, about how the state best acts to check domination,
and about when checks against domination are best left to non-state forces. Trying
to idealize away disagreements like is likely to beg important questions. 141
I hope it’s clear by now why having an equal claim on maximal
justification within the limits of reciprocity means that not all of us will make the

My answer to the question, “What are public reasons for?” is thus importantly different from
the way this question is answered by public reason liberals like Gaus and Vallier. For both, the
need for public justification is born of the need to legitimize coercion, rather than to minimize
domination. As a consequence, coercion necessary to minimize domination appears, from their
perspective, only as coercion, and coercion that can be legitimized only by public justification,
rather than by the instrumental role I’ve allowed here [chapter 3]. This tends to prejudice their
theories, I believe, in favor of elements of the status quo that instantiate domination, and prevents
their theories from being really emancipatory. I will only register this objection here;
substantiating it is something I intend to write more about elsewhere.
141
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same amount of difference to the shape of justified terms of social cooperation. If
it’s not clear by now, here’s why it means that: because larger and smaller swaths
of our worldviews are compatible with the status of others as claimants to
deliberative sensitivity. This is unavoidable given the justificatory project we’re
up to here. Even prima facie, an attempt to show how political power isn’t
exercised arbitrarily, and thus in deliberative isolation, can hardly take as
justificatory input just what some particular citizen would accept as terms of
cooperation in deliberative isolation from others—that’s exactly the paradigm of
dominating social power that’s our summum malum.
I hope it’s clear too why Friedman’s legitimation pool will be much more
populous on my account—where membership is measured by making a difference
to what counts as justified. Certainly, however reasonable or unreasonable it may
be to reject liberal restraint requirements, that’s hardly enough to justify the kind
of deliberative insensitivity implied by Quong when he says that what the
unreasonable think is of “no normative interest” (2004, 315). Even if (e.g.) the
liberal perfectionist will not or cannot (even after a respectable amount of trying)
understand that they should not use the state’s impositional power to force others
to live by terms of social cooperation insufficiently deliberatively sensitive to
them, nothing follows from this about the place of liberal perfectionists in the
legitimation pool except that this particular claim of theirs cannot figure in our
attempts to do justice to their perspective.
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What terms of social cooperation actually turn out to be justified on my
account? I think it’s clear enough that my criteria for public justification, like
Rawls’ own “criterion of reciprocity” will be violated . . .
. . . whenever basic liberties are denied. For what reasons can both
satisfy [the demand for equal, maximal, reciprocal justification]
and justify denying to some persons religious liberty, holding
others as slaves, imposing a property qualification on the right to
vote, or denying the right of suffrage to women? [1997, 579].
And my criteria won’t be violated when? I don’t know. In fact, I think that it
counts in favor of an account of public reasoning and public justification that we
can’t identify very much of what’s publically justified just by specifying the rules
of public reasoning. The more you know about how the game ends just by
specifying the rules, the more reason we have to suspect that the game is rigged.
It’s a mistake to think that public reasons should eliminate disagreement or
controversy in politics: the final form of justified terms of social cooperation,
given the enormous diversity of the public to whom public reasons are addressed,
is bound to generate enormous disagreement. It’s as subject to Rawlsian burdens
of judgment as anything ever is. I don’t think this is a problem. Perhaps
surprisingly, there’s at least some reason to think Rawls didn’t think this a
problem. Here’s a not-so-often quoted extract from the second introduction Rawls
produced for Political Liberalism:
[My] aim is to stress that the ideal of public reason does not often
lead to general agreement of views, nor should it. Citizens learn
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and profit from conflict and argument, and when their arguments
follow public reason, they instruct and deepen society’s public
culture (1996, lvii).
We should expect and welcome disagreement, as long as we’re disagreeing about
the right things. Disagreement about how to hold the state’s power to account so
that it’s deliberatively sensitive to all will almost certainly continue under the best
imaginable, domination-minimizing, political arrangements. That’s okay.
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